

LUDOVIKA UNIVERSITY OF PUBLIC SERVICE

The Doctoral School of Military Science

Madina Igibayeva

**Security Cooperation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
with special focus on Kazakhstan**

Doctoral (PhD) thesis

Supervisor

Professor ZOLTÁN SZENES, CSc

.....

Budapest, 2024

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First, I begin with words of gratitude to my Supervisor Professor Zoltán Szenes for kindness, support, and patience during my Ph.D. study. Thank you for your life advice and for caring.

I would like to thank the Director of the Doctoral School of Military Engineering, Professor József Padányi and the Professor of the Department of Operations and Support, Sposné Prof. Dr. Klára Kecskeméthy for believing in me and giving me this opportunity. I also grateful for late Ambassador and Professor János Hóvári, for the internship in the Representation Office for the Organization of Turkic States in Budapest in 2022-2023.

I would like to thank all staff of the Doctoral School of Military Science for their help and support throughout these amazing years of my study.

My gratitude extends to my friends for their encouragement and support all through my studies.

This work is dedicated to my family, especially to my mother, who is an inexhaustible source of inspiration and faith in me.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION

- 1.1. ACADEMIC PROBLEM
- 1.2. RESEARCH GOALS
- 1.3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
- 1.4. HYPOTHESIS
- 1.5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
- 1.6. RESEARCH LITERATURE REVIEW

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

- 2.1. INTRODUCTION
- 2.2. COOPERATIVE SECURITY
- 2.3. SECURITY COMMUNITIES
- 2.4. CRITICAL THEORIES
- 2.5. REGIONAL SECURITY
- 2.6. CULTURAL – HUMANITARIAN COOPERATION
- 2.7. CONCLUSION

3. HISTORY OF THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION

- 3.1. INTRODUCTION
- 3.2. ESTABLISHING THE SCO
- 3.3. DEVELOPMENT OF MEMBERSHIP AND PARTNERSHIP RELATIONS
- 3.4. THE NEW MEMBERS OF THE SCO
- 3.5. CONCLUSION

4. ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SCO

- 4.1. INTRODUCTION
- 4.2. THE STRUCTURE AND THE DECISION-MAKING BODIES
- 4.3. THE SUMMIT METINGS
- 4.4. RESULTS OF 20 YEARS COOPERATION
- 4.5. COOPERATION WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
 - 4.1.1. SCO AND BRICS
 - 4.1.2. SCO AND EAEU
 - 4.1.3. SCO AND CSTO

4.6. CONCLUSION

5. SECURITY POLICY OF THE SCO: FIGHT AGAINST “THE THREE EVILS”

5.1. INTRODUCTION

5.2. THE SCO POLICY ON COUNTERING TERRORISM

5.3. THE SCO POLICY ON COUNTERING EXTREMISM

5.4. THE SCO POLICY ON COUNTERING SEPARATISM THROUGH UYGHUR ISSUE

5.5. GEOSTRATEGIC RELATIONS OF CHINA AND CENTRAL ASIAN COUNTRIES

5.6. THE SCO PEACE MISSION

6. ECONOMIC SECURITY COOPERATION

6.1. INTRODUCTION

6.2. THE ECONOMIC WEIGHT OF THE SCO

6.3. THE SCO ECONOMIC POLICY

6.4. THE SCO AND THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE

6.5. THE SCO AND COVID-19

6.6. CONCLUSION

7. ROLE OF KAZAKHSTAN IN THE SCO

7.1. INTRODUCTION

7.2. EURASIAN SECURITY: THE SCO AND KAZAKHSTAN

7.3. KAZAKHSTAN’S FUTURE IN THE SCO THROUGH THE PRISM OF NATIONAL INTERESTS

7.4. THE STATE PROGRAM OF INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT “NURLY ZHOL”

7.5. WESTERN CHINA- WESTERN EUROPE

7.6. CONCLUSION

8. FINAL CONCLUSIONS

8.1. FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION OF THE SCO MEMBERS

8.2. SCIENTIFIC RESULTS

8.3. RECOMMENDATIONS

9. LIST OF TABLES AND MAPS

10. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

11. BIBLIOGRAPHY

12. LIST OF AUTHORS'S PUBLICATIONS

1. INTRODUCTION

Security cooperation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) plays a key role in ensuring stability and security in the region. In the context of Kazakhstan, cooperation in this area may be of particular importance due to its geographical location, economic importance, and potential security threats.

The main aspects of security cooperation within the SCO are the following:

The most important problem in the region is the fight against terrorism and extremism, where Kazakhstan actively participates in joint efforts to combat terrorism and extremism within the SCO. This includes information exchange, joint exercises, and operations, as well as the development of coordinated strategies and measures to prevent and counter these threats.

Kazakhstan actively cooperates with other SCO members in the fight against cross-border crime and drug trafficking. This includes coordinating actions to combat smuggling and illegal trade, strengthening border controls and joint operations to apprehend criminals.

Kazakhstan, as an important transit and transport hub, strives to ensure the safety of its energy routes and transport corridors. Within the framework of the SCO, the countries cooperate in the field of ensuring the security of energy and transport infrastructures.

The Siberian-Turkic route is one of the largest transport routes connecting Siberia and Western China through Kazakhstan. Cooperation in ensuring security along this route can be important for ensuring security and stability in the region.

The Siberian-Chinese-Kazakh cascade is a system of reservoirs and hydroelectric power plants located on the border of Kazakhstan and China. Cooperation in the field of safety of this cascade can help prevent possible environmental and man-made disasters.

Kazakhstan, as a member of the SCO, actively cooperates with other member countries in various aspects of security. Priorities for cooperation in the future may include strengthening borders, developing joint mechanisms to combat transnational threats, and supporting measures to prevent conflicts and industrial accidents.

1.1 ACADEMIC PROBLEM

The XXI. century is marked by a change in the system of international relations, the emergence of new challenges and threats (wars and military conflicts, international terrorism, drug trafficking, arms smuggling, human trafficking), and due to the large-scale activation of

terrorist groups in various parts of the world, and, especially in Central Asia, the severity of the security problem became obvious.

During my four years studies and research I have faced with several academic challenges:

1. Limited access to information: Security issues are often related to sensitive data and information, access to which it was restricted for researchers. This has made it difficult to understand some of the security actions and initiatives within the SCO, especially regarding to the participating countries.
2. Insufficient scientific literature: As only a limited amount of scientific research has been devoted to the analysis of security cooperation within the SCO, I has found it difficult to form a complete picture and conduct an in-depth analysis despite that I have conducted research in English, Russia, Chinese, Kazakh and Hungarian languages.
3. Geopolitical complexity: Kazakhstan is located at the intersection of many geopolitical interests and influences, which has complicated security research. My research has faced challenges in analyzing complex geopolitical relationships and conflict dynamics in the region.
4. Diversity of cultures and languages: The region covered by the SCO is characterized by a diversity of cultures, languages, and historical traditions. This challenged me to theorize different contexts and perspectives of different countries.
5. Determining the effectiveness of security cooperation within the SCO has been a difficult task due to the ambiguity in assessing results and achievements. I could overcome these difficulties only with using a comprehensive approach and analysis of various factors.

Despite these challenges, the study of security cooperation in the SCO with an emphasis on Kazakhstan is an important area of research against this background of the changing geopolitical state of the region, which can bring new knowledge and understanding of international security and regional cooperation issues.

1.2. RESEARCH GOALS

The purpose of the study was to examine the mechanisms and results of security cooperation within the SCO, with an emphasis on the role and contribution of Kazakhstan to this process. Key aspects of the dissertation:

1. Analyze the mechanism of cooperation: A study of the official structures and mechanisms of security cooperation within the SCO, including joint exercises, operations, and forums to discuss security and stability in the region.
2. Evaluate the results and achievements: to study the effectiveness and efficiency of security cooperation within the SCO in terms of preventing and countering terrorism, extremism, separatism, and other threats.
3. Kazakhstan's role and contribution to the SCO: to analyze Kazakhstan's participation and contribution to security cooperation in the SCO, including its initiatives, projects, and positions on security issues in the region.
4. Assessment of prospects and challenges: to assess the prospects for the development of security cooperation in the SCO with the participation of Kazakhstan, as well as an analysis of challenges and obstacles along the way.

A result of the research my purpose was to formulate practical recommendations to improve security cooperation in the SCO with the participation of Kazakhstan, as well as to increase its effectiveness and efficiency for future researchers of this topic.

Research of this kind can contribute to an in-depth understanding of the dynamics of security cooperation in the SCO, as well as the role and contribution of Kazakhstan to this process. The results obtained can be useful for the development of security policies and strategies at both the national and international levels.

1.3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Based on the research objectives, I formulated the following research questions:

1. Will the SCO be able to move from the political declarations to the practical implementation and find the means to carry out its primary missions and tasks and become a truly regional organization influencing security and development in Asia?
2. It is possible to exclude the fact that in the SCO countries, as well as around the world, various kinds of security challenges may arise. Will the experience in the Belt and Road Initiative Plan and the fight against the coronavirus pandemic can help strengthen cooperation between the SCO countries in the field of economic security?
3. What policies and measures are used by the SCO countries to prevent and combat “the three evils: terrorism, separatism, extremism”? What threats do the Central Asian countries including Kazakhstan face? Can the SCO policies in this area be applied in case of new member states?

4. What did Kazakhstan expect from SCO membership? What the country has archived over the decades? What are the priorities of cooperation for the future?

1.4. HYPOTHESIS

The main point of the SCO's activity is that it strengthens security in a wider term covering political, economic, social, military, and environmental sectors. In the recent years, the SCO has done a great job to improve political, security and economic (health) cooperation, particularly in coordination of security policies, in using the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) tools for criminal, terrorist and military-political purposes, and in dealing with political and socio-economic consequences in individual countries, in the SCO area. Despite frequent refutations of the SCO's military nature and disagreements among members regarding the military and security cooperation, some developments can be identified which indicate that the organization is fully aimed at ensuring broad regional security. In the economic area, for instance, the China's Belt and Road Initiative launched 11 years ago has adjusted the geopolitical and economic plans for Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries. Based on my research goals and questions I set up the following hypothesis:

1. *I claim* that the organization can be described by all the characteristics of political and security cooperative organization. The Shanghai Summits in the broad area of security have confirmed that the SCO Member States can react immediately regarding to the threat situation and made the necessary decisions at the initial stage by holding direct consultations and maintain the regional stability and security. The SCO despite the enlargement of the organization is successful to establish an effective mechanism for conflict resolution. The SCO member States have consistently and firmly maintained that the fight against terrorism must be conducted based on the norms and principles of international law and must not be equated with a fight against any religion, individual countries, or nationalities.

As part of the fight against international terrorism, the SCO has declared its intention to address the problems associated with the elimination of its material base, primarily by combating illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition, explosives, and drugs, organized cross-border crime, illegal migration and mercenaryism. According to the declared position of the SCO member states, special attention should be paid to preventing the use by terrorists of components of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

The SCO Member States believe that the security of Central Asia is inextricably linked to the prospects for the peace process in Afghanistan. They have repeatedly expressed their support for the efforts of the international coalition conducting the anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan. As is known, certain SCO Member States have provided their ground infrastructure for the temporary deployment of military contingents of coalition Member States, as well as their territory and airspace for military transit in the interests of the anti-terrorist operation.

2. *I assumed* that the SCO economic policy, the Belt and Road Initiative, and the coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19) has had a significant impact on strengthening cooperation between the countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in the field of economic security.

Thus, the economic weight and cooperation of economic policies has stimulated cooperation between the SCO countries in the field of economics, providing an opportunity to jointly respond to challenges and strengthen regional economic development. In this context, the SCO countries have strengthened cooperation in the field of infrastructure development, trade, and investment, including by jointly overcoming trade barriers and stimulating investment activity.

The SCO countries particularly actively exchanged information and experience in the fight against COVID-19, including measures to prevent the spread of the virus and support the affected sectors of the economy. This cooperation had a positive impact on the economy, ensuring a rapid restoration of public health and a return to normal business functioning.

3. *I supposed* that the SCO's priorities in ensuring regional security and stability will continue to be countering terrorism, separatism, extremism, illicit trafficking in drugs, arms, ammunition and explosives, nuclear and radioactive materials, as well as cross-border organised crime, and ensuring international information security, strengthening border security, jointly combating illegal migration and human trafficking, money laundering, economic crimes, and corruption. Member States will exchange information on these issues on a regular basis and conduct joint operations in the region, as well as training and scientific and practical activities through competent agencies on a bilateral and multilateral basis. Particular attention will be paid to improving the mechanism of operational response to emerging challenges and threats, including effective utilization of the potential of the Political and Diplomatic Regulations.

Using the potential of the Regulations on Political and Diplomatic Measures and Mechanisms for SCO Response to Situations, threatening peace, security, and stability in the region.

The member states will provide comprehensive assistance to international anti-terrorist co-operation within the framework of the United Nations, in the implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

An important resource for strengthening security cooperation will be the involvement of SCO observer states and dialogue partners in joint work, deepening contacts with interested countries and international organisations. deepening contacts with interested countries and international organizations.

4. On 4 July 2023, for the fourth time in history, the Republic of Kazakhstan assumed the chairmanship of the SCO, which is taking place in 2023-2024. *I presumed* that the country with SCO Presidency expects to increase its political influence in the region and beyond by participating in international dialogues and coordinated actions with other member countries.

An important aspect of SCO presidency program is also cooperation in the fields of culture, education, and science, which promotes the exchange of experience and the expansion of cultural ties. Over the decades of membership in the SCO, Kazakhstan has accumulated significant experience in cooperation in various fields which will be used in full breadth and depth.

1.5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Qualitative methodology in the context of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in my work is focused on studying the social, cultural, political and geopolitical aspects of cooperation between the members of the organization. This type of methodology may include various qualitative research methods such as:

1. Analysis of political processes: I studied the political systems, structures, and processes in the participating countries to understand their impact on decision-making within the organization.
2. I researched international relations, analyzed foreign policy strategies, diplomatic relations and international policy of the SCO members and their influence on the international arena.

3. Geopolitical analysis: I studied geopolitical factors such as borders, territorial disputes, conflicts over resources, and their impact on the stability and development of the region in which the SCO operates.
4. From security analysis: I studied military strategies, security threats, terrorism and other factors that may affect the security of the organization's members and the region.
5. Ethnographic and sociological research: I did personal and online interviews with professors from Hungary, Kazakhstan, and China, and in the Budapest Representative Office of the Organization of Turkic States. In addition, I conducted an observation and analysis of documents to study the cultural and social aspects of life in the SCO member states.

With the help of the research questions, I have had consultation asked with professors and experts on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the role of Kazakhstan in the Organization, and further prospects for the development of this organization, it was helped to analyze and identify the following. I am presenting some key important opinion now but I used all the accumulated experience in the preparations of my thesis.

Professor Ma Fengshu¹ from Shandong University sees the SCO as an important mechanism for promoting peaceful coexistence and cooperation between the countries of the Asia-Pacific region. He believes that the SCO contributes to strengthening security and stability in the region through dialogue, cooperation, and conflict resolution.

Regarding Kazakhstan's role in the SCO, he notes that Kazakhstan plays an important role as one of the key members of the organization. Kazakhstan contributes to various aspects of the SCO's activities, including cooperation in the fields of economics, security, and humanitarian issues. They may also note Kazakhstan's geopolitical position as an important bridge between Europe and Asia, which gives strategic importance to its participation in the SCO.

However, he also has a critical point of view, Professor Ma drew attention to the limited achievements of the SCO in some aspects of cooperation and the influence of geopolitical factors on its activities. Regarding the role of Kazakhstan, he highlighted certain challenges and obstacles that the country faces in the context of its membership in the SCO.

¹ Professor Ma Fengshu is a member of the Academic Committee of the School of Political Science and Public Administration of Shandong University, Jinan, China. He was my teacher in the period 2011-2015 during my undergraduate studies and also my supervisor on the topic "Research on cooperation between Kazakhstan and China within the framework of the SCO" (in Chinese).

Professor Wang Mingye² believes that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is significantly important for Kazakhstan as an active participant in various SCO initiatives aimed at strengthening economic ties in the region. This includes projects on infrastructure development, energy cooperation, transport routes and trade relations, which contribute to the expansion of economic opportunities for Kazakhstan. Participation in the SCO helps Kazakhstan to maintain stable political relations with other members of the organization. This is important for ensuring security and progress in the region, especially in the context of geopolitical tensions.

And most importantly, the SCO plays a role in promoting cooperation in the field of security and combating terrorism, extremism, and organized crime. This is important for Kazakhstan, considering its geographical location and interests in ensuring security on its territory and in the region. The SCO platform provides Kazakhstan with a diplomatic platform for interaction with other member countries, as well as with observation and dialogue partners. This allows Kazakhstan to actively participate in international affairs and promote its interests on the world stage.

Kazakhstan's support for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as a strategically important link on the path that can use its membership in the SCO to strengthen cooperation with China and other participants within the framework of this initiative. This can bring economic and infrastructural benefits for Kazakhstan and contribute to its integration into regional and global economic processes.

Thus, the SCO represents an important platform for Kazakhstan in various fields, including economics, politics, security, and diplomacy, which makes its participation in the organization strategically important for the development of the country and the region.

According to the Professor Kulipa Baysultanova³, Kazakhstan's participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) represents a significant opportunity for the country in the context of its foreign policy, economic development and geopolitical strategy. Here are some aspects of Kazakhstan's future within the framework of the SCO and the Belt and Road Initiative:

² Professor Wang Mingye is a Director of the International Petroleum Politics Research Center at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, China University of Petroleum (Beijing). The professor was my master's degree teacher from 2015-2017, and supervisor of my dissertation work on the topic "The Impact relations between Kazakhstan and Turkey before and after the Russian-Turkish conflict" (in Chinese).

³ Professor Kulipa Baysultanova is a Candidate of Political Sciences at the Abylai Khan Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, Almaty, Kazakhstan. She has many publications in international peer-reviewed scientific journals that are in the first three quartiles according to the Journal Citation Report and have at least 35 CiteScore percentile index in the database.

From an economic point of view, Kazakhstan's participation in the SCO and the Belt and Road initiative provides the country with access to a wide regional market and the opportunity to develop economic ties with other members of the organization. This can help attract investment, promote trade, and create new jobs. Kazakhstan is also actively involved in the implementation of infrastructure projects related to the Belt and Road initiative, such as the construction of railways, seaports, energy facilities and others. These projects can contribute to the modernization of the country's infrastructure and improve its transport accessibility.

Kazakhstan's political cooperation in the SCO provides it with the opportunity to cooperate with other participating countries on political and security issues. This can contribute to strengthening stability and security in the region.

The development of human capital in Kazakhstan in the expanses of the SCO and the BRI can also contribute to the development of the country's human capital. The exchange of experience, knowledge and technologies with other participating countries can contribute to the development of education, science and innovation in Kazakhstan.

In general, Kazakhstan's future in the SCO and the BRI depends on the successful implementation of cooperation with other participants, effective use of opportunities for economic development and strengthening political and security stability in the region.

Professor Pál Dunay,⁴ stressed that Kazakhstan's future in the SCO can be diverse and depends on many factors, including the current situation in the SCO, Kazakhstan's domestic policy and foreign policy, as well as geopolitical trends in the region and the world.

Although he sees Kazakhstan as a key player in the SCO and believes that the country will continue to actively participate in the work of the organization, contributing to the development of economic cooperation and ensuring stability in the region, when in his opinion others may be more skeptical and express concerns about the future of the SCO and Kazakhstan's role in it, based on various problems that The organization faces issues such as disagreements between members, ambiguity of goals and limited effectiveness in solving regional problems.

He highly appreciated the economic reforms and stability in Kazakhstan, as well as the country's role in resolving regional conflicts. They can recognize the importance of the SCO as a platform for economic and political cooperation in Central Asia.

⁴ Pál Dunay was a professor of NATO and European Security Issues at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. Currently he is an associate professor at the Faculty of Social Sciences of Loránd Eötvös University in Budapest. Between 2014 and 2016, he was director of the OSCE Academy in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.

The policy of Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, according to the Professor, requires special attention. He stressed that the policy of the President of Kazakhstan can be diverse and depends on many factors, including media coverage, political education, and individual views. He acknowledged that Tokayev's efforts towards economic reforms, improving democratic institutions and attracting foreign investment are raising Kazakhstan to a high level against the background of ongoing events in the world. Tokayev's commitment to economic development, support for peaceful and diplomatic initiatives, as well as efforts to improve democratic processes and human rights in Kazakhstan show his education and foresight in accordance with the requirements of the modern world. The Professor highly appreciated his diplomatic efforts in resolving conflicts in the region and his desire to cooperate with international partners.

Also, a positive opinion was associated with the reforms and modernization that are being carried out in the country under his leadership, including improving the investment climate, developing education and healthcare, as well as measures to combat corruption and strengthen the rule of law.

These views helped me deeper understand of various aspects of cooperation within the SCO and identify factors that may contribute to or hinder the development of the organization and the region.

1.6. RESEARCH LITERATURE REVIEW

In conducting this research, I have studied the scientific literature of Kazakh, Russian, Chinese, and Western researchers. The analysis of the subject of the study led to the division of literature into few groups in accordance with scientific problems.

The basis of the first historiographical complex consisted of works devoted to the activities of the SCO in the context of the history of international relations. Among them are the works of Alimov R.K., Borisov D.A., Bykov A.I., Dadabaeva Z.A., Luzyanin S.G., Malyshev D.V., Kurylev K.P., Morozov Yu.V., Hillman J., Rasmussena M.V., Svine M.D. and others.

Among the scientists studying the problems of political processes in Eurasia, it is worth highlighting Pivovarov E.I., Gushchin A.V., Knyazev A.A., Lapenko M.V., Syroezhkin K.L., Lukin A.V., Komarovskiy V.V., Chernyavskiy S.I., Muratshinov K.G., Nikitina Yu.A., Chufrina G.I., Sidorova D.A., Uyanaeva S.V. Referring to the works of these scientists allows us to draw original approaches and methodology for studying the development of institutional formats in various subregions of the Eurasian pan-regional space.

The world political processes taking place within the SCO, the prospects of this Organization and its role in the Chinese concept of the global world order of the "Community of one destiny" are being studied at the National Research Center of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization of China. For this study, the collective monograph "Shanghai Cooperation Organization (2001-2018): Looking back and looking into the future" is of the greatest importance, which allows us to identify the Chinese approach to this organization, which has a hybrid character, that is, extending the regimes of multilateral interaction to all spheres of cooperation: politics, economy, culture, and security.

Based on the analysis of this historiographical complex, I concluded that the SCO is of particular importance for Russia and China. Russia's participation in the work of the SCO promotes and protects its interests in the East and in the Central Asian region. The SCO makes it possible to strengthen territorial integrity, as well as develop backward and unstable areas, playing the role of a stabilizing factor in Eurasia and acting as a buffer for threats from South Asia and the Middle East.

The following historiographical complex highlights the topics of international cooperation between the countries of Central and South Asia within the SCO, the actual aspects of this process for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, India, Iran, and Pakistan. Exploring the various stages of ensuring the security of the SCO, Derankin A., Jaspal Z.N., Khan A., Jamali A.B., etc. analyzed the current geopolitical situation in South and Central Asia, and gave a forecast of possible options for its development. The directions of cooperation between Russia, China, Pakistan, India, their interaction in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in terms of measures aimed at ensuring security and stability in the space of this organization are considered.

The representative of the Kazakh scientific community Sitenko V.N. in his scientific works emphasizes that Kazakhstan, like other Central Asian countries, is interested in forming a fair and effective architecture of international security, and the SCO just has every chance to become a dialogue platform for participants to develop common approaches to solving existing problems, primarily in the field of security. The author focuses on the special importance of energy security for Kazakhstan. In particular, the republic is interested in finding ways to deliver energy resources to world markets, developing eastern transportation routes. In this context, they talk about the long-term prospects of cooperation between China and Kazakhstan, which can be greatly facilitated by the membership of both countries in the SCO. In addition, within the framework of the SCO, issues of regulation of water use, migration, etc. are relevant for Kazakhstan.

Theoretical and conceptual approaches to the interpretation of problems in the field of security and aspects of its provision at the global and regional levels are reflected in the works of Bakhlov O.V., Dubrovin Yu.I., Klimenko A.F., Ali A., Gill B., Murphy M., Hillman J. Borisov D.A., Vasilenko V.I., Zholamanov G.E., Kamolov T.M. and others devoted their research to the study of the relations of the SCO member states.

In foreign literature, various aspects of the SCO's significance for the regional subsystem are studied by such international historians as Carroll W.E., Ellison R., San Degang, Elmahli H., Hillman J., and others who have concretized its innovative potential from the point of view of the processes of regionalism.

Interesting studies of the SCO's activities in maintaining international peace and security were conducted by Rasmussen M.V., who analyzed the SCO's ability to anticipate the development of conflicts. A study of the development of SCO peacekeeping operations was conducted by a group of scientists led by Lavrov V.S.

The phenomenon of the SCO's international political status is studied in the works of Nikitina Yu. A., Luzyanin S. G., Rogov A.S. and Belov V.I. The authors pay special attention to the tools, means and models that the SCO uses during its activities, based on which a conclusion is drawn about the nature of this organization and its innovative contribution to the practice of international cooperation. In particular, the work of Belov V.I. thoroughly proves that the SCO is a regional organization of a global type. There is also a set of works by Western researchers, such as S. Aris, which considers regional cooperation in Central Asia in the field of defense and security within the framework of the SCO.

Thus, the analysis of historiography has shown that, despite a significant amount of research on the problems and prospects for the development of international cooperation in the field of challenges and threats to regional security in Central, Northeast and South Asia, the SCO activities in the field of countering the challenges of the "three evils", in the scientific discourse of the SCO member states and Western researchers Not enough attention is paid to determining the vectors of prospective interstate cooperation in the direction of integration of all members of the association on security issues in Eurasia. This makes it necessary to conduct a special study aimed at a comprehensive analysis of the nature and features of the activities of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to strengthen international security.

The following group of sources contains *the SCO normative legal acts*: fundamental treaties, conventions and constituent documents that allow us to form an idea of the normative basis of the international organization. The key sources of this group are the Declaration on the Establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (2001), the Shanghai Convention on

Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism (2001), the Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (2002), the Agreement on the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (2006), the Regulation on the Status of a dialogue partner SCO (2008), etc. Based on the principles, goals, objectives, and the most relevant areas of activity set out in the conceptual and normative acts of the regional organization, it is possible to identify points of contact of the member countries for their constructive and mutually beneficial interaction to strengthen the architecture of regional security.

An important subgroup of sources of this type are interstate agreements that have created a regulatory regime favorable for integration processes, in which states specify the elaboration of the areas of activity of the SCO. In particular, the "Agreement between the member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on cooperation in combating Illicit trafficking in Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances and their Precursors" in 2008 launched the process of working out an Anti-Drug Strategy, which in 2018 It was adopted at the Qingdao Summit of the Heads of the SCO member States.

Since I analyzed the degree of harmonization of national legislation with the SCO regulatory framework, the laws regulating the activities of state structures to counteract the "three forces of evil" on a national scale were also studied.

The group of *clerical sources* includes documents of internal document flow: action plans, reports, internal documents of structural units, resolutions, and decisions of international organizations, which serve as a starting point for the evolution of forms of interaction between the SCO member states. UN Security Council Resolution 2250, which deals with the topic of youth from the point of view of preserving peace and security, stimulated the SCO members to localize an institution on a regional scale that meets the proposals of this resolution. It became the SCO Youth Council. The annual declarations of the SCO Council of Heads of State act as a cornerstone for the Organization's activities, correcting the vector of development of the regional structure. In particular, the appeal to such sources as the Astana Declaration of the heads of the SCO member states (2017), the Qingdao Declaration (2018), the Bishkek Declaration (2019), etc. It allowed us to fix the attitude of the heads of the member states to the role of the SCO in the architecture of regional security, as well as to assess the degree of its adaptation to the expansion of the geographical scope of activities due to joining the countries of South Asia. The Dushanbe Declaration of the Heads of State of 2021 marked a new stage in the activities of this organization from both a functional and a subjective point of view. Firstly, for the first time, the number of economic provisions exceeded the number of security guidelines, and secondly, the inclusion of Iran as a member of the SCO was announced.

The next group consists of journalistic sources: statements and interviews of state officials, as well as communiqués of meetings of relevant structures. Referring to these sources allowed the author to assess the effectiveness of the SCO as a negotiating platform capable of creating impulses in national political discourses.

Statistical sources include collections containing macroeconomic indicators, which are important in assessing the structural characteristics of the region, and other statistical materials from various database. So, using the database of the Correlators of War project, I compared the potential of the SCO and other international organizations, proving that the former acts as a significant center of power for the countries of the "Collective Non-Western". Thus, the presented source base is extensive and versatile, which allows you to fully explore this topic and solve the tasks set.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. INTRODUCTION

After the collapse of the USSR, Kazakhstan, like all the independent states of the former Soviet Union, found itself alone with the People's Republic of China. The issue of borders became acute problem. In Soviet times, relations with China were not the best, as evidenced by the conflicts on Damansky Island and on the territory of Kazakhstan in Lake Jalanashkol, after which large military units appeared here. Therefore, the issue of settling the state border of Kazakhstan with China was of paramount importance. And the second issue was the withdrawal of military units. And these two tasks were successfully solved within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.

Now the situation in the world has changed, and for China the vector of military tension began to move to the Asia-Pacific region. Therefore, China needs a reliable rear guard in the Central Asian region. That is why such a mutually beneficial process took place here. The SCO, by the way, is an example of resolving border disputes. It is not by chance that Iran, India and Pakistan, which have problems on the border, have joined it.

The experience of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in resolving complex border issues is now recognised around the world, and the accession of these states is another indisputable proof of the success of the Shanghai Organisation. The question now is whether the SCO should evolve from a security organisation into another dimension - that of international economic cooperation.

Kazakhstan is one of the founders of the SCO. It is important for Kazakhstan to develop the organisation and multilateral cooperation covering virtually all spheres of life in the region. For Kazakhstan, cooperation within the SCO is of practical interest - from the point of view of stimulating regional integration processes, countering traditional and new threats and challenges, implementing economic policy, ensuring energy security and resolving the situation around Afghanistan. Further intensification of activities within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation will contribute to the implementation of the foreign policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan. The SCO summit in New Delhi in June-July 2023 handed over the chairmanship of the SCO to Kazakhstan, which will last until July 2024 and will end with a summit in Astana. According to the Kazakh Foreign Ministry, the heads of the SCO member states will adopt a package of documents that will be developed during expert and ministerial meetings on the territory of the republic during the year. Kazakhstan's chairmanship will cover

security, economy and trade, energy and healthcare, ecology and education. A step-by-step process of improving the activities of the organisation itself will begin. Almaty will become the SCO's tourist and cultural capital, where several public events are planned.

2.2. COOPERATIVE SECURITY

International security is not an easy concept that has a historical appearance. The process of development in the social legal consciousness of views on ways and means of providing international security, the military-political and legal content of this definition, the nature of the connection between national and international security, and in addition, the proper normative and law enforcement work of countries in various epochs of human history was significantly influenced by rethinking the concepts of war and peace, in international relations – the ratio of right and power.

The first peace Conference in The Hague, in 1899, played an important role in the issue of war and peace. Initially, the conference was held to address the issue of disarmament and the limitation of the arms race.⁵

However, this conference did not achieve its original goals, but was an excellent attempt to solve the problem on the basis of multilateral diplomacy. The first issue at this conference was related to the issue of international security.

The first organization to ensure international security was the League of Nations, formed in 1919. The creation of this association has led to significant changes in the modern arena of international relations. Countries have a chance to replace military-political blocs with a system of *collective security*. The position of the League of Nations spelled out that member countries were prohibited from resorting to such a means of conducting foreign policy as war, and it was indicated to turn to it only as a last resort. In accordance with article twelve of the Statute, the members of the League agreed that "if a conflict arises between them that could provoke a rupture of relations, they will use the arbitration court or submit to the consideration of the Council. They give up the war for three months after the decision of the arbitrators or the report of the Council."

Collective security is defined as "a system of joint actions of States in order to maintain international peace and counter acts of aggression".⁶ The term originated in 1922 within the

⁵ European Commission. A maturing partnership - shared interests and challenges in EU - China relations. COM (2003). 533 finals. Brussels, 2003. P. 11

⁶ Legal dictionary. 2000 // URL: <http://dic.academic.ru/dic.nsf/lower/15381> (access: 01.04.2023)

framework of the League of Nations, and was subsequently enshrined in the UN Charter of 1945, as well as in the documents of a number of regional organizations.

In the current system of collective security, two levels are distinguished — universal and regional collective security. Universal collective security is implemented through the United Nations system. Within the framework of this system, in the event of disputes and conflicts in international relations, either peaceful means of dispute resolution listed in Article 33 of the UN Charter are used, or if the UN Security Council finds a threat to international peace and security, a decision is made to conduct a peacekeeping operation. Thus, collective security is both a principle, the guiding principle of international relations, based on the indivisibility of security and the interdependence of subjects, and at the same time it is a system of concrete measures that the international community is taking to implement this principle.

The collective security system is legally formalized by a treaty, where, along with specific obligations, its participants fix three provisions:

- not to resort to force and the threat of force
- resolve disputes exclusively by peaceful means
- actively cooperate to eliminate any danger to the world, improve the international situation.

The global collective security organization is the UN. It pursues several goals, but the main one is to maintain international peace and security and take effective collective measures for this.⁷

The system of collective measures provided for by the UN Charter covers:

- measures to prohibit the threat or use of force in relations between States;⁸
- Measures for the peaceful settlement of international disputes;⁹
- disarmament measures;¹⁰
- security measures during the transition period;¹¹
- Measures for the use of regional security organizations;¹²
- temporary measures to prevent violations of the peace;¹³

⁷ Article 1 of the UN Charter

⁸ Ibid. paragraph 4 of Article 2

⁹ Ibid. Chapter VI

¹⁰ Ibid. articles 11, 26, 47

¹¹ Ibid. Chapter XVII

¹² Ibid. Chapter VIII

¹³ Ibid. Article 40

- compulsory security measures without the use of armed forces;¹⁴
- coercive measures with the use of armed forces.¹⁵

The SCO is a regional international organization, is not a military bloc (like, for example, NATO) or an open regular security meeting (like, for example, the ASEAN ARF), but occupies an intermediate position. According to Article 1 of the founding document of the SCO - the Charter of June 7, 2002, the main goals and objectives of the SCO are: strengthening mutual trust, friendship and good neighborliness between the member states; development of multidisciplinary cooperation in order to maintain and strengthen peace, security and stability in the region, promote the construction of a new democratic, just and rational political and economic international order; joint counteraction to terrorism, separatism and extremism in all their manifestations, the fight against drug and arms trafficking, other types of transnational criminal activity, as well as illegal migration; encouraging effective regional cooperation in political, trade and economic, defense, law enforcement, environmental protection, cultural, scientific and technical, educational, energy, transport, credit and financial and other areas of common interest; promoting comprehensive and balanced economic growth, social and cultural development in the region through joint actions based on equal partnership in order to steadily raise the standard of living and improve the living conditions of the peoples of the Member States; coordination of approaches to integration into the world economy; promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms in accordance with the international obligations of Member States and their national legislation; maintenance and development of relations with other States and international organizations; interaction in the prevention of international conflicts and their peaceful settlement; joint search for solutions to problems that will arise in the 21st century.

Over the years of its existence, the SCO as a young regional international organization has withstood the challenges of changes in the international situation and has turned into a mature association.

The organizational structure of the SCO has been formed and the legal basis for its functioning has been determined. The working procedure of all SCO bodies was developed and adopted (in 2003 at the Moscow summit). Since January 2004, the main structures of the organization have started working, and since that moment the association has been functioning as a full-fledged international organization.¹⁶

¹⁴ Ibid. Article 41

¹⁵ Ibid. Article 42

¹⁶ Declaration on the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization dated 15.06.2001.

Today, the SCO is a functioning and successful organization, whose opinion, position and reaction cannot be ignored in relation to international events both in the Central Asian region and in Europe, Asia and the Pacific.

Together, the SCO countries represent almost half of the world's population (3.4 billion people) and occupy more than 20% of the planet's territory (34 million square kilometers). The SCO countries accounted for a quarter of global GDP (more than \$23 trillion) in 2022. At least four countries (Russia, Iran, India and China) have nuclear weapons, and Kazakhstan has the only point from which a person can be sent into space today — the Baikonur Cosmodrome. The SCO members and partner countries have the world's largest reserves of oil, gas and rare earth metals, and are also influential members of major international and regional associations (UN, G20, WTO, CSTO, EAEU, APEC, ASEAN and others). Finally, none of the BRICS participants joined the "war of sanctions" launched by the collective West. Such a partnership determines the role of this association in building a system of collective security both in Central Asia and in the Asia-Pacific region.

2.3. SECURITY COMMUNITIES

The effectiveness of the SCO lie in the fact that, having political influence among the leading states of the world, it has objectively secured the energy market, the market of other natural resources, the areas of economic and military cooperation. The SCO actively contributes to ensuring security and stability in the region, contributes to the global economy and sustainable development of one of the largest regions of the world community, and expands the dialogue of cultures and civilizations. The strengths of the SCO, which form the basis for the development and deepening of regional cooperation, and problems in the organization's activities at the present stage. (Table 1)

Table 1. Strong and weak sides of the activities of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

Strong sides	Weak (problematic) sides
A single space (a single regional integrity), stability and security of almost the whole continent.	Significant influence on the development of the situation in each SCO member state of the world powers, primarily the United States, the European Union

Concentration of natural resources of global importance, interest in their development of many countries of the world.	Unstable regimes in individual SCO States.
Availability of Eurasian transport corridors and transport and communication networks, direct access (via China) to the Asia-Pacific region (APR, APEC, ASEAN); availability and opportunities for the development of the traditional "Great Silk Road".	The absence of an effective (operational, coordinated) mechanism of interaction between the SCO countries, including on the fight against terrorism.
The existence of a mechanism for the collective settlement of existing disagreements within the regional bloc based on international legal agreements.	Weak (not strong enough) economic cooperation between the SCO countries; bilateral cooperation prevails over the solution of common regional and global problems; practically no multilateral economic project has been implemented.
The presence of an integration "core" capable of acting as a locomotive in the development of national economies and the region.	Insufficiently strong historical and cultural ties, values: interfaith differences, interethnic harmony, language barrier (multilingualism); there are four civilizations: Confucianism, Islam, Slavic civilization, Hinduism.

Source: own editing based on the official webpage of the SCO.

At the same time, despite the dynamism of its development and the scale of its activities, the SCO remains a young organization with great potential. In this regard, a number of internal contradictions and external challenges in the Organization will have to be overcome. The most critical problems are:

- The problem of the organization's international status and its future role in resolving key contradictions in the SCO space

- The large scope of the SCO's areas of activity and the duplication of many areas by other international organizations (The wide range of problems the SCO seeks to cover leads to the fact that its area of responsibility largely overlaps functionally and geographically with other structures in the region. Duplication of functions leads to negative results in the form of inefficiency and creation of conflict potential in relations between organizations)

- The problem of SCO expansion. Asymmetry of the SCO member states in terms of their political and economic potential. It can be stated that the existence of some disadvantage of the Central Asian states has not yet entered an active phase. Nevertheless, it should be noted

that the SCO has been formed mainly at the highest level of cooperation, at which it is customary to skillfully conceal or circumvent existing differences, but in case of further expansion and deepening of cooperation, the sectoral levels will be activated, at which the difference in the potential of the states will become problematic.

- Divergence in the prioritization of SCO activities.

The main external challenge at present and soon is the American factor against the backdrop of growing global imbalance and sanctions actions against individual full members of the organization.

The SCO Secretary-General drew attention to the fact that the socio-economic crisis caused by the Pandemic is a major external challenge at present and soon.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is open for admission to its membership of other states that undertake to comply with the purposes and principles of the charter, as well as the provisions of other international treaties and documents adopted in the SCO.

In 2017, India and Pakistan became SCO members. The accession of India and Pakistan to the SCO has significantly changed the regional and global balance of power. The SCO is an international institution that includes the leading "non-Western" countries of Eurasia, and thus can be considered as an emerging union of a multipolar world, as a platform offering a Eurasian alternative to Western Europe.

Crucial importance are the further development of economic and military cooperation, transport, and communication networks; direct access to the Indian Ocean; expansion of the collective security system; the movement of regional economic integration and ensuring comprehensive stability. The admission of Pakistan and India to the SCO allowed us to get closer to solving the problem of Afghanistan.

The obstacle to the full-fledged entry of India and Pakistan into the SCO was that, according to the charter of the organization, the member countries should not have unresolved conflicts among themselves, and Pakistan and India have not been able to eliminate the Kashmir problem for several decades.

However, the influence of the Kashmir factor should not be absolutized since Pakistan is interested in developing its industry and corresponding trade and economic ties with India. India benefits from the unity and territorial integrity of Pakistan due to the threat of risks of uncontrolled migration flows and the associated slowdown in economic growth.

The participation of India and Pakistan in the SCO will contribute to the normalization of relations between them: at the same time, it is a signal that the organization will ensure the normalization of Pakistani Indian relations. If earlier, in the 60s of the XX century, the USSR

could act as an arbitrator between the two countries, now the SCO can take over this function. On the other hand, the complication of Pakistani Indian relations poses a threat to the organization since the aggravation of mutual contradictions may lead to a split within the SCO when certain countries adopt certain positions of the parties. At the same time, there are additional opportunities for an objective and open dialogue within the entire organization on certain very difficult issues of a bilateral nature between the participants of the regional bloc. In the current integration of the SCO member states, we should not forget about the existing differences not only between India and Pakistan, but also between India and China.

The SCO's main role in this issue is a platform for resolving mutual claims and reaching agreements through the mediation of third countries. In case of aggravation of territorial claims between China and India and intensification of disagreements within the SCO countries, a collective position in the settlement of complex issues will allow solving many problems in the context of agreements within the framework of the regional organization.

One of the main "irritants" in relations between New Delhi and Beijing is the unresolved border issue and mutual claims to the two disputed territories:

- the deserted high-altitude plateau of Aksaychin in the western sector of the border;¹⁷
- a significant part of the states of Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim (an area of about 150 thousand square kilometers), ruled by India, but to which China claims rights.

The parties have repeatedly made attempts to settle their border dispute. Due to the lack of an agreement between them fixing the passage of the line of actual control, hundreds of border violations occur annually on both sides, which sometimes escalate into clashes.

Pakistan's entry into the SCO was actively prevented by the United States. Pakistan is a long-standing military and economic ally of the Americans. There is access to the Indian Ocean through Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Iran has recently joined the SCO, which until that time was an observer state in the SCO. Iran viewed the SCO as a tool to counter the American military presence, which is a threat to the country's security. In this regard, the accession seems very real and justified.

There is an exit to the Persian Gulf through Iran. For the SCO, this means strengthening its geopolitical and geo-economic positions due to Iran's advantageous geographical location, capacious sales market, energy potential and transport infrastructure.

¹⁷ In 1962, the area was occupied by Chinese troops during the armed conflict and is now under the de facto control of Beijing, but New Delhi insists that Aksaychin is part of the Indian region of Ladakh.

Iran attracts the SCO both as an important transport hub and as a leading exporter of energy resources. Iran's accession to the SCO will accelerate the resolution of territorial problems in the Caspian Sea. Iran's presence in the SCO will make it possible to solve serious problems more effectively both in Central Asia and Afghanistan, as well as in the countries of the Caspian basin.

Another important issue in the SCO's activities is the expansion of the economic belt of the Great Silk Road. In this regard, the actual topic of discussion is the reality of economic cooperation between the SCO and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), as well as the directions of such interaction.¹⁸

The EAEU states promote the goods of the SCO countries to the European market. There is a great interest of the German and other European economies in the acquisition by the European Union (EU), represented by the SCO, of a collective partner for the implementation of the EU's large-scale plans for the development of the capacious market of Central Asia. The EU is particularly interested in the idea of the SCO to create an Energy Club. On this basis, the EU and the SCO may have a mutually beneficial dialogue.

Relations between the EU and the SCO have not been the subject of modern political science until now. It may be easy to explain this circumstance by the relative short-term existence of the SCO and the relatively current heterogeneity of these international structures. At the same time, it should be noted that both the EU and the SCO show some interest in each other.

At the same time, it is obvious that the Central Asian states are of great interest to an integrated Europe. In recent years, it has become clear that the countries of this region have, first, an economic interest - as an alternative energy supplier for the European market. In the 1990s, the EU concluded a partnership and cooperation agreement with the States of the region and extended several European projects to the region, particularly the TACIS program. The EU was guided by a coordinated common foreign and security policy - relations with individual states, not with regional structures.¹⁹

The denunciation of the treaty on the formation of the USSR and the signing of the agreement on the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States led to the

¹⁸ Mikheev V. V.: Проблемы и перспективы взаимодействия ШОС и ЕврАзЭС в Центральной Азии. *Collection of materials of the International Scientific and Practical Conference "Problems of economic and financial cooperation within the SCO"*, May 31, 2006 Almaty: CIS under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2006.

¹⁹ Yun S. M.: The policy of the European Union in Central Asia: from the "opening" of the region to the "strategy of a new partnership" (1992-2008). Tomsk, 2009.

emergence of fifteen new independent countries. After the collapse of the USSR, Turkmenistan was left alone with its southern neighbors – the Islamic State of Iran and unpredictable Afghanistan. At that time, the neighboring Central Asian republics began to pursue an anti-Russian policy, the nationalist movement was growing, and Russia was largely focused on solving its internal political and economic problems associated with the transition from socialism to a society with a market economy.

The policy of the first President of Turkmenistan S.A. Niyazov was aimed at preventing interethnic conflicts on the territory of the republic. The political leadership of Turkmenistan has made a historically important strategic decision on permanent neutrality and submitted a corresponding application to the UN General Assembly. A real historical event of Turkmenistan's foreign policy was the proclamation of UNGA Resolution No. 50/80 "the status of permanent neutrality of Turkmenistan" on December 12, 1995. The resolution stresses that the UN, "expressing the hope that the status of permanent neutrality of Turkmenistan will contribute to strengthening peace and security in the region, recognizes and supports the status of permanent neutrality proclaimed by Turkmenistan." Such a unique document was adopted for the first time in the activities of the entire international community of nations. UN support is a rare phenomenon in the more than half a century history of this international organization. The UNGA resolution expresses recognition and support of Turkmenistan's neutrality status by all members of the world community, and also calls on states to respect and support it. 185 member states of the world community voted unanimously for its adoption at the UN General Assembly session. Such a success of the unanimous vote may be due to the fact that Turkmenistan of all the former Soviet republics did not have any internal confrontations on national, religious, socio-political grounds, and also none of the bordering states had territorial claims to Turkmenistan. Thus, considering the contribution of such political and peacekeeping centers as Austria and Switzerland to the history of international relations, with the adoption of the status of permanent neutrality of Turkmenistan, a new center has appeared in the Asian region where acute international issues can be resolved. The practical experience of the peacekeeping mission of Turkmenistan was associated with the settlement of the inter-Tajik crisis in 1995-1996, in the UN peacekeeping efforts for a peaceful and political solution to the civil confrontation in Afghanistan in 1999, which confirmed the active positive impact of Turkmenistan on regional affairs.

A neutral state must fulfill three requirements:

1. not to allow the parties to the conflict to use their territory (for the deployment of bases, cargo transportation, aircraft launch, offensive, retreat, etc.)

2. do not provide your own army.
3. exclude discrimination of any party to the conflict in the case of supplies of weapons and other military goods (that is, supplies are allowed, but only in equal quantities to both sides).

If a neutral State is subjected to military aggression, its right to armed protection of its sovereignty is not limited in any way. In this case, it may seek assistance from other States. In peacetime, it can develop its defense potential, produce, buy and sell weapons, and its neutral status does not limit this in any way.

A neutral State has the right to:

1. territorial integrity
2. protection of its sovereignty in case of aggression against it
3. political independence
4. market trade with warring countries.

At the same time , it must comply with such duties as:

1. strict observance of neutrality
2. non-interference in the affairs of other States
3. complete rejection of military alliances and blocs
4. equal treatment of the parties to the conflict
5. prohibition on the use of one's own territory in the interests of the belligerents
6. refusal of all forms of military support to the belligerent countries.

Today, neutral Turkmenistan is one of the recognized peacekeeping centers not only in Central Asia, but in the world. Considering that Switzerland does not de facto observe its neutral status, since the adoption of sanctions against Russia violates the neutral status of Switzerland itself, which contradicts the country's constitution, Turkmenistan, following the principles of permanent neutrality, has the moral right to make a statement at the next UN General Assembly on the transfer of numerous international organizations and secretariats (for example, the World Trade Organization, World Meteorological Organization, World Intellectual Property Organization, World Health Organization, International Labour Organization, The International Organization for Migration and many others), based in Geneva, to other neutral countries – Ashgabat (Turkmenistan), Vientiane (Laos), Phnom Penh (Cambodia), Valletta (Malta), thereby leveling the political influence of the United States and the European Union on decision-making by these organizations.

In addition, given Turkmenistan's neutral status and practical experience in conducting negotiations on the settlement of interethnic conflicts in Central Asia, official Ashgabat could

hold a summit on the settlement of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine on its territory with the mediation of China, Saudi Arabia, Iran (especially since Iran and Saudi Arabia signed a joint statement in China on the resumption of the work of their embassies and consulates) or Brazil.

This year Turkmenistan celebrates the 28th anniversary of the international recognition of its neutral status. A significant date, the most important event in the independent history of the Turkmen state, a milestone in its foreign policy. Based on the results of more than a quarter of a century, we can talk about the obvious positive results of Turkmenistan's neutral status. On a global scale, Turkmenistan has managed to build partnerships with the main world centers – Russia, China, the European Union, and the United States. At the regional level, Turkmenistan has established good–neighborly and equal relations with neighboring countries and major regional powers - Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, and India. The interests of these states have never been in conflict on Turkmen soil. Thus, the essence of the philosophy of neutrality can be defined as follows: to be friends equally and maintain good relations with everyone, but not to be friends with anyone against someone.

The neutral status allows Turkmenistan to carry out bilateral and multilateral military-technical cooperation, to have armed forces at its disposal to cooperate in the fight against threats common to the region - terrorism, drug trafficking, transnational organized crime. The country's military doctrine is exclusively defensive in nature, which prescribes a ban on the use of the Turkmen Armed Forces outside its borders.

2.4. CRITICAL THEORIES

Criticism of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) may be related to various aspects of its work and structure. Some of the possible aspects of criticism include:

1. The SCO does not always achieve the expected results in solving regional problems, such as the fight against terrorism, conflict resolution and the development of economic cooperation. They may indicate the lack of specific implementation mechanisms and the limited powers of the organization. Despite efforts to resolve conflicts, for example, between India and Pakistan or between China and India, the SCO does not always achieve significant progress. Despite dialogue and attempts to ease tensions, some conflicts remain unresolved or subside on a temporary basis without addressing the root causes.

The SCO is considered one of the structures aimed at combating terrorism and extremism in Central Asia. However, despite efforts in this direction, some terrorist groups continue to be

active in the region²⁰, which highlights the limitations in the effectiveness of combating this threat.

The SCO strives to deepen economic cooperation between the members of the organization. However, some economic projects and initiatives may face obstacles due to differences in the economic systems and interests of member countries, which may slow down or make it difficult to achieve concrete results.

In the energy sector, the SCO is taking steps to improve cooperation and security of energy supplies. However, the implementation of large energy projects, such as the transportation of gas or oil, may face difficulties due to political and economic obstacles. The SCO is too heavily focused on economic issues, ignoring other important aspects of cooperation.

2. The SCO is limited by membership in Central, North, and East Asian countries and Russia, which reduces its ability to influence events in other parts of the world.

The SCO includes countries primarily located in Asia and Russia, partially located in both Europe and Asia. It does not include other key geopolitical actors such as the United States, the European Union, or the countries of the Middle East and Africa. The SCO does not have as wide an international presence and connections as other international organizations such as the United Nations or the Group of Twenty (G20). This limits its ability to influence global issues and events. The SCO's mandate is limited to the main aspects of security, economic cooperation and cultural exchange. Although the organization can deal with some global issues, its resources and abilities in this regard are limited.

In general, the SCO's limited membership of East Asian countries and Russia limits its geographical and functional impact on events in other parts of the world. However, it continues to play an important role in regional cooperation and international policy in the Asia-Pacific region.

3. The lack of democratic decision-making mechanisms within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) does raise certain concerns. The SCO is not a democratic organization, and its leadership is not directly elected by the people. Instead, member countries make decisions by consensus or through diplomatic negotiations between States. Some SCO member states have authoritarian regimes (China, Russia, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan) in which civil liberties and political rights are restricted. This may raise concerns about the principles of participation and representation in decision-making within the organization.

²⁰ The list of organizations recognized as terrorist and extremist in the Member States Collective Security Treaty Organization. [https:// https://antiterror.odkb-csto.org/terror_orgs/](https://antiterror.odkb-csto.org/terror_orgs/) (accessed: 22.01.2024)

Decisions in the SCO are often made in the form of informal consultations and negotiations between high-ranking representatives of the member states. This can make it difficult for the public to access decision-making processes and increase the likelihood of a limited number of people influencing decisions. In case of disagreements between the SCO member states, there are no clear and formalized mechanisms for their resolution. This can lead to problems in conflict resolution and create risks for stability in the region. Although the SCO provides a mechanism for dialogue and cooperation between States, its lack of democratic decision-making mechanisms may raise questions about the legitimacy and transparency of the decision-making process within the organization. They may indicate that several SCO member states have authoritarian regimes, which makes it difficult to develop democratic norms and values in the organization.

4. Transparency in the SCO's activities may be one of the aspects of concern. Internal decisions and discussions within the SCO are often conducted behind closed doors without extensive public debate or the participation of civil societies. This leads to a feeling of a lack of openness and transparency in the organization's activities. Some aspects of the SCO's activities, such as decisions taken at summits or meetings, may be little accessible to the public. This can create obstacles to understanding the actions and decisions taken in the organization.

SCO financing and expenditures have been insufficiently transparent. The lack of information about how the organization's funds are used, and which projects are funded raised enough questions for me about the effectiveness and fairness of resource allocation. These and other factors may contribute to the perception of a lack of transparency in the SCO's activities. Increasing transparency and openness in the work of the organization can help to increase its credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of the public and the international community. They may indicate that several SCO member states have authoritarian regimes, which makes it difficult to develop democratic norms and values in the organization.

5. The SCO competes with other regional and international organizations, such as the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, or with NATO, instead of cooperating with them to achieve common goals of international stability and development. Although the competition between the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and NATO (North Atlantic Alliance) is not direct or explicit since they operate in different regions of the world and have different goals and priorities. However, some aspects of their activities may be seen as competing or influencing each other.

NATO focuses on security and defense in Europe and North America, while the SCO focuses on economic and political cooperation in Asia, both organizations can compete for

influence in strategically important regions such as Central Asia. In the context of defense and security, situations may arise when NATO and the SCO conduct military exercises or establish military cooperation in the same regions. This may create some tension and competition for influence among the countries under their influence. Both organizations can also influence regional stability through their actions and policies. The priorities and strategies of NATO and the SCO may differ, and their impact on neighboring regions may be resisted or feared by each other. At the same time, NATO and the SCO can also cooperate and engage in dialogue on common interests, such as combating terrorism, drug trafficking and other transnational threats. This allows them to reduce potential conflicts and improve mutual understanding.

The SCO continues to work to improve its effectiveness and expand its influence, but a few factors may hinder its ability to achieve the expected results in solving regional problems. These and other aspects may be the object of criticism of the SCO. However, the organization continues to play an important role in regional cooperation in East Asia and Central Asia, and its work is evaluated by different countries and parties depending on their interests and priorities.

2.5. REGIONAL SECURITY

Large-scale threats are directly related to regional security. But in different regions they manifest themselves in different ways. The policy of international actors affects only partially.

²¹ Regional security is international security in a certain region of the world. Regional security is like international security, but it has many differences, such as forms of manifestation, balances of forces, and various traditions.

Firstly, both international organizations (OSCE) and associations of States (OAU) can ensure security. Regional security occupies a central place in the activities of international organizations and is also intertwined with the main issues of their activities.

Secondly, maintaining security in the region requires the attention and interest of the great Powers. Studying world history, it is possible to determine whether war or armed conflict is inversely proportional to the distance between states. Progress in science and globalization have reduced the importance of this theory, but not destroyed it at all. Military conflicts in the region require greater concern of States. During the Cold War, the policy of intervention of

²¹ Lukashuk I.I.: International law. Special part: studies. for law students. fac. and universities; Russian Academy of Sciences, Institute of State and Law, Academy of Sciences. Legal Un-T. - Ed. 3rd, reprint. and additional - M.: Walters Kluwer, 2015. 544.

great powers in local conflicts overshadowed the independence of actors acting in the conflict. Today, the intervention of the leading powers to counter new threats has not yet acquired the same intensity. Consequently, many actors behave more autonomously.

A region is a group of States whose common issue is security. Recently, States that have an impact on the security of the region have joined the existing countries of the region. Usually, the location of the regions from the point of view of security coincides with the location of well-established partnerships between states.

After the Cold War, the usual configuration of the regions changed. For example, the regions of the Middle East and the Middle East that were considered separately are currently being united in the issue of security into a single region of the Greater Middle East or the Middle East. Similar processes can be seen in the Asia-Pacific region. But some states are very difficult to attribute to any region. For example, Turkey, in the matter of security, refers to both the European and Eurasian regions.²²

At the same time, from the point of view of "threat intensity", there is a redistribution of regions in the global aspect. A region like Europe is becoming one of the most stable and safer, despite its history. The Middle East is becoming the epicenter of conflict. Security activities in the Asia-Pacific region are acquiring new meanings. India and Pakistan are acquiring nuclear weapons; therefore, this region is of interest to the United States.

A new quality in the field of regional security with high potential is the "post-Soviet space". Directly, this term refers to the common heritage of the region. It is impossible not to notice that there is military and political potential in this region, the authority of the great powers is growing, priorities and interests are changing.

The collapse of the USSR and the formation of new independent state entities in Eurasia were the circumstances that destabilized the concept of global and regional relations. After all the historical events, new conflicts and security threats have occurred in the region. Three forces: terrorism, extremism and separatism seriously threaten the security and stability of all states.²³

The activities of terrorism and the distribution of drugs required immediate intervention. The SCO tried to stabilize the region. The Organization has established its core values for maintaining security, putting first the problem of combating terrorism, extremism, and separatism.

²² Public International Law: Textbook / Edited by D. K. Bekyashev. M., 2019. 553 p.

²³ Vorobyov V.: Развитие ШОС. *Interview cor. RIA Novosti.* URL: <http://www.dni.ru/news/russia/2004/10/13/22604.html> (access: 23.01.2023).

The region has formed before the SCO not only the issue of the three forces of evil, but also the problems of drug trafficking, weapons and transnational crime, environmental problems, socio-economic education, and how effectively the SCO will be able to solve these problems, so security in the region will be determined.²⁴

The SCO has formed several elements and facilities that are able to regulate security measures in the region. The organization began to develop within the framework of the law. Firstly, the Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism was signed, aimed at forming practical cooperation between law enforcement agencies and special services in combating these issues, other agreements were signed.²⁵

After, the "Agreement between the SCO member States on the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure" was signed.²⁶

Once formed, the RATS made every effort to fulfill the tasks of combating terrorism and extremism. In 2022, the bodies of the SCO member states suppressed the activities of 73 clandestine cells of international terrorist organizations, prevented 69 terrorist attacks and 46 crimes of a terrorist and extremist nature. 13,166 channels of financing of international terrorist organizations have been opened.²⁷

In addition, measures are being taken to form a "list of terrorists, separatist and extremist institutions whose work is prohibited in the territories of the SCO member states." At the same time, there is no general idea of which organizations are considered terrorist and which threaten the security of the State. The final registration of the general (unified) lists of terrorist and extremist institutions is complicated by State differences. Not all terrorist organizations operating on the territory of the States of the Central Asian region are recognized by some countries as such.

Thus, the work of the "Islamic Party of Turkestan" and the "Organization for the Liberation of East Turkestan" is banned in three countries, "Al-Qaeda" and the "Taliban

²⁴ Agreement between the SCO member States on a Regional Anti-terrorist Structure, 23.02.2006/http://www.ecrats.com/content_rus/docs/23.02.06.html (June 20, 2006)

²⁵ The Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism. Shanghai, June 15, 2001. *Moscow Journal of International Law*. - 2001, - No4. - pp. 3-10.

²⁶ The Agreement between the SCO member States on the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure, 23.02.2006/http://www.ecrats.com/content_rus/docs/23.02.06.html (June 20, 2006)

²⁷ The RATS made every effort to fulfill the tasks of combating terrorism and extremism. URL: <http://berlek-nkp.com/analitics/11418-rats-shos-za-god-predotvratila-41-terakt-v-stranah-organizacii.html?ysclid=lmrmqei9j684870545> (access: 05.09.2023)

Movement of Afghanistan" - four, and the "Islamic Movement of East Turkestan", "Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan" and "Hizb-ut-Tahrir al-Islami" - in Five.²⁸

The RATS notifies the SCO member States of new developments in terrorism, configurations and methods of operation of terrorist and separatist institutions that pose a threat to the security of the SCO member states. In accordance with the decisions of the SCO RATS Council of Directors of the Council of the Executive Committee, semi-annual bulletins "on the status and trends of the situation, manifestations of terrorism, separatism and extremism participating in the SCO member states" are published quarterly.

In 2002, the SCO recognized the formation of the concept of combating drugs along the borders of Afghanistan.²⁹

At the Tashkent Council of Heads of State and Government of the SCO countries in 2004, it was decided to form an Afghanistan-SCO coordination Council to support efforts to control borders and combat drug trafficking. Within the framework of this partnership, activities on the formation of a drug control zone on the borders of Afghanistan.³⁰

Even though the fight against drug trafficking and drug trafficking within the SCO is still not as deep as anti-terrorist work, there are all the promises of its formation. In addition to the anti-drug belt on the borders of Afghanistan, at the Tashkent Summit in 2004, an "agreement on joint work to combat the illicit distribution of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and their precursors" was adopted.³¹

To ensure equally effective work in the fight against drugs, as well as work on combating terrorism, it is necessary to create a mechanism for coordinating legislation, the work of specialized services and agencies to conclude certain contracts in the fight against narcotic substances on the example of RATS. This will increase efficiency and create a practical link between the Central Asian States with this task. If Afghanistan participates in this structure, it will be very productive.

²⁸ SCO countries have approved a "blacklist" of terrorist organizations, 04.04.2006/<http://www.pr.kg/n/detail.php?id=6708> (May 21, 2006)

²⁹ Karneev A.: Научная конференция "ШОС: Проблемы и перспективы межгосударственных отношений в Евро-Азиатском регионе". *Problems of the Far East*. - 2004. - No5

³⁰ On the ratification of the Agreement between the member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure: Federal Law of the Russian Federation of March 5, 2004. No. 7-FZ. URL: <http://www.aneews.ru/archive / 738827.htm> (February 2006)

³¹ Agreement between the member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on Cooperation in Combating Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances and Their Precursors. Tashkent, June 17, 2004. URL: http://www.kremlin.ru/interdocs/2004/06/17/0000_type72066_75285.shtml?type=72066.html (December 2005)

Unfortunately, the fight against drug production in Central Asia is not happening in any way. The problem of drug production defines the problem of changing narcotic plants for culture. It is also necessary to study projects on the formation of an agricultural economy, support for scientific research, obstacles to the growth of narcotic drugs.

To combat drug production, it is necessary to formulate the concept of international inspections and observers to control the cultivation of narcotic drugs, according to the example of the OSCE and the UN, which regularly monitor conditions in the region that are not represented in the SCO.³²

The fight against drugs, both at the local and intergovernmental levels, requires constantly significant financial resources. The budget problem is one of the main difficulties of the SCO.

Filling the budget would be facilitated by including more States in the organization. Cooperation in joint projects with other international organizations would make it possible to plan funds to solve specific problems. An alliance with the CSTO would not allow the allocation of already small resources, since most of the CSTO members are members of the SCO, which would solve many financial problems and increase the efficiency of their activities.³³

Thus, the share of Kazakhstan in the budget of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) decreased, as well as the shares of other member countries due to the accession of Iran.³⁴

Table 2. The budget of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)

Member-states	before ³⁵	after ³⁶
People's Republic of China	20,6%	19.1%

³² Environment and Security: Transforming risks into cooperation - Central Asia - Ferghana / Osh / Khujand area. UNEP, UNDP, OSCE, NATO, 2015

³³ Wu Jiao, Li Xiaokun: Cooperation contracts worth \$2 billion will be signed within the framework of the SCO summit// <http://www.gazeta.kz/art.asp?aid=76824> (June 2016)]. In 2010, the SCO approved the procedure for admitting new members. (June 12, 2019). "The SCO agrees to the expansion." *China Daily*. Archived from the original on June 17, 2010.

³⁴ The Ministry of Finance (MOF) of Kazakhstan reports.

³⁵ Agreement on the procedure for the formation of the budget execution of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (Sochi, December 1, 2017). This Agreement was approved by the Decree of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan dated March 28, 2018. No. PP-3627 "On approval of an international treaty" (Entered into force for the Republic of Uzbekistan on February 26, 2019) (Entered into force for the Republic of India on September 4, 2019)

³⁶ Memorandum of Obligations of the Islamic Republic of Iran to obtain the status of a member State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Samarkand, September 16, 2022 (Effective from July 2, 2023) Article 4. Financial aspects of joining the SCO

Russian Federation	20,6%	19.1%
Republic of Kazakhstan	17,6%	16.4%
Republic of Uzbekistan	14,6%	13.6%
Kyrgyz Republic	8,8%	8.2%
Republic of Tajikistan	6%	6%
Republic of India	5,9%	5,9%
Islamic Republic of Pakistan	5.9%	5.9%
Islamic Republic of Iran		5.8%

Source: It follows from the draft resolution of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan on signing the protocol on amendments to the Agreement on the Procedure for the formation and execution of the SCO Budget dated December 1, 2017", posted on the official website of the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

Another threat to the region is illegal migration, which has become a problem for the rapidly developing states of the region, Kazakhstan, and the Russian Federation, which have become a beacon for the population of other states who want to work and earn. In the conditions of destabilization, migration flows in each of the states of the region will be directed to other surrounding states. In addition, human trafficking in Central Asia is threatened. Especially, girls are in sexual slavery.

In Central Asia, the likelihood of conflicts is high due to the uneven use of water resources. In addition, there are many environmental problems in the region. These are landfills of radioactive waste, territories contaminated with radioactive substances caused by nuclear tests and storage of residues, a significant problem and dehydration of the Aral Lake. All of the above difficulties are solved, first of all, by the states of this region, many organizations that are trying to implement projects in environmental and conflict areas here -UNDP, OSCE, the NATO program "Security Science".³⁷

The accession of India, Pakistan and Iran to the organization will sooner or later cause the organization to include problems in joint work in the field of nuclear safety. At a press conference in 2005, Executive Secretary Zhang acknowledged that the issue of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons could be the subject of discussion by all parties.

³⁷ Report on Human Development in Central Asia/ into the future without barriers: Regional cooperation in the field of human development and human security. *UNDP Regional Office for Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States*, 2005

In addition, the problem of non-proliferation can be solved in the fight against terrorism. However, this point of view will be announced only until the SCO RATS have such problems.³⁸ The SCO also declares its inclination to strengthen the strategic stability of international systems in the field of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Executive Secretary Zhang Degang also stated that "within the framework of the SCO countries, a system has been created to combat the proliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, but so far the organization does not have legal documents on this issue."

To form a mechanism and structure of partnership in the field of nuclear safety, the SCO must still conclude numerous agreements. The presence of such nuclear countries as the Russian Federation, China, Iran, India, and Pakistan can make the issue of nuclear control one of the most important and effective in the work of the SCO.³⁹

Unfortunately, the above-mentioned security problems have not been developed, and the possibilities of partnership to solve these problems within the SCO have not yet been disclosed. There are no projects or specialized agencies that deal with these difficulties, although these difficulties are no less critical than the problems of terrorism and drug trafficking. All this defines the regional problem facing the SCO.

2.6. CULTURAL - HUMANITARIAN COOPERATION BETWEEN THE SCO STATE - MEMBERS

In modern conditions, the image of the state is formed not only by its economic policy in the international arena, not only by its foreign policy. Humanitarian cooperation is also of considerable importance. The explanatory encyclopedic dictionary explains that "international humanitarian cooperation" includes cooperation between states on issues of culture, science, information, sports, tourism, etc.

Through knowledge of the language, traditions and, in general, the culture of another people, a positive perception of other national cultures is formed, a tolerant attitude towards other peoples, resulting in trust between people.

Thus, humanitarian cooperation between States is of great practical importance: it allows States to interact more successfully in security issues, to counter such modern problems as terrorism and extremism.

³⁸ The SCO member states agreed on the need to form a coordination structure to combat drug trafficking. URL: <http://www.scosummit.org/> (accessed: 21.05.2022)

³⁹ Musharraf P. : Pakistan intends to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Interview cor. *RIA Novosti* and *ITAR-TAS*. URL: <http://www.lenta.ru/world/musharraf.htm> (access:02.02.2022).

It is no coincidence that one of the activities of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is humanitarian cooperation. The Charter of this organization stipulates "expansion of cooperation in the field of science and technology, education, healthcare, culture, sports and tourism".

In the context of globalization, humanitarian cooperation is becoming a priority. It is through humanitarian cooperation that States and organizations gain credibility in the international arena and create a positive image of themselves. This work involves popularizing their culture through the organization of cultural centers, working with compatriots, attracting foreigners to work. In turn, all this requires considerable financial injections. Large states, realizing the importance of cultural and humanitarian cooperation, invest significant funds. The countries that joined the SCO represent different civilizational and cultural communities: Confucianism, Islam, Christianity, and Hinduism. This circumstance can play a twofold role: on the one hand, it can contribute to the mutual enrichment of cultures, on the other hand, it can be a kind of barrier.

Issues of humanitarian cooperation are an area of cooperation where there is practically no discussion, where the interests of the main participants coincide. Nevertheless, the capabilities and the position of the SCO countries are not the same in solving the problem of humanitarian cooperation. Even though the organization has existed since 2001, the implementation of humanitarian ties does not begin until 2005.

The main document regulating the cultural interaction of the SCO countries is the Agreement between the governments of the SCO member states on Cooperation in the field of culture, signed on August 16, 2007, in Bishkek. But the real work with the adoption of plans began with the creation of an expert group on cultural interaction in 2005. As a result, the number of events held began to grow, for example, art festivals of the SCO member states have been held on a regular basis since 2005. The album "Dialogue of Civilizations" was created, which provides an overview of the cultures of the Member States of the Organization.

Cooperation in the field of education is based on an intergovernmental agreement on cooperation in the field of education. The Agreement was signed in June 2006 and entered into force on January 1, 2008. According to the document, it provides for the exchange of students, scientific and pedagogical personnel, the study of languages, history, culture of the SCO member states. The SCO member states have agreed on mutual recognition of educational documents and academic degrees and titles received by graduates of educational institutions of the Organization's countries.

An initiative role in the field of education, science and innovative technologies was taken by the SCO Business Council, a non-governmental organization structure created by the Council of Heads of State of the Organization and uniting authoritative representatives of its business community.

The idea of creating the SCO University, expressed by Vladimir Putin in 2007, was discussed at the SCO Business Council, where it was decided to involve several major reputable Russian universities in this process: MSU, MGIMO, MGLU, Peoples' Friendship University and new federal universities, such as the Siberian Federal University.

At the SCO summit in Yekaterinburg in 2007, it was decided to launch the activities of a Network Distributed University (SCO University). With this decision of the heads of state, the practical implementation of the common educational space within the SCO began. Already in the following years 2008, 2009-2011, work began on the development of the basic documents of the SCO University: the Concept of the SCO, the Order of interaction of universities. This work was entrusted to Russia. It was not a random choice. The countries of Central Asia have a long-standing connection with Russia, in addition, a few Slavic universities have already been opened in the sovereign countries of the region, teaching according to Russian educational standards. The Soviet system at one time was taken as the basis of the educational system of the People's Republic of China.

China actively supports cooperation in the field of education. First, the Chinese side allocates scholarships to students in China from the SCO member states. There is a Chinese language study program in Central Asian countries and teacher training at the Northwestern University of China. Chinese language contests are held regularly, and the number of people who want to study it is growing.

Educational and cultural cooperation is developing most successfully in the space of the SCO member states. The creation of a common educational space of the Organization will contribute to the strengthening of the SCO as a regional international organization.

An equally important area of humanitarian cooperation between the SCO countries is cooperation in the field of healthcare. The need for cooperation between the Organization's countries is dictated by the situation in the CAR countries in the field of healthcare: the state of the medical base in hospitals in the region, insufficiently qualified personnel and, accordingly, the question of the quality of medical care.

Globalization itself is pushing for this cooperation, when we are witnessing an increase in labor migration, the internationalization of food trade and are witnessing extensive cross-border epidemics. Therefore, the issue of the quality of sanitary control at the borders, the

condition of food transported across the border, the health of livestock and the quality of meat and dairy products is acute.

An urgent prerequisite for cooperation in the field of healthcare is the problem of drug trafficking and related infections: HIV/AIDS. This problem has long been international and requires the efforts of all countries. The proximity to Afghanistan makes the CAR countries vulnerable to the spread of drugs and their transit. Through the Central Asian countries, drugs enter Russia and further to the West. China is also facing this problem, and everywhere there is an increase in drug use. In such a situation, joint actions of the SCO member states will be natural. First, these actions are aimed at training qualified personnel, conducting training and internships of specialists, exchanging experience and ideas between the SCO countries. Humanitarian cooperation of the SCO countries also covers such areas as prevention and liquidation of emergency situations, ecology, tourism. Cooperation in all these areas is planned and is proceeding with varying degrees of success.

Humanitarian cooperation contributes to the rapprochement of the peoples of Eurasia, strengthening the potential and authority of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The intercultural contacts of neighboring peoples are rooted in deep history. For a long historical period, the SCO member states have been in a common territorial and cultural space, lived, created and made a huge contribution to world civilization. Since ancient times, the SCO countries have sought to have close ties and contacts with their neighbors. Among the mountains and deserts for centuries they have been trampled paths, later united into a single concept of the Great Silk Road. From time immemorial, the "Silk Road" connected the peoples of the countries. Documents show that a monk of the Tang Empire made a pedestrian crossing through the present Pamir Highlands (ancient Tsunlin) to study in India.

The Great Silk Road, which was one of the very first caravan routes, in ancient times and the Middle Ages connected the ancestral lands of the Central Asian countries with China and India, Ancient Egypt and Babylon, Persia and Byzantium. He played an important role in the rapprochement of peoples, the development of trade, and the exchange of cultures.

The expansion of the SCO's sphere of competence allows us to put forward new models of interaction of cultural development within the SCO countries, where the main goal is to develop multilateral cooperation in education, science, mass communications, sports, tourism, and protection of cultural heritage. In this regard, activities are underway to develop and support projects of cooperation between countries within the SCO states in these areas, to create an effective mechanism for strengthening the scientific, educational, and cultural potential of countries that can prevent the manifestation of any kind of extremism. Today we can say that

this mechanism is already being created. A flexible and efficient structure is being developed, which allows us to quickly respond to real needs arising in the field of humanitarian cooperation.

Interaction in the field of culture in the SCO space has combined creative energy, experience, intelligence and, finally, the unique culture of all the peoples of the SCO countries. The dynamics of relations in the field of cultural cooperation has a positive impact on the development of their relations within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The results of the four meetings of the Ministers of Culture of the SCO member states (respectively Beijing, 2002; Astana, 2005; Tashkent, 2006 and Dushanbe, 2007), as well as the adoption of long-term plans and programs of interaction, are of lasting importance for the development of multilateral cultural ties within the SCO.

The SCO culture ministers met for the first time in Beijing on April 12, 2002, and signed a joint statement on the continuation of cooperation. The joint Statement of the Ministers of Culture of the SCO member states, adopted at that time, was of great importance for the legal provision of cultural cooperation of the participants of the regional organization. The document provided for the holding of festivals and exchange days of culture, the participation of art collectives and artists in them, the organization of tours of creative collectives, cooperation in the field of monument protection, museum and library work, cinematography, television, radio broadcasting, publishing, and sports.

The implementation of the plan of multilateral cultural cooperation between the SCO member States for 2005-2006, adopted at the Astana Meeting of the Ministers of Culture of the SCO member States, generally contributed to the preservation of the diversity of cultures of the SCO member states, mutual respect, and the wide dissemination of knowledge about the traditions and customs of peoples living in the Eurasian space. The SCO-sponsored art festival and exhibition were held for the first time during the 2005 summit in Astana. Kazakhstan also proposed to hold a folk-dance festival under the auspices of the SCO. A similar festival was held in 2008 in Astana.

The existence of various civilizations and the mutual enrichment of their cultures have undoubtedly played and continue to play an important role in preserving and strengthening the spirit of friendship in the region.

At the third meeting of the Ministers of Culture of the SCO member states in April 2006 in Tashkent, the Plan of Multilateral Cultural Cooperation for 2007-2008 was approved. The Republic of Tajikistan was one of the active participants of the art festivals held within the

framework of the SCO. The festivals have made an important contribution to the strengthening of friendship relations between States and their peoples.

Tajikistan has contributed to the development of cultural ties between the SCO member states. From April 23 to April 26, 2007, a meeting of the Ministers of Culture of the SCO member states was held in Dushanbe, following which a draft agreement between the governments of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization member states on cultural interaction was approved.

The President of Uzbekistan at the Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Astana in 2017 initiated the creation of the SCO Public Diplomacy Center. At the end of January 2019, the SCO Public Diplomacy Center opened its doors in Tashkent. The main task of the new Center is to strengthen trust and good neighborliness, interethnic and interfaith harmony, and the development of an inter-civilizational dialogue.

Its appearance was due to several factors at once. In a relatively short period of time, the SCO has become an influential international organization playing a significant role in international relations. Currently, the organization including member states, observers and dialogue partners, brings together 23 countries.

The SCO territory occupies about a quarter of the earth's area and unites almost half of the world's population. Undoubtedly, possessing such a huge potential, the SCO plays an important role in the formation of a new type of relations on the Eurasian continent. And in this regard, the widespread use of the mechanisms of public diplomacy acquires special significance.

In the context of the intensifying processes of globalization and integration throughout the world, people's diplomacy is becoming one of the main elements of international relations. The use of the tools of such diplomacy will undoubtedly contribute to the rapprochement of the SCO countries and their peoples, strengthening the spirit of mutual trust and good neighborliness.

The main goal of the center is to contribute to the further deepening of the dialogue and further rapprochement of the SCO countries and their peoples, strengthening the spirit of mutual trust and good neighborliness. To achieve this goal, it is planned to carry out large-scale educational work aimed at mutual knowledge of the rich historical and cultural heritage, the centuries-old traditions of the peoples of the countries of the organization through the implementation of joint projects and various kinds of events.

Until now the measures taken to develop public diplomacy in the states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization have not been enough for the peoples living here to have ample opportunities to know each other through traditions, culture, and way of life.

In this regard, the establishment of the center is a relevant and timely event. Currently, a "road map" has already been developed for organizing the effective activities of the center, according to which more than 30 events were planned to be held in 2019.

One of the important activities of the center is the expansion of relations with national and foreign partners, because, of course, the implementation of the tasks assigned to it requires the combined efforts of many organizations. For this, work is underway to establish practical interaction with governments and public organizations.

Another important point is that the SCO countries are connected not simply by the political situation in the world. There are deep historical and cultural ties between them, which have united them for millennia, including thanks to the Great Silk Road, which for centuries was a center of trade, exchange of cultural and spiritual values.

The realities of the modern world dictate the need to bring peoples closer together and recreate these processes. Naturally, this cannot be achieved without a cultural and humanitarian component, communication between scientists, experts and ordinary people, holding various festivals, fairs, exhibitions for this, establishing links between universities and cultural objects. With a serious help for the newly created structure, the adoption of a decree by President Shavkat Mirziyoyev on state support for the center became. This document outlines its tasks, providing for the expansion of cultural and humanitarian ties, the creation of conditions for practical interaction between civil society institutions, including youth and women's organizations, cultural and academic, analytical and educational institutions of the SCO countries, the formation of information resources and interaction with funds mass media. The establishment of the SCO Public Diplomacy Center is a timely and promising measure. This event demonstrates not only the increased attention of the government of the country to the development of the SCO, but also contributes to the strengthening of cultural and humanitarian ties with all members of the organization.

Vladimir Tyurdenev, the Russian ambassador to Uzbekistan, argues that in the modern world, people's diplomacy, strengthening direct contacts between the public is becoming increasingly important in international relations, helping representatives of different cultures and civilizations to better understand each other, to study the values on which their worldview is based. In this case, public diplomacy has a number of advantages over state diplomacy. With the help of public diplomacy, people can express their feelings wider and deeper, speak without

any barriers and embellishments. This is the first such institution in the organization's space, designed to strengthen ties between the states of the SCO family and promote the rapprochement of our peoples. With the assistance of the center, the number of materials about the history, culture and traditions of our countries will increase in the mass media. Today, the existing structure of the SCO is a Network University that provides training of highly qualified personnel in such fields as regional studies, ecology, energy, IT technologies and nanotechnology.

The SCO Youth Council also functions effectively. As part of his initiatives, the second forum of young leaders of the organization's countries was held in Khabarovsk in September 2018, which was attended by more than 160 youth representatives from Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, India and Belarus. The participants agreed to create a network of international youth industry business incubators on the territory of universities and business parks, as well as to support the program and project activities of young entrepreneurs in the field of "green economy".

Pakistan, as a recently admitted member of the SCO, attaches great importance to the development of strong friendly relations with all its members. Since our membership, the organization has continued to take strong steps for cooperation, especially in the areas of trade, investment, regional ties, transport, science, technology, agriculture and education.

India appreciates the initiative of the President of Uzbekistan regarding the proposal to appeal to youth, which became one of the documents of the SCO summit held in June in Qingdao.

They are also keeping out Uzbekistan's initiative to establish a university for the development of tourism "Silk Road" in Samarkand and expressed by willingness to promote cooperation in this direction with all the interested institutions in the countries concerned.

The cultural cooperation of the SCO member states is not limited to the participation of creative teams in festivals. The sphere of cultural interaction between these countries is diverse, it expands from year to year, covering the organization and holding on a mutual basis of exhibitions of fine and decorative arts, anniversary events and joint concerts, performances of both art collectives and individual performers, mutual publication and translation of prominent Tajik and Chinese writers and poets, etc. The mentioned events undoubtedly contribute to the popularization of the culture of the states located in the Eurasian space and strengthen bilateral Tajik- Chinese relations.

Thus, it can be concluded that cultural interaction contributed to mutual spiritual enrichment, gave the peoples living in the SCO space a sense of openness, receptivity to external phenomena and stimulated partnership.

2.7. CONCLUSION

In the history of modern international relations, the creation and development of the SCO is the creative meaning of diplomatic practice. It laid the foundation for a new worldview of security, which contains the foundations of mutual trust, disarmament, partnership, and security.

In 2007, the international community confirmed the decision to open a Regional center for preventive Diplomacy in Central Asia in the capital of Turkmenistan, Ashgabat. Neutrality is not a hindrance to ensure that the level of security and cooperation is not high enough. On the contrary, neutral States have some advantages in the field of progressive cooperation and peaceful resolution of international conflicts.

Consideration of the model of permanent neutrality of Turkmenistan made it possible to identify the advantages of the status of neutrality of the subjects of the world community in the process of globalization and cooperation in establishing universal peace and security. Turkmenistan, fulfilling all its rights and obligations arising from its status, is a good example of a State actively participating in the development of the collective security system, mainly at the regional level.

Thus, in modern conditions, the cooperation of states in various spheres is necessary for their full-fledged existence. Basically, such cooperation arises when States join international intergovernmental organizations.

The study revealed that Turkmenistan's membership in the UN and other international organizations did not affect its neutral status in any way. On the contrary, the State has the confidence of international organizations in carrying out certain tasks assigned to it. The current trend of using collective approaches to resolving issues concerning universal peace and well-being leads to the fact that states with a neutral status can participate in almost all structures of the activities of organizations such as the OSCE, SCO, UN, CIS, etc. However, the identified opportunities do not provide for the legitimacy of the participation of neutral states in any military operations.

3. HISTORY OF THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION

3.1. INTRODUCTION

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is an international organization established on June 15, 2001, by the leaders of five countries. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is an influential regional organization established by six countries of the region (the Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Republic of Tajikistan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Uzbekistan). The total territory of the SCO member countries is more than 34 million square kilometers, which is 60% of the territory of Eurasia. The population of the organization's member countries is about 3.4 billion people.

One of the main goals of the states in creating this organization is to strengthen and expand political, economic, trade, scientific and cultural cooperation, as well as the development of relations in the fields of education, transport, communications, and other spheres. At the end of the last century and at the beginning of the new century, the most profound changes took place in the international arena. The geographical and political situation in Eurasia has also undergone significant changes. The countries of the region faced both opportunities and challenges. The current situation has forced the six neighboring countries to ensure peace and stability in the region through cooperation, good neighborliness, mutual trust and mutually beneficial cooperation.

3.2. ESTABLISHING THE SCO

The SCO creation process was hindered mainly by the differences that remained after the collapse of the USSR, which concerned controversial issues in the border area. The relevant negotiations began during perestroika in 1987, but received a new impetus for development after 1991, when the USSR ceased to exist, and China began to resolve these issues with countries that had already appeared in the post-Soviet space and had direct state borders with the PRC: Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ Streltsov D. V.: Территориальный вопрос в афро-азиатском мире. *Moscow. Aspect press.* 2013. 104-105 pp.

A landmark event in this regard was the signing on 26 April 1996 in Shanghai of the "Agreement between the Russian Federation, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan and the People's Republic of China on confidence-building in the military field in the border area". It was this document that formed the basis for the formation of the association of these states, called the Shanghai Five.⁴¹

Within the framework of the "Five" (Uzbekistan, which does not have a direct border with China, distanced itself from such processes at that time) in 1997, an "Agreement on the mutual reduction of armed forces in the border area" was signed, which China has insisted on since the 1980s.⁴²

In January 2001, Uzbekistan joined the Shanghai Five. An important factor in this process was the events in neighboring Afghanistan, in particular the appearance there of many Islamists who fled from Uzbekistan. In addition, the latter has a small section of the border with Afghanistan — 144 km (it is the smallest in length of the external borders of the republic, but due to permanent tension in Afghanistan has become the most problematic). On January 15, 2001, the heads of six states — the Shanghai Five + Uzbekistan — secured the latter's accession to this mechanism.⁴³ On June 14-15, 2001, a new international structure was organized in Shanghai — the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in the format of six states: Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. At the same time, the founding documents of the SCO were signed — the Declaration on the Establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization⁴⁴ and the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism.⁴⁵ Both documents defined the main goals and objectives of the SCO, which continue to play a key role in the organization's activities even now, 20 years later. These include, strengthening trust and friendship between States; cooperation in various fields, especially in political, trade, economic, humanitarian, and cultural; ensuring peace, security and stability in the region; combating terrorism, separatism and extremism.

⁴¹ Bogaturov A.D.: *Международные отношения в Центральной Азии. События и документы. Moscow. Aspect-Press, 2011. pp. 450-453.*


⁴² Agreement between the Russian Federation, the Republic of Kazakhstan, The Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan and the People's Republic of China on the mutual reduction of armed forces in the border area. URL: <https://docs.cntd.ru/document/901779315> (accessed: 19.08.2022).

⁴³ Joint statement of the Heads of State of the Republic of Kazakhstan, China People's Republic, Kyrgyz Republic, Russian Federation, Republic Tajikistan, Republic of Uzbekistan. January 15, 2001. *Secretariat of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization*. URL: <http://www.sectSCO.org/RU/show.asp?id=84> (accessed: 19.08.2022).

⁴⁴ Declaration on the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. *Official website of the President of Russia*. URL: <http://www.kremlin.ru/supplement/3406> (accessed: 19.08.2022).

⁴⁵ Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism. *The official website of the President of Russia*. URL: <http://kremlin.ru/supplement/3405> (accessed: 19.08.2022).

Table 3. The SCO members



Source: *The Expansion of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.* URL: <https://www.visualcapitalist.com/mapped-the-expansion-of-the-shanghai-cooperation-organization/> (access: 01.01.24)

On 7 July 2002, at the SCO summit in St. Petersburg, the Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was adopted, which is currently the main document of the SCO.⁴⁶ The goals stated in the Charter practically repeat the previously announced activities of this organization,

⁴⁶ Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. *Website of the Chairmanship The Russian Federation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2019-2020.* URL: <https://scorussia2020.ru/images/17/25/172532.pdf> (accessed:20.08.2022).

primarily in terms of countering separatism, extremism and terrorism. These goals are closely related to the tasks of combating drug trafficking and illegal migration, promoting the prevention and peaceful settlement of international conflicts.⁴⁷

In July 2005, at the fifth summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, with representatives of India, Iran, Mongolia, and Pakistan attending the SCO summit for the first time, the President of the host country, Nursultan Nazarbayev, greeted the guests with words that had never been used before in any context: "The leaders of the states sitting at this negotiating table are representatives of half of the human population".⁴⁸

On June 9, 2017, the leaders of the SCO member states signed the decision to admit India and Pakistan to the organization.⁴⁹

3.3. DEVELOPMENT OF MEMBERSHIP AND PARTNERSHIP RELATIONS

Since 2005 the SCO has been an observer in the UN General Assembly, the European Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)⁵⁰, the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. In April 2010, the UN and SCO Secretariats signed a Joint Declaration on Cooperation. SCO Secretariat has also established partnerships with the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the World Tourism Organization (UNWTO), and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), in addition to its ongoing cooperation with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) and the UN Office on Counterterrorism (UNCT).

The Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), as well as UNRCCA (United Nations Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia) maintain regular contacts with the SCO officials. The cooperation activities focus on security developments in the region and key issues related to counterterrorism and prevention of violent extremism. In July 2017, DPPA deployed a Liaison Officer to the SCO in Beijing.

⁴⁷ Malyshev D.V.: Шанхайская организация сотрудничества и ее роль в системе современных международных отношений (к 20-летию образования ШОС). *Moscow University Bulletin of World Politics*. 2021. No. 4. P. 81–104. URL: <https://www.imemo.ru/files/File/ru/articles/2021/MoscowUniversityBulletin-042021-Malyshev.pdf> (accessed:20.08.2022).

⁴⁸ Igbayeva M.. The twenty-year-old Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Security, Economic and Cultural Cooperation. *A Haza szolgálatában*. 2021. pp. 111-112.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

In a short period of time, the Organization managed to solve a complex of complex tasks on its institutional and ideological design, create a solid legal framework and effective mechanisms of interaction.

The principles of the "Shanghai Spirit"⁵¹, which are at the heart of the Organization's activities, have defined the ideological and political essence of the SCO as an equal partnership of small and large states and serves as an important guideline in resolving international differences through peaceful political and diplomatic means.

For two decades, the Organization's activities have been aimed at strengthening good-neighborliness, mutual trust and mutual respect for the cultural and civilizational diversity of the Member States, constructive partnership, expanding comprehensive political and economic cooperation, jointly ensuring and maintaining peace, security and stability in the region, advancing towards the creation of a democratic, just and rational new international political and economic order based on equal, joint, indivisible, comprehensive and sustainable security, ensuring the interests of each and every State in accordance with the norms and principles of international law.

Today, the SCO is entering its third decade, a fundamentally new period of its development, due to serious changes in the region and the world. Currently, international relations are going through a stage of deep transformation, strengthening of new political and economic centers of influence, the formation of a world order based on the principles of multipolarity, strengthening the regional level of global governance and strengthening the positions of developing countries. Under these conditions, the SCO makes a significant contribution to the construction of a new type of international relations embodying mutual respect, justice, equality. and mutually beneficial cooperation.

Reaffirming their firm support for the efforts of the UN as a universal multilateral organization that plays a central and coordinating role in maintaining international peace and security, stimulating global development, promoting, and protecting human rights, the SCO stands for preserving the key place of the UN Security Council in the system of maintaining international peace and security provided for by the UN Charter.⁵²

The SCO is a collective security organization which is not an alliance directed against other States and regions. The concept of co-operative security means that states will work together

⁵¹ Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. *CIS Legislation*. June 7, 2002. URL: <https://cis-legislation.com/document.fwx?rgn=3851> (accessed: 12.04.2023).

⁵¹ Igbayeva M. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization 20th anniversary summit meeting - Challenges and Prospects. *A Haza szolgálatában*. 2021. pp. 78-79

⁵² Ibid.

to solve common problems and it often used synonymously with collective security. In international relations the term co-operative security is used to describe cases where states work together to deal with conventional and non-conventional threats and challenges. The SCO was formed in this spirit and by guarantees of equal security for all States. All members of the Organization (alliance) refuse to use force in relations with each other and agree to develop relations through peaceful cooperative way. The official working languages of the SCO are Russian and Chinese.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is an international organization open for interaction, it is an example of fruitful cooperation between representatives of different civilizations: Confucian, Orthodox – Christian, Islamic, Indo–Buddhist.

3.4. THE SCO MEMBERS, OBSERVERS AND DIALOGUE PARTNERS

The SCO is an organization that has concentrated its main interests in the Eurasian region. This is clearly visible on the map. Together with observers, SCO countries cover almost the entire territory of Asia, from India to China and Europe.

The list of SCO countries is not a static document, the organization regularly receives new members. Now there are 9 permanent participants, observers – candidates applying for the status of partners are added to them. In 2023, the list of SCO countries is formally headed by Uzbekistan. It is this State that currently presides over the organization.

Table 4. **The full list of SCO countries for 2023**

Country	Note	Chair / Presidency
<i>Russia</i>	Member of the organization since 1996 (from the Shanghai Five). Stood at the origins of its creation. Their geography is extensive – from Moscow and St. Petersburg to Sochi, Yekaterinburg, Ufa.	2002, 2003, 2009, 2015, 2020
<i>China</i>	One of the main participants, founders of the organization. Since 2003, the SCO headquarters has been permanently located in China. It was at the Shanghai Summit in 2001 that the SCO was announced.	2001, 2006, 2012, 2018
<i>Kazakhstan</i>	One of the founding countries, a member of the Shanghai Five.	2005, 2011, 2017, 2023
<i>Tajikistan</i>	One of the founding countries of the organization.	2000, 2008, 2014 and 2021

<i>Kyrgyzstan</i>	One of the founding countries.	2007, 2013, 2019
<i>Uzbekistan</i>	He was admitted to the SCO in 2001. This procedure marked the beginning of the reformatting of the "five" into a larger international association. In 2022, on September 15-16, she hosted the SCO summit in Samarkand.	2004, 2010, 2016
<i>India</i>	It was accepted into the organization in June 2017. Prior to that, since 2005, it had been acting in the status of an observer country.	
<i>Pakistan</i>	Joined the SCO at the same time as India. He also received observer status in 2005.	
<i>Iran</i>	On September 15, 2022, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian and Secretary General of the organization Zhang Ming signed in Samarkand a memorandum on the country's obligations in order to obtain the status of a SCO member state, after which a final decision was made to grant Iran this status. On November 27, 2022, the Mejlis adopted a bill on Iran's accession to the SCO.	
<i>Belarus</i>	At the stage of official joining the organization. Official accession is expected in 2024. Since 2010, he has been a dialogue partner.	

Source: own editing based on the official documents of the SCO.

In 2005, Iran became an observer state in the SCO. The process of the country's accession to this regional organization began in 2021. Iran has joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a full member. Iran's accession to the organization was officially announced during the 23rd SCO summit, which was chaired by India.⁵³

The new SCO members have not yet hosted summits on their territory. But they will get this right in the order of priority.

⁵³ Sudhi Ranjan Sen. Iran Joins SCO, the China-Founded Regional Security Grouping // URL: <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-07-04/iran-joins-sco-the-china-founded-regional-security-grouping#xj4y7vzkg> (accessed: 08.08.2022)

According to the Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the SCO is an organization open to admission to its membership of other states that undertake to comply with the goals and principles of the Charter, as well as the provisions of other international treaties and documents adopted within the framework of the SCO.

In addition to permanent members, the SCO 2023 list includes states in 2 statuses: observers (candidates) and dialogue partners. They have different opportunities to interact with the SCO on global security issues, legal assistance, and economic programs. According to the Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the SCO is an organization open to admission to its membership of other states that undertake to comply with the goals and principles of the Charter, as well as the provisions of other international treaties and documents adopted within the framework of the SCO.

The position of a Dialogue Partner was created in 2008 in accordance with Article 14 of the SCO Charter of June 7, 2002. This article concerns a dialogue partner as a state or organization that shares the goals and principles of the SCO and wishes to establish a relationship of equal and mutually beneficial partnership with the Organization. *Nine countries* have been granted the status of SCO dialogue partners — Azerbaijan, Armenia, The Arabic Republic of Egypt, Kingdom of Cambodia, The State of Qatar, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka.

On June 16, 2009, at the end of the summit of the SCO member states in Yekaterinburg, it was decided to grant the status of a “dialogue partner” that had not been previously used in the organization’s practice to two countries: The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka and Republic of Belarus.

Belarus received the status of a dialogue partner in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2009 at the group's summit in Yekaterinburg. Belarus applied for observer status in the organization and was promised support from Kazakhstan in achieving this goal. However, then-Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov expressed doubts about the possible membership of Belarus, saying that Belarus is a purely European country. Despite this, Belarus was accepted as a dialogue partner at the 2009 SCO summit. *In 2022, Belarus officially applied to join the SCO as a full member.*

As a result of the video-format meeting of the SCO Council of Heads of State, a memorandum of obligations of the Republic of Belarus was signed on July 4 to obtain the status of a member state of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. During the summit, a memorandum was signed on the commitments of the Republic of Belarus in the process of joining the organization as a full member state. This memorandum has been signed by all

countries without exception, signed by the Secretary General of the organization. The further process will relate to the ratification of this memorandum and the entire package of our obligations by all member countries. As soon as the ratification process by all countries is completed, it will be possible to talk about Belarus' full membership in the SCO, it is expected that in early 2024 Belarus, which still has observer status, will become its full member.⁵⁴

Sri Lanka received the status of a dialogue partner in the SCO in 2009 at the group's summit in Yekaterinburg. *Turkey*, a NATO member, received the status of a dialogue partner in the SCO in 2012 at the group's summit in Beijing. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said that he even jokingly discussed the possibility of Turkey's refusal to join the European Union in exchange for full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.⁵⁵ On September 14, 2022, in Tashkent, in preparation for the summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a ceremony of signing memoranda on granting the status of a SCO dialogue partner to The Arabic Republic of Egypt and The State of Qatar was held. In 2022, at the Samarkand SCO Summit, the procedure for joining the Organization in the status of a dialogue partner state in relation to *Bahrain, Maldives, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Myanmar* was initiated.⁵⁶

The procedure and procedures for granting such status are established by a special agreement between the Member States. The status of a dialogue partner at the SCO is an intermediate stage between the status of an observer and a member of the SCO.

The procedure for granting the status of a dialogue partner at the SCO to an interested state or intergovernmental international organization is defined in the Regulation "On the status of a dialogue partner at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization", which was adopted at the SCO summit in Dushanbe.⁵⁷

According to the Regulation "On the status of a Dialogue Partner", a state or organization wishing to obtain the status of a dialogue partner at the SCO on the basis of respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and equality of the Member States, recognition of the main goals, principles and actions of the Organization, must send appeals to the Council of

⁵⁴ Bernstein D. Беларусь вступает в ШОС. Как Китай может помочь Лукашенко? *Deutsche Welle*. URL: <https://www.dw.com/ru/belarus-vstupayet-v-sos-cem-kitaj-mozet-pomoc-lukasenko/a-66222228> (accessed: 08.08.2022)

⁵⁵ M. Igibayeva. *A Haza szolgálatában*. 2021. pp. 113-114.

⁵⁶ 上海合作组织成员国元首理事会撒马尔罕宣言 [Samarkand Declaration of the Council of Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Member States] // URL: http://ru.china-embassy.gov.cn/zgxw/202209/t20220917_10767328.htm?ysclid=llv7o8h9ig310357685 (accessed: 08.08.2023)

⁵⁷ Alimov R. ШОС на саммите в Душанбе приняла решения в пользу расширения. *Renmin Zhibao* URL: <http://russian.people.com.cn/n3/2021/0917/c95181-9898035.html> (accessed: 08.08.2022)

Heads of SCO Member States (SGG), signed accordingly the head of state or the head of the organization indicating those areas of cooperation within the SCO in which this state or organization would like to receive the status of a dialogue partner.

A State or organization that has received the status of a dialogue partner may be invited to open meetings of the Council of Heads of State and/or the Council of Heads of Government (Prime Ministers) of the SCO member States within the framework of the cooperation of the dialogue partner with the SCO.

A State or organization that has received the status of a dialogue partner has the right to: attend open meetings of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the SCO Member States (CFM) and Meetings of Heads of Ministries and/or departments of the SCO member states within the framework of their cooperation with the SCO; participate without the right to vote and with the prior consent of the chairman in the discussion of issues in within the areas of their cooperation with the SCO; to distribute written statements on issues of interest to them within the areas of their cooperation with the SCO, which is within the competence of the SCO; get access to documents and decisions of the SCO bodies, within the framework of their cooperation with the SCO, if the relevant SCO bodies do not impose restrictions on their dissemination.

The status of a dialogue partner does not give the right to participate in the preparation and signing of the Organization's documents adopted within the framework of cooperation with the SCO. The dialogue partners also do not participate in the development of decisions of the SCO bodies within the framework of areas of cooperation with the SCO and are not responsible for such decisions.

If a State or organization that has received the status of a dialogue partner commits actions or statements directed against the Organization, decisions of the SCO bodies or principles laid down in the Charter, such a State or organization may be deprived of the status of a dialogue partner.

Observer status allows states, with the consent of the SCO members, to participate in meetings of the organization, discussions. At the same time, they do not have the right to vote. Three countries currently have this status: *Mongolia, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, and Republic of Belarus* (applied for membership in September 2022 at the summit in Samarkand, Republic of Uzbekistan).⁵⁸

⁵⁸ Regulation on the Status of Observer to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization // URL: <https://www.google.com/url?sa=i&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=0CDkQw7AJahcKEwjQzZnnI>

Among other countries in the Central Asia region, *Mongolia* became the first country to receive observer status at the Tashkent summit (2004).⁵⁹ The Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Republic of India, and Iran before becoming full members of the organization, they were observers and received observer status at the summit in Astana in 2005. At a series of meetings in February 2006 with Chinese officials and journalists, President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan Pervez Musharaff cited arguments willingness of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to join the organization as a full member. The Islamic Republic of Pakistan signed an agreement on extradition of terrorists from the Republic of Uzbekistan to cooperate actively in the Contact Group of the SCO – Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, conducting active ideological and military struggle against Al - Qaeda and the Taliban, and so on. In terms of the economy with the help of the SCO countries to strengthen their positions of traditional exporter of textiles and footwear, rice, high-quality medical equipment, as well as an importer of fine-staple cotton and energy resources (Pakistan is one of the last in the world for energy production).⁶⁰

Tehran received observer status at the SCO back in 2005, after which it applied for full membership in 2008. But until 2015, Iran could not be admitted to the association because of the international sanctions in force against it. According to the rules of the SCO, a country under the sanctions of the UN Security Council cannot become a member, and several restrictive measures have been applied against Iran. The sanctions were lifted in 2015 when Tehran agreed to limit its nuclear program. But even this did not open the door to the SCO for him. Unexpectedly, the Iranian application was blocked by Tajikistan, which previously had perhaps the warmest relations with Iran among all the SCO countries. Dushanbe accused Tehran of supporting the Islamic Renaissance Party of the Republic of Tajikistan (IRPT, banned in Tajikistan) and indirect involvement in the organization of terrorist acts. Today, relations between the two countries have returned to a friendly channel, and its new President Ebrahim Raisi attended the fateful summit for Iran in Dushanbe.⁶¹

In 2017, *Republic of India* and *Islamic Republic of Pakistan* joined the organization, and on September 17, 2021, at the anniversary meeting in honor of the 20th anniversary, the

[CBAXUAAAAHQAAAAQAw&url=http%3A%2F%2Feng.sectsc.org%2Fload%2F197725%2F&psig=AOvVaw2w0yqUWK7c8ieZslUfGcNY&ust=1693342039149205&opi=89978449](http://www.sco.international/ru/press-center/press-releases/2021/08/08/2021080801) (accessed: 08.08.2022)


⁵⁹ Deng Hao. 20 years of the SCO: Development, Experience and Future Direction. *China Institute of International Studies*. 2021. URL: https://www.ciiis.org.cn/english/ESEARCHPROJECTS/Articles/202112/t20211203_8276.html (accessed: 08.08.2022)

⁶⁰ M. Igibayeva. *A Haza szolgálatában*. 2021. p 113

⁶¹ M. Igibayeva. *A Haza szolgálatában*. 2021. p 85

participants of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit, which was held in Dushanbe, signed a package of several dozen documents. One of the most important points was the decision of the Council of Heads of SCO member states to start the procedure for Iran’s admission to the organization. Formally, this decision does not yet make Tehran a full member of the SCO, but only launches the process of joining the organization. Full acceptance involves signing several agreements, which usually takes about two years. However, in fact, a fundamental decision has been made, and the Islamic Republic can already be called a full member of the organization.

Map 1: The SCO members, observer, and dialogue partners



Source: <https://www.quora.com/What-is-the-Shanghai-Cooperation-Organization-SCO-What-are-its-member-states-and-what-are-their-positions-in-the-world-order-What-does-the-SCO-contribute-to-the-world-order> (accessed: 15.05. 2023)

Table 5. The list of dialogue and observer states

Date	Note
October 2011	Turkey submitted an official request for partner status to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).
6 June 2012	At the summit in Beijing, Afghanistan received observer status.

7 June, 2012	The SCO Council of Heads of State decided to grant observer status to Afghanistan and Turkey's dialogue partner status.
2013	Vladimir Putin proposed to approve the official procedure for admitting new members to the SCO, according to which it is planned to admit Mongolia, Republic India, and Islamic Republic of Pakistan
August 2012	The President of Ukraine announced its desire to become an observer country in the SCO.
13 February, 2015	The Syrian Arab Republic recently applied to participate in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as an observer. There are also applications for obtaining observer status of the organization from Azerbaijan, Armenia, Bangladesh, and Nepal.

Source: own editing based on the official documents of the SCO.

Since 2001, after the Republic of Uzbekistan's accession, the SCO has postponed expansion until 2017, when Republic of India and Islamic Republic of Pakistan joined. First, the SCO members feared attempts to "dilute" the organization and, as a result, reduce its "weight" in the world community. Secondly, the accession of India and Pakistan to the SCO could reduce the effectiveness of its work since the foreign policy interests of these countries differ significantly. Third, the entry of Iran against the background of the aggravation of the situation around the Iranian nuclear program could position the SCO as a bloc and cause a deterioration in relations with Europe and the United States, cooperation with which India and China value. For India, the SCO plays an important role in resolving issues of political, economic cooperation, in the field of security and relations between peoples in the region. They are ready to make every effort to the joint fight against common threats and challenges of our time, as well as deepening dialogue and cooperation in various fields. For instance, Russian Federation, which has established close economic cooperation with this country, in turn has repeatedly stated that it agrees to the accession of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (supported in this by China) only if Republic of India joins the organization at the same time.

According to the Professor H. M. Mammadov, the problem of the Islamic Republic of Iran's participation in the SCO largely problematic country of nuclear weapons and the US relationship with the SCO. For the countries of the Shanghai Organization, Islamic Republic of Iran does not pose any threat, much of which the member countries are concerned about is

China's nuclear program. In addition, Iran is attracting the SCO as an important transport hub and a leading exporter of energy resources.⁶²

Some of the contradictions between the SCO member states and Iran lie in the sphere of territorial disputes. In particular, the issue of dividing the Caspian Sea is still not resolved. While Iran agrees to a part, not less than 20 %, Russian Federation, Republic of Kazakhstan and Republic of Azerbaijan signed the Agreement "On the point of intersection of the dividing lines of the adjacent sections of the seabed of the Caspian Sea", according to which Islamic Republic of Iran will receive less than 14 % along the division line along the usual median line. Russian Federation, Republic of Azerbaijan, and Republic of Turkmenistan - almost 20 %, and Republic of Kazakhstan - 29 %.⁶³

At the same time, it became known that Russian Federation and China wanted to see Islamic Republic of Pakistan and Republic of India as full members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Mainly because both India and Pakistan also possess nuclear weapons and have shown an interest in their further non-proliferation.⁶⁴

Bakhtiyor Khakimov stressed that the topic of expanding the organization is constantly on the agenda, since the organization cannot self-develop in a limited format. Evolution requires a flow of "fresh blood", ideas. Many states have shown interest in such cooperation.⁶⁵

Khakimov mentioned as an example India, which joined the organization along with Republic of Pakistan in 2017. According to him, after this accession, "the power of the SCO has strengthened significantly." "If we talk about the SCO today, it is almost 60% of the territory of the entire Eurasian continent, about 45% of the population of the entire globe. Islamic Republic of Iran, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and a number of other countries have expressed their readiness to join the organization for many years. The expert also said that the Shanghai Organization cannot exist without expansion. "We are receiving a lot of applications with requests to be accepted into the organization or to become observers. For now, natural candidates for membership expansion are Iran, which applied back in 2008, and

⁶² Mammadov H. M.: *Security Problems: the SCO and Iran. Shanghai cooperation organization: towards new frontiers of development*; Collection of materials of the "round table", April 2007. - M.: Publishing house of The Institute of the Far East of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2008. pp. 329-350.


⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ India-Russia-China Explore Alternative to SWIFT Payment Mechanism. *The Economic Times*. November 14, 2019. URL: <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/india-russia-china-explore-alternative-to-swift-payment-mechanism/articleshow/72048472.cms> (accessed: 29.09.2021]

⁶⁵ The SCO has received applications from 16 countries to join the organization. URL: <https://ria.ru/20201109/shos-1583750577.html> (accessed: 09.11.2022]

*Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. The application from him was received in 2015. Also, recently, relevant signals have been received from Mongolia.*⁶⁶

Table 6. Number of populations, GDP, and land area in the world.



Source: *sectSCO.org, World Bank*

With the entry of Republic of India and Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the SCO’s member-states now represent 20 per cent of the world’s GDP and 40 per cent of its population, as well as including four of the declared nuclear powers.

3.5. THE NEW MEMBERS OF THE SCO

The coronavirus settled in India much later than in Europe and the United States, which reminds of the relatively peripheral role of this country in world economic relations, but for its economy, the pandemic seems to have become a much more serious test than for China. Back in March, epidemiological reports from India did not cause much concern, the national quarantine was introduced only in May, but in the following months, the country showed a rapid increase in the incidence. Now the number of diagnosed coronavirus India ranks second in the world after the United States (about 10.7 million people), the number of deaths (more than 154 thousand people) — third after the USA and Brazil. At the same time, it is obvious that the potential for

⁶⁶ M. Igbayeva. 2021. pp. 115

further development of the pandemic in India, with its population of one and a half billion people, is still very high.⁶⁷

Republic of India's GDP will shrink by 9.5% in the 2020-2021 fiscal year, and the economic downturn observed in April-June is "already behind us," the Reserve Bank of India said in a report. As noted by the head of the Reserve Bank of India, Shaktikanta Das, the highest resistance to the pandemic of the coronavirus showed the rural economy. He noted that employment in rural areas is growing, and migrant workers are returning to work in urban areas, where "factories and construction are returning to life."⁶⁸

In the first quarter of fiscal year 2020-2021, India's GDP declined by 23.9% — the worst growth rate of India's economy since 1966, when the country began publishing quarterly data, and the worst performance among the major economies in Asia. Republic of India's economic growth slowed even before the outbreak of the pandemic — in the third quarter of the 2019-20 fiscal year, GDP growth was 4.1%, the lowest rate since the global financial crisis more than a decade ago.⁶⁹

The Reserve Bank of India, the country's central bank, cut interest rates by 115 basis points (1.15 percentage points) in March as part of a measure to protect the economy from the pandemic's disruptions to businesses.⁷⁰

The international agency Moody's Investors Service has published a quite optimistic forecast, according to which a large-scale recovery in demand and economic conditions will support India's strong GDP growth of 10.8% in the next financial year (from April 1, 2021 to March 31, 2022). However, analysts noted that the recovery of the Indian economy due to the difficult situation with the coronavirus will be fragile, and 14 of the 21 largest companies in the country with ratings from Moody's received a negative outlook on them. In particular, Moody's forecasts a deterioration in profitability and business conditions in the oil and gas sector due to lower refining margins, car sales will increase only slightly, and growth will be low in such an important industry for the Indian industry as metallurgy. However, in the telecommunications segment, profitability has already recovered due to higher tariffs, and in the mining sector, good prospects are determined by a stable global outlook.⁷¹

⁶⁷ Igibayeva M. Economic Mobilization Measures for the COVID-19 Pandemic in the SCO member states. *A hadtudomány és a 21. század* 2021. p. 227.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid. p. 228

At a time when the COVID-19 pandemic has reached unprecedented global proportions, Pakistan has made significant strides in the fight against this pandemic. The situation has improved significantly since the Government has formulated a clear strategy, which was implemented by the administrative apparatus. As of the first decade of February 2021, the total number of confirmed cases were about 573,384 people, and the recovery rate was 90%. With this figure among an estimated 1050 new cases, Pakistan is among the few countries where the number of COVID-19 cases has dropped significantly in recent weeks. The peak period was in mid - June. National Command and Operations Center (NCOC) Islamic Republic of Pakistan worked as a " think tank", reviewing the situation on a daily basis, and this achievement would not have been possible without the cooperation of the people. International observers and organizations recognize that they can learn from what happened in Pakistan. At the same time, the threat has not completely disappeared, and it is too early to talk about a victory over COVID-19. Now, Islamic Republic of Pakistan ranks 30th among countries in the number of cases of infection and 30th in the number of deaths.⁷²

The Pakistani authorities have implemented a very promising idea of employment for tens of thousands of people who lost their jobs due to the consequences of the coronavirus pandemic.

The country has already created more than 63 thousand jobs in the forestry sector. This was made possible after Islamabad decided to return to the five-year "Tsunami of Ten Million Trees" program, designed to green Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The program was interrupted due to the Covid-19 pandemic, but now the government has found an opportunity to return to it, despite the budget deficit.

Tens of thousands of unemployed people, mostly from rural areas, were hired to plant trees, protect them from fires and fight illegal logging. Employees are required to wear masks and observe social distancing. Their salaries are paid daily.

3.6. CONCLUSION

The SCO has entered the third decade of development and celebrated the 20th anniversary of the adoption of one of its basic documents — the Charter of the organization. The path she has traveled is both a considerable baggage of achievements and the accumulation of a number of challenges.

⁷² Ibid. p. 228

The achievements of the SCO are known. It is a recognizable subject of international life, a structure that has developed multidisciplinary working mechanisms, has formed a solid documentary base of memoranda, statements, and agreements. Within the framework of continuous institutional processes over 20 years, the composition of its participants has expanded and gained a status step. The SCO is growing both at the expense of full-fledged members, Republic of India and Islamic Republic of Pakistan joined the "six", which signed the SCO Charter in 2002, 15 years later in 2017. Islamic Republic of Iran officially became a full partner of the SCO during the summit in New Delhi, Republic of Belarus is next in line, the admission procedure for it began in 2022, while it is in observer status. Mongolia and Islamic Republic of Afghanistan are also observers in the organization. From the point of view of the general parameters of the world role, the SCO today is spoken of as a structure whose countries represent half of humanity, a quarter of the world's landmass and a third of the world's GDP by PPP.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization continues to play the role of a guarantor of regional stability, especially considering the ever-growing external threats. At the same time, the SCO demonstrates a desire both to expand the geographical scope of its activities and to intensify interaction between its members in a variety of areas.

4. ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SCO

4.1. INTRODUCTION

Now, there is a change in the macroeconomic climate in the Asian zone. In particular, the member states of the SCO, BRICS, CSTO and EAEU associations are acquiring sustainable and unshakeable economic development. This is manifested in the formation and initiation of a unified economic, cultural, and political development strategy. The states that are members of the above-mentioned international associations, in addition to forming a unified policy in different directions, create a legislative framework for the functioning of uniform norms and rules in individual spheres of life. In addition, the integration member states are working to create a "single space" of interaction (by this we should understand a common platform, the main purpose of which is the mutual exchange of the latest technologies, information, experience; improvement of scientific and technical knowledge bases, and more).

4.2. THE STRUCTURE AND DECISION – MAKING BODIES

The Commonwealth of Independent States is characterized by the formation of independent integration structures on its territory, uniting its individual participants to achieve certain goals. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, in addition to several CIS member states, also includes China.

The Declaration on the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was signed on 15 June 2001 by the heads of State of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the People's Republic of China, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan, and the Republic of Uzbekistan.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a "regional organization of multilateral cooperation in various fields" was established based on the Shanghai Five after joining it as a full participant of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

The foundations of cooperation of the Shanghai Five were laid by the Agreement signed between the Russian Federation, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, on the one hand, and the People's Republic of China, on the other hand,

on Confidence-building in the Military Field in the Border Area of 26 April, 1996⁷³ and the Agreement on Mutual Reduction of Armed Forces in the Border Area dated 24 April, 1997.⁷⁴ Following the results of the annual meetings of the heads of State of the Shanghai Five, at which issues of its functioning and activities were considered, documents were adopted aimed at ensuring security and stability in the region, as well as expanding cooperation between states in other areas.

The founding document defining the goals and objectives, principles, structure and activities of the SCO - the Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was signed on 7 June 2002.

According to the Charter⁷⁵, the goals and objectives of the SCO are:

- strengthening mutual trust, friendship and good neighborliness between the Member States; developing multidisciplinary cooperation in order to maintain and strengthen peace, security and stability in the region, contributing to the construction of a new political and economic international order,
- joint counteraction to terrorism, separatism and extremism, fight against drug and arms trafficking, other types of transnational criminal activity, illegal migration,
- effective regional cooperation in various fields; promotion of comprehensive and balanced economic growth, social and cultural development in the region; coordination of approaches to integration into the world economy; promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms,
- maintaining and developing relations with other States and international organizations; cooperation in the prevention and peaceful settlement of international conflicts; joint search for solutions to problems that arise in the 21st century.⁷⁶

Thus, the goals and objectives of the SCO are defined quite broadly. They correspond to the main directions of cooperation within the SCO provided for in Article 3 of the Charter, the list of which is not exhaustive.⁷⁷

⁷³ Agreement between Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and China on Confidence Building in the Military Field in the Border Area // URL: <https://peacemaker.un.org/regional-confidencebuildingborders96> (accessed: 22.10.2021)

⁷⁴ Charter of the SCO // URL: https://www.google.com/url?sa=i&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=0CDcQw7AJahcKEwiY7PPmn4mBAxUAAAAAHQAAAAAQAw&url=http%3A%2F%2Feng.sectsc.org%2Fload%2F203013%2F&psig=AOvVawIP_pPqVh_m52Z53nFfsNfN&ust=1693652080639382&opi=89978449 (accessed: 22.10.2021)

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Article 1 of the Charter

⁷⁷ Charter of the SCO // URL: <https://www.google.com/url?sa=i&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=0CDcQw7AJahcKEwiY7PPmn>

For more than 20 years of its development, the SCO has turned into a clearly structured international organization with a whole system of bodies and divisions. The SCO's institutional structure includes the following bodies: the Council of Heads of State, the Council of Heads of Government (Prime Ministers), the Council of Foreign Ministers, Meetings of Heads of Ministers and/or Departments, the Council of National Coordinators, the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure, the Secretariat.⁷⁸

The Council of Heads of State is the supreme decision-making body of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. This council meets at the SCO summits, which are held every year in one of the capital cities of the member states. The Council of Heads of Government is the second most important body in the SCO. This council also holds annual summits at which its members discuss issues of multilateral cooperation. The council also approves the organization's budget. The Council of Foreign Ministers also hold regular meetings at which they discuss the current international situation and the interaction of the SCO with other international organizations.⁷⁹

The Council of National Coordinators, as its name suggests, coordinates the multilateral cooperation of the member states within the framework of the SCO charter. Headquarters located in Beijing, China.

The supreme body of the SCO is the Council of Heads of State, which, as its name implies, makes the main fundamental decisions within the framework of the organization's activities. The IC deals with the internal structure of the SCO, is responsible for cooperation and interaction with other states and international organizations, considers the most significant international problems. The frequency of meetings of the Council of Heads of State is on average once a year. As a rule, the next meeting of this body takes place in the country that chairs the SCO this year, and the chairmanship itself alternates in the order of the Russian alphabet.⁸⁰


4mBAxUAAAAAHQAAAAAQAw&url=http%3A%2F%2Feng.sectSCO.org%2Fload%2F203013%2F&psig=AOvVaw1P_pPqVh_m52Z53nFfsNfN&ust=1693652080639382&opi=89978449 (access: 22.10.2021)

⁷⁸ 上海合作组织机构 [The structure of the SCO]. *SCO official website*. URL <http://chn.sectSCO.org/structure/> (accessed: 28.02.2022)

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Council of Heads of SCO States. *Secretariat of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization*. URL: http://rus.sectSCO.org/about_sco/20190715/564695.html (accessed: 22.10.2021)

Table 7. The principal structure of the SCO



Source: own editing based on the official web site (sectsc.org) of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

Any international structure in the modern world has, as a rule, a certain body exercising executive power. In the SCO, such a body is the Council of Heads of Government (Prime Ministers). It is he who forms the budget of the organization and deals with the main issues of current activities, primarily in the socio-economic field. The Council meets for regular meetings at least once a year and is chaired by the head of the Government of the State in whose territory the meeting is held. This chairmanship does not necessarily coincide with the country's chairmanship in the SCO.⁸¹

Since the sphere of international relations is an important area of the organization's activity, the Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) plays a special role in its structure. This body considers the problems of interstate relations and may submit proposals for the development of cooperation within the SCO, the conclusion of multilateral treaties and agreements, etc. to the Council of Heads of State and the Council of Heads of Government for consideration. In addition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on behalf of the organization can make various statements on issues of world politics, organizes interaction between the foreign policy bodies


⁸¹ Regulations on the Council of Heads of Government (Prime Ministers) of the member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. URL: <https://docs.cntd.ru/document/901880663> (accessed: 22.10.2021)

and departments of the SCO states. The meetings of the Council of Ministers are held annually on the territory of the State that organizes the meeting of the Council of Heads of State, as a rule, a month before it.⁸²

The SCO Secretariat is a permanent executive body of the SCO, which is in Beijing. The Secretariat is headed by the Secretary General, who is approved by the Council of Heads of State on the proposal of the Council of Foreign Ministers. The Secretary-General is appointed from among the citizens of the Member States on a rotating basis in the order of the Russian alphabet of the names of the Member States for a period of three years without the right to extend for the next term. The Deputy Secretaries-General are approved by the Council of Foreign Ministers on the recommendation of the Council of National Coordinators. The officials of the Secretariat are hired from among the citizens of the Member States on a quota basis.⁸³

The SCO Secretariat coordinates, provides information and analytical, legal, organizational, and technical support for the Organization's activities.

Table 8. **The structure of the SCO Secretariat**



Source: own editing based on the official web site (sectsco.org) of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

The SCO has its own budget, which is formed and executed in accordance with a special agreement between the member States. This agreement also determines the number of

⁸² Regulations on the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization member States. URL: <https://docs.cntd.ru/document/901880662> (accessed: 22.10.2021)

⁸³ SCO official website

contributions that Member States make annually to the Organization's budget on the basis of the principle of equity participation.

Table 9. Contribution of the SCO member states to the Organization's budget ⁸⁴

Country	Amount (%)
Islamic Republic of Pakistan	5.9%
Republic of India	5.9%
Republic of Tajikistan	6%
Kyrgyz Republic	8.8%
Republic of Uzbekistan	14.6%
Republic of Kazakhstan	17.6%
People's Republic of China	20.6%
Russian Federation	20.6%

Source: On signing an Agreement on the procedure for the formation and execution of the budget of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

The budget of the Organization is drawn up for a period of one calendar year, which is also a financial year and is approved by the Council of Heads of Government.

According to the SCO Charter, the summits of the Council of Heads of State are held annually in different places. The venue of these summits is listed in alphabetical order after the name of the Member State in Russian. The Charter also provides that the summit of the Council of Heads of Government (i.e. Prime Ministers) is held annually at a place previously determined by the members of the Council. The summit of the Council of Foreign Ministers is held one month before the annual summit of the heads of State. Extraordinary meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers may be convened by any two Member States.

An important role within the organization is played by the Meeting of Heads of Ministries and Departments since the SCO must solve problems in various fields. These meetings are held to address specific issues within the framework of SCO activities. These meetings are chaired by the head of the relevant ministry/department, which is the organizer of this event. Meetings of secretaries of security councils, representatives of supreme courts, Ministers of Internal Affairs

⁸⁴ Распоряжение правительства Российской Федерации от 24 ноября 2017 г. № 2612-р Москва. О подписании Соглашения о порядке формирования и исполнения бюджета Шанхайской организации сотрудничества [Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 2612-r dated November 24, 2017 Moscow. On signing an Agreement on the procedure for the formation and execution of the budget of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization] URL: <https://docs.yandex.ru/docs/view> (access: 01.01.2024)

and Defense, chiefs of General staffs, ministers of Justice and Health, Culture and Education, etc. are held annually.⁸⁵

The SCO's current activities are managed by the Council of National Coordinators. He prepares meetings of the SCO supreme bodies (the Council of Heads of State, the Council of Heads of Government, and the Council of Foreign Ministers). The Council of National Coordinators meets at least three times a year. In particular, the SNC held in Dushanbe in June 2021 considered about 50 issues, including the preparation of meetings of SCO bodies in the same year, interaction with representatives of observer countries and dialogue partners, and other issues.⁸⁶

One of the most important structures operating within the SCO, which acts as a kind of core of the organization, is the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS). This is understandable since the main activity of the SCO is the fight against the terrorist threat. The Agreement on the establishment of the RATS was signed by the SCO states on 7 June 2002 in St. Petersburg, in which the RATS was defined as a permanent body.⁸⁷ RATS within the SCO has the status of a legal entity, i. e. he can conclude contracts on his own behalf, acquire property, open bank accounts, initiate lawsuits in courts, etc.

The main tasks of the RATS include:

- The development of cooperation in the fight against terrorism, extremism, and separatism,
- Assistance to the relevant SCO bodies in countering these threats,
- Collection and analysis of information on this issue,
- Formation of the RATS database on international terrorist organizations and their leaders, individuals supporting such organizations, on the spread of terrorism,
- Training of specialists and instructors for anti-terrorist activities.

⁸⁵ Charter of the SCO. URL:

https://www.google.com/url?sa=i&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=0CDcQw7AJahcKEwiY7PPmn4mBAxUAAAAAHQAAAAAQAw&url=http%3A%2F%2Feng.sectsco.org%2Fload%2F203013%2F&psig=AQvVaw1P_pPqVh_m52Z53nFfsNfN&ust=1693652080639382&opi=89978449 (accessed: 22.10.2021)

⁸⁶ Meeting of the SCO SNC chaired by Tajikistan. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan*. URL: <https://mfa.tj/ru/main/view/8074> / zasedanie-snc-shop-pod-predsedatelstvom-tadzhikistana (accessed: 08.10.2022).

⁸⁷ Agreement between the member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on a Regional Anti—terrorist structure. URL: [https:// docs.cntd.ru/document/901858897](https://docs.cntd.ru/document/901858897) (accessed: 12.12.2022).

The RATS also has its own bodies — the Council and the Executive Committee (EC) headed by the Director of the Executive Committee Jumakhon Giesov,⁸⁸ who is appointed by the relevant decision of the SGG from representatives of one of the SCO member states.⁸⁹

The SCO's permanent executive body is the Secretariat, whose headquarters are *in Beijing*. This body coordinates the functioning of the SCO itself and its cooperation with observers, dialogue partners, other countries, and international organizations. One of the important activities of the SCO Secretariat is the information support of those events that are held within the organization.

The secretariat is headed by the Secretary General, who is approved for this position by the SGG on the proposal of the SMID. Since 2019, the SCO Secretary General has been the representative of Uzbekistan V. Norov.

As for the economic and financial sphere, on 26 October, 2005, the SCO Interbank Association (SCO IBO) was established by the decision of the SRC to organize financing and banking services for investment projects supported by the governments of the SCO countries. In addition, the IBO actively cooperates with those business structures that operate in the SCO space. This association includes the Development Bank of Kazakhstan, the State Development Bank of China, Vnesheconombank of the Russian Federation, the National Bank of Tajikistan, the National Bank for Foreign Economic Activity of Uzbekistan.⁹⁰

A non-governmental structure that unites the most authoritative representatives of the business community of the SCO member states, such as the SCO Business Council, is directly connected with the economic component of the SCO's activities. It was established on June 14, 2006, to promote economic cooperation between various structures of the member States, establish a dialogue between business and financial circles, and promote multilateral projects. Along with this, the Business Council participates in the search for sources of financing, issues recommendations on improving the conditions of economic cooperation within the SCO, develops plans and programs for cooperation between business and financial circles.⁹¹

It is impossible not to mention such a structure of scientific, cultural, and educational interaction within the framework of the association as the SCO University.⁹² This educational structure functions as a kind of network of already existing universities in the SCO states and

⁸⁸ Since 2019, the director of IC RATS is the representative of the Republic of Tajikistan.

⁸⁹ Regional Anti-terrorist Structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. URL: <https://ecrats.org/ru/> (accessed: 12.12.2022).

⁹⁰ SCO development banks will adopt a new strategy of interbank unification in the fall of 2021. TASS. URL: <https://tass.ru/ekonomika/11395189> (accessed: 12.12.2022).

⁹¹ SCO Business Council. URL: <https://bcSCO.ru> (accessed: 02.09.2021).

⁹² University of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. URL: <http://uni-sco.ru> (accessed: 05.09.2021).

observer countries. At the end of the training, the student receives a diploma from the university in which he has fully mastered the relevant programs and passed the exams. Within the framework of the SCO University, a certain model of personnel training has been developed for bachelor's, master's, postgraduate, doctoral, and advanced training programs.

Thus, at present, an extensive institutional structure has been formed within the SCO, which reflects the diverse functionality of this organization, its desire to cover the most diverse spheres of life of the modern globalizing world.

Table 10: List of Council of Heads of States and Council of Heads of Government

The current Council of Heads of State	Council of Heads of Government
Arif Alvi (Pakistan)	Bilawal Zardari (Pakistan)
Sadyr Yaparov (Kyrgyzstan)	Akylbek Zhaparov (Kyrgyzstan)
Emomali Rahmon (Tajikistan)	Kokhir Rasulzoda (Tajikistan)
Xi Jinping (China)	Li Keqiang (China)
Ram Nath Kovind (India)	Subrahmanyam Jaishankar (India)
Shavkat Mirziyoyev (Uzbekistan)	Abdulla Aripov (Uzbekistan)
Vladimir Putin (Russia)	Mikhail Mishustin (Russia)
Kassym-Jomart Tokayev (Kazakhstan)	Alikhan Smailov (Kazakhstan)

Source: own editing based on the official documents of the SCO.

According to the Charter of the SCO,⁹³ summits of the Council of Heads of State shall be held annually at alternating venues. *The locations of these summits follow the alphabetical order of the member state's name in Russian.* The charter also dictates that the Council of Heads of Government (that is, the Prime Ministers) shall meet annually in a place decided upon by the council members. The Council of Foreign Ministers is supposed to hold a summit one month before the annual summit of Heads of State. Extraordinary meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers can be called by any two member states.

4.4. SUMMIT MEETINGS

⁹³ Ministry Of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit. URL: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gjhdqzz_681964/lhg_683094/jbqk_683096/201404/t20140430_9388210.shtml (accessed: 29.10.2023)

Table 11: List of the SCO Summits

Summits of heads of state⁹⁴		
Date	Country	Location
14 June, 2001	China	Shanghai
7 June, 2002	Russia	Saint - Petersburg
29 May,, 2003	Russia	Moscow
17 June,, 2004	Uzbekistan	Tashkent
5 July, 2005	Kazakhstan	Astana
15 June, 2006	China	Shanghai
16 August, 2007	Kyrgyzstan	Bishkek
28 August, 2008	Tajikistan	Dushanbe
15-16 June, 2009	Russia	Yekaterinburg
10-11 June, 2010	Uzbekistan	Tashkent
14-15 June, 2011	Kazakhstan	Astana
6-7 June, 2012	China	Beijing
13 September, 2013	Kyrgyzstan,	Bishkek,
11 - 12 September, 2014	Tajikistan	Dushanbe
9 – 10 July, 2015	Russia	Ufa
23-24 June, 2016	Uzbekistan	Tashkent
8-9 June, 2017	Kazakhstan	Astana
9-10 June, 2018	China	Beijing
14-15 June, 2019	Kyrgyzstan	Bishkek

⁹⁴ Council of Heads of Government. URL: http://rus.sectsco.org/about_sco/20190715/564700.html (accessed: 29.03.2023)

10 November, 2020	Russia	Saint-Petersburg (videoconference)
16-17 September, 2021	Tajikistan	Dushanbe
15-16 September, 2022	Uzbekistan	Samarkand
5 May, 2023	India	Goa
July, 2024	Kazakhstan	Astana

Source: own editing based on the SCO official documents

Table 12. List of Summits of government⁹⁵

Date	Country	Location
14 September, 2001	Kazakhstan	Almaty
23 September, 2003	China	Beijing
23 September, 2004	Kyrgyzstan	Bishkek
26 October, 2005	Russia	Moscow
15 September, 2006	Tajikistan	Dushanbe
2 November, 2007	Uzbekistan	Tashkent
30 October, 2008	Kazakhstan	Astana
14 October, 2009	China	Beijing
25 November, 2010	Tajikistan	Dushanbe
7 November, 2011	Russia	Saint - Petersburg

⁹⁵ Ibid.

5 December, 2012	Kyrgyzstan	Bishkek
29 November, 2013	Uzbekistan	Tashkent
15 December, 2014	Kazakhstan	Astana
15 December, 2015	China	Zhengzhou
3 November, 2016	Kyrgyzstan	Bishkek
30 November – 1 December, 2017	Russia	Sochi
11 – 12 October, 2018	Tajikistan	Dushanbe
30 October - 1 November, 2019	Uzbekistan	Tashkent
30 November 2020	India	videoconference
25 November 2021	Kazakhstan	videoconference
1 November, 2022	China	videoconference
3-4 July 2023	India	New-Delhi
July, 2024	Kazakhstan	Astana

Source: own editing based on the SCO official documents

On 5 May, a meeting of the SCO foreign ministers concluded in Goa, which became the preparation for the summit of the G8 leaders, which was held in New Delhi on 3 - 4 July. Therefore, the announcements of the foreign ministries of the participating countries were not replete with special details of the meeting. According to the statement of the Russian Foreign Ministry, for example, in Goa, the ministers discussed "draft relevant documents and decisions" of the SCO and exchanged views on "topical issues of the international and regional agenda." The statement of the Chinese Foreign Ministry coincided almost word for word.

Nevertheless, during two days of meetings (the first of which was mainly devoted to bilateral contacts), representatives of the SCO member states managed to discuss quite a lot. However, most of them remained behind closed doors.

About 20 declarations were prepared for the leaders' summit, including a political declaration, and several documents on combating radicalization, as well as on digital transformation and healthcare. But its key outcome was the admission of Iran to the SCO membership. After the admission of the Republic of India and Islamic Republic of Pakistan to the SCO in 2017, the organization has repeatedly said that they do not plan to further expand the G8. However, over the past year, the trend has changed. At the last leaders' summit in September 2022 in Samarkand, the SCO launched the procedure for admission to the organization not only of Republic of Iran, but also of Belarus, and at the current meeting, the ministers, among other things, discussed Minsk's appeal on the possible acceleration of the admission procedure.

In addition, memoranda on granting SCO dialogue partner status to Kuwait, Myanmar, Maldives, and the UAE were signed in Goa. Bahrain will receive the same status, however, such a memorandum with this country will be issued later at the SCO headquarters in Beijing, since Manama decided that the minister, not the ambassador, should sign the document, as is the case with other newly minted partner countries.

The last addition to the SCO partners' shelf happened in March. In this capacity, Saudi Arabia, the largest economy among Arab countries and the fastest growing economy among the G20 states, which in the past focused mainly on the United States in foreign policy, decided to join the organization. And if joining the ranks of India and Pakistan a few years ago was largely due to Russia, then in the case of the Saudis, China's influence undoubtedly affected. It was through the mediation of Beijing that Riyadh restored diplomatic relations with Tehran after an eight-year gap. This not only brought China into serious players in the affairs of the Middle East, but also increased the interest of the countries of the region to participate in regional structures with the participation of the PRC.

China is the world's number two center, and standing next to it is important for many. Of course, there are countries that are trying to distance themselves and establish relations with the United States, like the Philippines, but many prefer to balance and use different opportunities. At the same time, it cannot be said that in accordance with Western clichés, China is the country that determines the SCO agenda, and other participants are too big — both Russia and India. The association includes many other important countries that will occupy a central place in international processes.

The 23rd meeting of the Council of Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in New Delhi was held on 4 July 2023 in the format of a videoconference. The summit was attended by all member States of the organization (Russian Federation, People's Republic of China, Republic of Kazakhstan, Republic of Tajikistan, Republic of Uzbekistan, Republic of Kyrgyzstan, Republic of India, and Islamic Republic of Pakistan). Republic of Belarus, Islamic Republic of Iran and Mongolia were invited as observers. Republic of Turkmenistan participated as a guest. The event was also attended by the heads of the SCO Secretariat and the SCO Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure. The leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Eurasian Economic Union, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the United Nations, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-building Measures in Asia, and the Commonwealth of Independent States were invited.

From 2022 to 2023, India was the chairman of the SCO. For the period from 2023 to 2024, this post will be transferred to Republic of Kazakhstan. Following the summit, the New Delhi Declaration was adopted, in which the SCO member states fixed key positions.

One of the main outcomes of the 23rd SCO summit was the expansion of the association: Islamic Republic of Iran's accession was officially announced. This country became the 9th member of the organization. That is, the SCO has become a "nine" from the "eight", and next year it will turn into a "ten".

Even though the organization retains its non-block status, it is undergoing a transformation, especially on the security track. The SCO is still characterized by its non-military nature, as well as its non-orientation against third countries and the absence of claims to hegemony and monopoly inherent in the United States and NATO countries.

Among the promising areas of development of the SCO member states are also financial interactions related to the establishment of mechanisms for mutual trade settlements in national currencies, and transport, tied to the functioning of two strategically important corridors - "North – South" and "East–West". The energy issue also remains relevant for the SCO countries. The North-South International Transport Corridor has great economic potential. The port of Chabahar, which is developing on the southeastern coast of Iran, which connects Iran and India through the territory of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, and in the future can be connected through the railway network to the transport system of the Caspian Sea, has also become extremely important. We should not forget that the North-South corridor connects not only Republic of India and Russian Federation, but also both countries with the markets of Central Asia. The members of the organization hope that after Islamic Republic of Iran's

accession to the organization, the volume of private investment in the port of Chahabar will increase.

Thus, by maintaining three tracks – security, economic and humanitarian cooperation – the Indian chairmanship helped the SCO to rise to a new, higher level of its development. The SCO is a growing organization with huge potential and plays a leading role in the development of political and economic cooperation between the member countries. For its part, Republic of India positively assessed Iran's accession to the SCO, paying special attention to transport, logistics and financial cooperation with this country. This is important for Islamic Republic of Iran. Membership in this organization will provide Iran with an opportunity for sustainable economic development.

4.4. THE RESULT OF 20 YEARS COOPERATION

One of the landmark events of the SCO summit, timed to its 20th anniversary and held on 16-17 September 2021 in Dushanbe, along with the approval of a three-year cooperation program to combat terrorism, separatism and extremism, an anti-drug strategy implementation plan, an information security cooperation plan, it was officially decided to launch the procedure for Iran's accession to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Thus, Republic of *Iran* became the ninth permanent member of the SCO along with Republic of India, Republic of Kazakhstan, Republic of Kyrgyzstan, People's Republic of China, Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Russian Federation, Republic of Tajikistan, and Republic of Uzbekistan.⁹⁶

For two decades, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has demonstrated steady progressive development even in the face of various contradictions between its member countries on certain issues, sometimes important. For example, if now most SCO members, including the recently adopted Iran, treat the first steps of the Taliban who seized power in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan with restraint or criticism, then Islamic Republic of Pakistan and People's Republic of China have expressed their readiness to cooperate with the Taliban in these conditions.⁹⁷

It took some time before Iran's membership in the organization was finalized, since the documents that Tehran signed at the summit were subject to ratification in Islamic Republic of

⁹⁶ M. Igibayeva. *A Haza szolgálatában*. 2021. p. 85

⁹⁷ Xue Y., Makengo B. Twenty Years of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Achievements, Challenges and Prospects. *Open Journal of Social Sciences*, 2021. 9, pp. 184-200.

Iran. For comparison, the accession process of India and Pakistan after their accession to the SCO in 2017 took two years.

Tehran received observer status at the SCO back in 2005, after which it applied for full membership in 2008. But until 2015, Iran could not be admitted to the association because of the international sanctions against it. According to the SCO rules, a country under UN Security Council sanctions cannot become a member, and several restrictive measures have been applied against Iran. The sanctions were lifted in 2015 when Tehran agreed to limit its nuclear program. But even this did not open the door to the SCO for her. Unexpectedly, the Iranian application was blocked by Republic of Tajikistan, which previously had perhaps the warmest relations with Iran among all the SCO countries. Dushanbe accused Tehran of supporting the Islamic Renaissance Party of the Republic of Tajikistan (IRPT, banned in Tajikistan) and of indirect involvement in the organization of terrorist acts. Today, relations between the two countries have returned to a friendly channel, and their new President Ebrahim Raisi took part in a fateful summit for Iran in Dushanbe.⁹⁸

The approval of Tehran's application to join the SCO was the first significant foreign policy victory of the new Iranian president, conservative Ebrahim Raisi. One of the key tasks of the new head of the Government of the Islamic Republic is to demonstrate his own achievements in contrast to the failures of his predecessor, the reformer Hassan Rouhani. The latter has repeatedly advocated expanding cooperation with the SCO, but during his presidency, Tehran did not have time to join the organization.

Iran's entry into the SCO is very organic. According to the statistics of the Customs Administration of Iran, in the first four months of 2021, Iran's trade turnover with the member countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization reached 15.76 million tons worth \$ 9.82 billion. Exports to eight member countries of the organization for the same period amounted to 13.37 million tons worth \$ 5.64 billion. Iranian imports from the SCO countries at the same time amounted to 2.39 million tons worth 4.18 billion dollars.⁹⁹

Iran's foreign trade with the member countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) for 11 months of the current Iranian year (started on 20 March 2022) amounted to 38.8 billion dollars.

⁹⁸ M. Igibayeva. *A Haza szolgálatában*. 2021. pp. 85

⁹⁹ Xuanzun L.: Chinese troops start joint anti-terrorism drill In Peace Mission, 'displays capability to safeguard regional peace'. *Global Times*. URL: <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202109/1234029.shtml> (accessed: 28.09.2021)

Ruhollah Latifi,¹⁰⁰ said that Iran's trade with the member countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), with the exception of crude oil exports, amounted to 50.6 million tons of goods worth \$ 38.8 billion in the first 11 months of the current Iranian calendar year (21 March 2022 – 19 February, 2023), registering an increase of 18.3 percent in value terms and a three percent increase in weight. Thus, during the reporting period, Iran's trade turnover with the SCO countries increased by 18% compared to the same period last year.¹⁰¹

Iran's exports of goods to the SCO countries increased by 6.4% in 11 months, to \$19.6 billion. Imports from the SCO amounted to \$19.2 billion. The indicator jumped by 33.4% compared to the previous year.¹⁰²

For the SCO members, Tehran's accession is obviously connected with the expansion of their both trade and economic and geopolitical regional influence. The geographical position of Iran plays a special role here — at the crossroads of many roads. As an example, it is enough to mention the Iranian strategic port of Chabahar in the south-east of the country, capable of connecting India with Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the coastal states of the Persian Gulf. The Islamic Republic of Iran is a major producer of energy resources, which means a natural addition to the potential already existing in the countries of the alliance. The Islamic Republic of Iran's accession to the SCO will expand its regional reach, providing operational access to the Middle East region, and strengthen the organization's military capabilities.

In turn, membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization gives Islamic Republic of Iran additional diplomatic arguments in the whole complex of difficult relations with the West in the negotiations on the nuclear program and the lifting of sanctions. And this is especially important because sanctions slow down the development of the country. It is no coincidence that Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi said during the summit that membership in the SCO can help Tehran in the fight against sanctions. "The SCO is not a choice; it is a necessity. Islamic Republic of Iran can become a link between the east and the west of Eurasia," Raisi expressed his wish.¹⁰³

The presence in the SCO opens new horizons for Iran for economic cooperation with the countries of this alliance. The Iranian leadership is betting on the growing multifaceted potential of the SCO, given its recent expansion at the expense of Republic of India and Islamic

¹⁰⁰ Representative of the Commission on International Relations and Development of the Trading house of the Ministry of Industry, Mines and Trade of Iran.

¹⁰¹ Товарооборот между Ираном и ШОС за 11 месяцев вырос более чем на 18%. *Russian News Agency*. URL: https://iran.ru/news/economics/122511/Tovarooborot_mezhdu_Iranom_i_ShOS_za_11_mesyacev_vyros_bole_chem_na_18 (accessed: 01.08.2023)

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ M. Igibayeva. *A Haza szolgálatában*. 2021. p. 86

Republic of Pakistan. Under the auspices of the SCO, as Tehran clearly understands, a giant market has formed, represented by dynamically developing world economies. At the same time, the Iranian leadership assigns a high role to joint military exercises conducted within the framework of the SCO and the exchange of military knowledge, experience, information, and technology.

For Islamic Republic of Iran, permanent participation in such a powerful regional alliance, the role of which is significantly enhanced by the two permanent members of the UN Security Council (Russia and China), is of particular importance. The Islamic Republic of Iran would like to see the SCO as an organization that opposes the penetration of US influence into the Central Asian region in terms of its goals and purpose. And, at least, the Islamic Republic of Iran is quite capable of trying to play on such a sensitive factor.

Iran, which has been under unprecedented pressure from the United States for a long time, is in solidarity with the leading SCO players that the region should independently ensure its stability and security without interference from external forces. The coincidence of interests creates certain prerequisites for cooperation in this strategic area. The status of a full member of the SCO will allow Iran to make full use of the organization's summits to demonstrate its principled approaches to the formation of a regional security system. Tehran not only hopes that its accession to the alliance will strengthen the priorities of independent national-state self-identification in the SCO but will also try to make the most of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to criticize the United States on a global scale.

The Islamic Republic of Iran, as a member of the authoritative SCO, will be able to more effectively resist attempts to introduce the United States into the region, discredit American aspirations for the "democratization" of Asia according to the Washington template. Now Iran will be engaged in establishing a confrontation with the United States through regional relations formed with the participation of other members of the organization. In any case, it is most likely delivered in Tehran.

In short, for Islamic Republic of Iran, joining the SCO was a fundamental step towards integrating its sovereign course into world geopolitics. For the same purpose, Tehran signed a 25-year strategic cooperation agreement with Beijing on 27 March 2021.¹⁰⁴ Iran's accession to the SCO took place against the background of growing demand for the creation of new mechanisms of international cooperation between the member countries of the organization. For a significant part of its history, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has looked like a

¹⁰⁴ M. Igibayeva. *A Haza szolgálatában*. 2021. p. 87

demonstrative alternative to the Western order, but today, in several areas, the alternative is turning from an option into a necessity. Finally, a key prospect for the SCO can be called its transformation into a platform for dialogue between states with different views in order to develop new international approaches. The organization's extremely broad mandate allows it to deal with a huge range of issues and realize the potential of becoming a system integrator of the work of various international players.

Iran, therefore, turns out to be a unique test for the entire structure. A country with a completely different worldview and specific goals will be forced to negotiate with the largest states of the entire macro region on a regular basis. As a full participant, Tehran does not just observe the course of the meetings - it takes a position on issues that are included in the SCO agenda. As for Iran's own interests, in the short term, the organization is more in line with its political interests. Rather, the bilateral agreements of the countries serve as the basis for the development of trade relations, and the role of the SCO as an economic locomotive remains at an inchoate level. This structure will contribute to Tehran's security cooperation and political rapprochement. However, an indirect consequence of this may be the development of economic cooperation.

In any case, Iran's accession can be called an important stage in the formation of the SCO as a more mature international institution. Prior to Iran's accession, the organization was focused on combating terrorism, separatism, and extremism, although its mandate allows it to address a much broader range of issues. The expansion of the membership increases the legitimacy of the SCO. However, along with this, expectations from this organization as a global force are also growing. To justify them, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization assumes great responsibility and does not limit itself to security issues.

On 15-16 September 2022, in Samarkand, where the summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was held, Sergey Aleynik¹⁰⁵ said that strengthening and expanding the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is of particular importance in the context of the sanctions confrontation that countries are experiencing from the West. Belarus shares the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's approaches to countering protectionism and trade wars, which hinder global development and are fraught with a deep economic recession. Belarus currently has the status of an observer state at the SCO and has applied for membership in the organization. This issue, among others, considered at the summit in Samarkand.

¹⁰⁵ First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus

According to Leonid Marinich¹⁰⁶, the SCO's authority and influence is growing, the organization is already competing freely with other major international associations. According to him, membership in the SCO will open up additional advantages for Republic of Belarus to work in the markets of the member states of this organization. Republic of Belarus will open a huge market. It seems to be open, but the availability of this market will become better and easier. Therefore, it is beneficial for them. Secondly, financial and material flows will increase significantly, since the economic union between the SCO countries is very strong, and the organization has shown this during its existence.

According to the Regulations on the admission of new members to the SCO dated 11 June 2010, the applicant State must join the international treaties in force in the SCO (about 40), make the necessary changes to national legislation (Republic of India and Islamic Republic of Pakistan took about two years to do this, Iran is undergoing the relevant procedures). The acceptance of the Islamic Republic of Iran means that the SCO will fully support it. Great importance is attached to the fight against drug trafficking and cross-border organized crime. And therefore, when Xi Jinping says that "we must fight against hegemony and the policy of force", it means that the US policy aimed at increasing sanctions pressure on the Islamic Republic of Iran will be opposed by the members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, primarily from People's Republic of China and Russian Federation. And here I would like to emphasize that the SCO is an organization that unites such, one might say, different states as Republic of India and Islamic Republic of Pakistan, which are in a complex border confrontation. Republic of India and Islamic Republic of Pakistan are fighting for water sources, for glaciers, which are located in the region of the states of Jammu and Kashmir. Whoever controls these glaciers will ensure the flow of water. And that's why now the next phase of the aggravation of relations is precisely because of the water. On the other hand, Islamic Republic of Iran is a state that borders Afghanistan. With Iran's accession to the SCO, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is now surrounded by the SCO and CSTO member states, apart from Republic of Turkmenistan, which is an independent state. Iran's accession to the SCO has allowed this organization to pursue a more consistent policy towards Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

The acceptance of Islamic Republic of Iran indicates a new factor. Today, Islamic Republic of Iran is the only state that conducts an uncompromising struggle with the State of Israel. States such as Arab Republic of Egypt, Libya, Syrian Arab Republic, and Islamic Republic of Iraq have dropped out of this confrontation with the State of Israel, and therefore

¹⁰⁶ The Ambassador of Belarus to Uzbekistan

this factor must be borne in mind. Israel is the US aircraft carrier in the Middle East. It should be noted here that Iran has been seeking admission to the organization for 10 years. And the acceptance of Iran is not accidental. Iran's admission to the SCO should be linked to another event — the creation of a new Indo-Pacific bloc AUKUS (Australia, the United Kingdom, the United States). And if many experts had previously written that the SCO would be closed to Islamic Republic of Iran because no one wants to spoil relations with the United States of America, now the situation in the world has changed. In addition to AUKUS, there was a US withdrawal from Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, and this indicates that the US is becoming a weakening state.

And therefore, Islamic Republic of Iran's entry into the SCO is, on the one hand, evidence of the weakening of the US position in the world, and on the other hand, it is a kind of response signal from People's Republic of China, first, to the creation of a new Indo-Pacific bloc. Moreover, this new Indo-Pacific bloc, despite statements about peacefulness, provides for the creation of an entire fleet of nuclear submarines in Australia. That is, it speaks about the aggressive nature of the Indo-Pacific bloc and its offensive nature.

And first, the People's Republic of China and other states of the Asia-Pacific region that dare to pursue an independent policy that does not coincide with the policy of the United States of America fall under this new "club" of AUKUS nuclear submarines.

It is worth paying attention to Xi Jinping's words when he says that it is impossible to solve international affairs from a so-called position of strength or by hegemony, rudeness and harassment. The Chinese leader welcomes Iran's accession to the SCO and notes that this is evidence of the strengthening of the "Shanghai family", which will make efforts to maintain peace on the planet.

Republic of Belarus considers the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as an international platform for identifying specific mechanisms for developing cooperation in countering the threats of terrorism, extremism, organized crime and drug trafficking. He stands for strengthening the economic dimension of the SCO as the most important factor of stability in the Eurasian region. The country has been participating in the SCO since 2010 in the status of a dialogue partner and since 2015 in the status of an observer, taking an active part in all the main dimensions of the SCO's activities: political and diplomatic, trade and economic, cultural and humanitarian, as well as military cooperation.

In 2021, the SCO states accounted for 57.8% of the total trade turnover of Belarus, including 47.7% of exports and 67.4% of imports.

In the economic sphere, Republic of Belarus is interested in the development of the SCO common transport space, international road transport, as well as in the coordinated development of highways and rail transport, which will contribute to participation in multimodal transport, the formation of a favorable network of transport infrastructure and the disclosure of transit potential. Since 11 November 2018, Republic of Belarus has been a party to the agreement between the governments of the SCO member states on creating favorable conditions for international road transport.

The Republic of Belarus is also interested in cooperation within the SCO in all areas of cultural and humanitarian cooperation, as well as in cooperation with SCO cultural and information centers and foundations.¹⁰⁷

4.5. COOPERATION WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

The SCO is a regional organization rapidly gaining influence in the world, uniting Eurasian states. The leaders of this organization occupy leading positions in the global economy. The growing influence of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is explained by both external and internal reasons. External reasons include the fact that the SCO is formed and operates in a region where there are practically no other multilateral international institutions in the field of security, except for the CSTO. This situation makes the role of these organizations in regional international relations essentially unique.

Now, there is a change in the macroeconomic climate in the Asian zone. In particular, the states that are members of the SCO, BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa)¹⁰⁸ and EAEU associations are acquiring sustainable and unshakable economic development. This is manifested in the formation and initiation of a unified economic, cultural, and political development strategy. The states that are members of the above-mentioned international associations, in addition to forming a unified policy in different directions, create a legislative framework for the functioning of uniform norms and rules in individual spheres of life. In addition, the integration member states are working to create a "single space" of interaction (this should be understood as a common platform, the main purpose of which is the mutual exchange of the latest technologies, information, experience; improvement of scientific and technical knowledge bases, and more).

¹⁰⁷ Что это за организация ШОС и зачем Беларусь хочет стать ее членом. *CIS Internet Portal. Integration Space*. URL: <https://e-cis.info/news/566/103312/?ysclid=lhao60njvu695017079> (accessed: 21.09.2022)

¹⁰⁸ Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and United Arab Emirates joined the BRICS on 1st of January 2024.

The international Association of the SCO, BRICS and the EAEU are three inseparable partners on the continent, which occupy a dominant geographical position in the region.

Table 13. **The member countries of the organization**

Organization	The main duties	Member-states
SCO	An organization dealing with issues of regional security and the fight against terrorism and extremism.	Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, India, and Iran.
BRICS	The union of the five largest developing economies of the world, which seek to increase their influence on the world stage, deepen economic cooperation and solve global problems.	Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and United Arab Emirates
EurAsEC (former name of the EAEU)	An integration project of five post-Soviet countries aimed at creating a single economic space with a common market for goods, services, capital and labor.	The Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and the Russian Federation.
CSTO	Comprehensive development of political cooperation, development and improvement of the military component, countering international terrorism and extremism, drug trafficking, weapons, and other threats.	Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan.

Source: own editing based on the official documents of the SCO.

4.5.1. SCO AND BRICS

The name of the association comes from the name of the member states - from the English BRICS:

- Brazil is rich in agricultural products.
- Russia is the world's largest exporter of mineral resources.
- India — cheap intellectual resources.
- China is the owner of cheap labor resources.
- South Africa — natural resources.

According to statistics provided by the information center of the CIS Internet portal, the share of the SCO's GDP is more than 30%. In addition, the world trade of the association's

participants accounts for 16% of the total world trade, the total population of the SCO and EAEU member states has taken the form of 40%.¹⁰⁹

In addition, the membership of the organization has been replenished this year with new states, including Republic of Belarus (a member state of the EAEU), Islamic Republic of Iran (which has received full-fledged status of a member in the SCO). The names of other states that have expressed a desire to join the SCO and be a permanent participant have not yet been disclosed due to unnamed reasons.¹¹⁰

It can be stated that under the "unnamed reasons" there are measures of negative impact from other states, considering the current situation on the world stage – the imposition of sanctions on the Russian Federation. In turn, Russia is a member of the EAEU, SCO and BRICS, so such a condition may provoke the imposition of sanctions on the member states of international associations, since they indirectly interact with the sub-sanctioned state represented by Russia.

However, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is not the only international organization that is a permanent economic partner of the EAEU. On the agenda is the rapid development of relations with the BRICS members. It is necessary to consider the policy of economic development within the framework of the EAEU and BRICS.

The EAEU and BRICS, now are aimed at forming a single financial structure. In 2023, the main directions of development for BRICS members include: tasks to improve and strengthen the multilateral (international) trading system,¹¹¹ WTO reform, economic development using digital means (digital economy).¹¹²

Among the permanent tasks, it is also planned to:

- Maintain the smooth operation of supply chains, which is undoubtedly an urgent aspect of development in the current conditions that have formed among the world community;
- Promote a sustainable economy among participants, as well as the climate issue (climate change, consequences, and possible benefits).

The BRICS members, as well as the SCO members, are confident that the key role of development lies in investments. Thus, infrastructure investments in practical use should

¹⁰⁹ Чжан Мин: странам ШОС комфортно сосуществовать друг с другом. *Russia Today*. — 2023. — URL: <https://ria.ru/20230105/shos-1843074885.html> (accessed: 29.01.2023)

¹¹⁰ Six Countries to Join SCO. *LENTA.RUю Rambler&Co*. — 2022. — URL: <https://lenta.ru/news/2022/09/13/shos/> (accessed: 30.01.2023)

¹¹¹ CIS Internet Portal. *Integration Space: Official website*. 2022. URL: <https://e-cis.info> (accessed: 30.01.2023)

¹¹² International Monetary Fund: official website. — URL: <https://www.imf.org/> (accessed: 31.01.2023)

become part of the development of mutual partnership of the participating states, and ultimately reflect the result of this interaction.

The result of the above interaction will be the introduction of a fundamentally new concept (relatively new for the SCO, BRICS and EAEU members) of development into practical application: an effective mechanism for cooperation and an increase in infrastructure financial assets, which will increase the share of GDP of the member states of the associations on a global scale.¹¹³

The interaction between the BRICS members and the EAEU countries is multifaceted – in addition to economic development directions, the development strategy is envisaged in the energy sector. The participants of the association are aimed at creating universal access to cheap, but at the same time reliable and sustainable, and modern energy sources. It is necessary to consider that the transformations in the energy sector differ in each country of the association due to national characteristics, therefore, the creation of a single energy market is one of the fundamental goals in this area of development. It is worth noting that the participating countries are not always in solidarity with each other on several territorial and energy issues. For example, there is tension between Republic of India and People's Republic of China over the border in the Himalayas, which has already led to a military clash in 2020 and continues to cause tension between the two nuclear powers. Therefore, the allies need to develop dialogue and trust among themselves, and together look for compromises and an approach to controversial issues.

In addition, the cooperation strategy of the BRICS members can be traced in the hospitality industry and in the military sphere. The leaders of the association countries confirmed the intentions of cooperation in the field of tourism. In the field of armaments, the participants advocated strengthening the system of treaties and agreements in the field of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation of armed systems.¹¹⁴

In general, the countries that are members of the BRICS international association occupy an exceptional position in the global economy. The BRICS countries account for about 25% of global GDP, and the scale of the market for goods, works and services of the countries of the union is equal to 42% of the world's population.

¹¹³ ЕАЭС и БРИКС проработают создание универсальной платежной системы и независимых международных институтов. *Eurasian Economic Integration*. URL: <https://eec.eaeunion.org/news/eaes-i-briks-prorabotayut-sozdanie-universalnoy-platezhnoy-sistemy-i-nezavisimykh-mezhdunarodnykh-in/> (accessed: 31.01.2023)

¹¹⁴ Межгосударственное объединение БРИКС. *Bank of Russia*. URL: <https://www.cbr.ru/today/ms/smo/brics/> (accessed: 30.01.2023)

The mutually beneficial development of the member states of international associations is obvious due to the following reasons: constant cooperation, recruitment of new member states, expansion of the geography of interaction (Asia, Europe, Africa), investment activities, exchange of experience and technologies.

4.5.2. SCO AND EAEU

The SCO is increasingly moving beyond strictly regional competencies, claiming active participation in global affairs. At the same time, it retains the position of one of the most significant forces in the processes taking place on the territory of Eurasia, where important integration projects are being implemented in full swing. First, we are talking about the Eurasian Economic Union implemented under the auspices of Russia and the Chinese Silk Road Economic Belt program, which is an overland part of the One Belt, One Road initiative.

After Republic of India and Islamic Republic of Pakistan joined the SCO, the combined population of the member countries of this association amounted to 64% of the total world population, and the GDP of the participants of the SREB was 40% of world GDP¹¹⁵.

It is in the center of international attention – all its summits are always covered in detail by the world media, and the structure itself is a constantly developing mechanism with huge opportunities and ambitious goals, which is partly fixed in the Charter¹¹⁶. The strengthening of the SCO's influence in the Eurasian space due to the accession of India and Pakistan to the organization demonstrated the correctness of the political vector chosen at the Astana summit¹¹⁷.

In particular, the expansion of the SCO makes it possible to extend the scope of its activities not only to Central Asia, but also to South Asia. And in general, the accession of these two regional powers to the SCO to some extent can be considered as a definite attempt to create a new system of collective security on the Eurasian continent.

Since People's Republic of China and Russian Federation are recognized leaders in Eurasia, the convergence of three projects is especially important for the coordination of their interests: the EAEU, the SCO, and the SREB. Moreover, over the past few years, there has been a clear

¹¹⁵Zhao L. To a Mutual Understanding. *China*, 2017, no. 5, pp. 24-25

¹¹⁶Vorobyov V. Ya. Where will the Shanghai Cooperation Organization move? *Problems of the Far East*, 2016, No. 5, pp. 4-10.

¹¹⁷Information message on the results of the meeting of the Council of Heads of Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Astana, June 8-9, 2017. URL: <http://rus.sectsc.org/news/20170609/289250> (accessed: 05.06.2023).

trend towards the development of economic cooperation between China and other SCO countries, mainly in the format of bilateral relations. As an example, we can cite the experience of Republic of Kazakhstan, which participates in the implementation of the SREB, while simultaneously offering its own large-scale program of infrastructure development “Nurly Zhol” (“The Bright Path”).

An important aspect of Eurasian cooperation can be a single free trade zone (FTA) for all SCO members. People’s Republic of China has proposed the idea of creating such a zone as an international organization since the very beginning of the SCO's functioning, but it has not received much development.

The SCO countries were in no hurry to open their borders, fearing – and not unreasonably – that they simply would not be able to compete with the influx of goods from People’s Republic of China.¹¹⁸ It should also be noted that the SCO member states themselves form an influential core of the Eurasian continent.

After all, the SCO is the largest association in Eurasia in terms of territory and population and, therefore, it is the key platform for Eurasian cooperation. Even the term “Eurasian design” has appeared, which implies a certain accumulation of integration processes within the framework of the EAEU, the Chinese BRI, the planned “Great Eurasian Partnership” with the participation of ASEAN.¹¹⁹

Currently, the tasks of Eurasian integration are most fully implemented in the EAEU format. Some positive results have been achieved here, even though the Eurasian Economic Union is a relatively young entity. After all, it has been operating based on the Customs Union only since 2011, and the economic community since 2015. The EAEU sets its main goal to realize the potential of economic ties more effectively within the Eurasian continent. In addition, the organization's tasks include: the modernization of national economies, the creation of conditions for their entry into global markets. In general, the main content of the Eurasian integration process is the formation of a single market for goods, services, capital, and labor.¹²⁰

Within the framework of the EAEU, the participating countries are gradually strengthening a certain economic community. From this point of view, at least several essential characteristics can be distinguished.

¹¹⁸ Free Trade Zone with China Is Disastrous for Russia (In Russ.) // URL: <https://riafan.ru/489921-grigorev-kitai-hochet-sdelat-iz-rossii-fabrichnyi-pridatok> (accessed: 05.06.2023).

¹¹⁹ R. K. Alimov. Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Greater Eurasia. *Bulletin of International Organizations*, 2018, vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 19-32.

¹²⁰ The Eurasian Economic Union. St. Petersburg, EDB Integration Research Center, 2017, pp. 296

Firstly, it is the predominant weight of the leading states in the economy of the Eurasia region: according to the EDB definition, about 80% of the EAEU GDP is accounted for by Russian Federation, 10% by Republic of Kazakhstan, and only 4% together are the shares of Republic of Belarus, Kyrgyz Republic and Republic of Armenia.¹²¹ Many integration associations (such as NAFTA, MERCOSUR, the South African Customs Union, etc.) operate under the domination of one of the countries.

Secondly, the continued dependence of several EAEU states on raw materials exports. Thirdly, the presence of a common historical heritage because of the presence of these countries for a long time as part of a single state (first the Russian Empire, then the USSR). Fourth, maintaining a relatively low level of trade turnover between the EAEU countries themselves: they mainly trade with Russia, not with each other. The only exception to this rule is trade between Republic of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyz Republic, the volume of which shows positive dynamics.¹²²

In the process of formation and development of the EAEU, there have been and there are certain problems that are explained both by objectively existing imbalances between its member states and the global conjuncture. According to the totality of economic indicators, the EAEU is the second integration association in the world after the European Union. The sectoral structure of such EAEU locomotives as Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan remains similar, while agricultural production plays a significant role in the structure of farms in Armenia and Kyrgyzstan.¹²³

But in general, the EAEU continues to be compared with the European Union for purely objective reasons. And in this regard, the question arises whether the EAEU will follow the path of the EU in terms of deepening integration? Will there be an appearance in the Union of a single currency like the euro, which, as you know, is accepted in most EU countries, but not in all? The realities of today are such that deep integration according to the EU model is associated in Eurasia with a few difficulties that have not yet been overcome even in a much longer integration association, such as the Russian Federation and Republic of Belarus. Nevertheless, the EAEU continues to actively discuss the prospects for integration. They propose to make the Russian ruble a single currency for all participants, focusing on strengthening its role and importance in the mutual trade of the Eurasian states. The Chinese

¹²¹ R. K. Alimov. Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Greater Eurasia. *Bulletin of International Organizations*, 2018, vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 33.

¹²² D. Karimov. Bring it up to a billion // URL: www.eaeunion.org/#aboutus (accessed 07.06.2023).

¹²³ A. Dynkin, E. Telegina, G. Halova. The role of the Eurasian Economic Union in the formation of Greater Eurasia. *World Economy and International Relations*, 2018, vol. 62, No. 4, pp. 5-24.

yuan is also being put forward as an alternative. In the meantime, the countries that are members of the EAEU are not ready to abandon their national currencies, and it is unlikely that any semblance of a single currency it will appear in the near future.¹²⁴ The ideas of Eurasian integration, which originated more than 100 years ago, continue to occupy an important place in the processes of economic and political rapprochement of the peoples of the former USSR. This process itself is not easy due to both external and internal factors. But in any case, it can be stated with confidence: the states of Eurasia are trying to create integration associations in various formats, to solve issues of mutual interest with their help. And this trend affects most of the states of the Eurasian continent. It is also obvious that the prospects for the development of not only individual Eurasian states, but also the entire continent as a whole depend on how successful the integration processes promoted within the framework of the EAEU and the SCO will become.

4.5.3. SCO AND CSTO

Along with the SCO, Russia's cooperation with the member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) seems to be the most promising in the field of ensuring national and military security. This organization is a military-political union created in 2002 based on the Collective Security Treaty signed in Tashkent in 1992 and entered into force in 1994. Currently, the CSTO includes seven states: Republic of Armenia, Republic of Belarus, Republic of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Russian Federation, Republic of Tajikistan, and Republic of Uzbekistan.¹²⁵

At the end of 2003, the CSTO received observer status at the UN.¹²⁶ This status means that the CSTO is a full-fledged international organization and, in accordance with Chapter 8 of the UN Charter, is recognized as a regional security association. Cooperation with international organizations is carried out to coordinate issues in the field of military security and the tasks being solved by the CSTO. The SCO is the most important partner of the CSTO in ensuring security in the Eurasian region. The working body for coordinating issues of international cooperation is the CSTO Interparliamentary Assembly (IPA), whose headquarters is located in St. Petersburg.¹²⁷

¹²⁴ A. Sibirskaya. The Single currency of the Eurasian Union: pros and cons. Eurasia Expert. URL: <https://eurasia.expert/edinaya-valyuta-evraziyskogsoyuza-za-i-protive> (accessed: 09.06.2023.)

¹²⁵ CSTO- official web page. URL: <https://en.odkb-csto.org/25years/?ysclid=lm2asecnls315339619> (accessed: 02.02.2022)

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

Its goals are to establish the collective defense space of the CIS, to improve the quality of joint defense capabilities to prevent conflicts and regional disputes among the CIS countries and mediation within the CIS. The strategic goal of the organization is to contribute to the establishment of a just and democratic international order, maintaining the prosperity and security of Eurasia.

The CSTO and the SCO have many overlapping or similar strategic goals and interests in the field of security. In this regard, both organizations can focus on international cooperation in the field of security, especially in the field of preventing "color revolutions", maintaining stability in Central Asia, in the fight against terrorism, extremism and separatism, as well as drug trafficking, transnational organized crime and other non-traditional security threats.

In geographical distribution, Member States have a high degree of overlap: The SCO includes member States: People's Republic of China, Russian Federation, Republic of Kazakhstan, Republic of Tajikistan, Kyrgyz Republic, Republic of Uzbekistan, observer States: Mongolia, Republic of India, Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Islamic Republic of Iran, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, as well as dialogue partners: Republic of Belarus, Sri Lanka, and Turkey. The CSTO members are Russian Federation, Republic of Kazakhstan, Republic of Tajikistan, Kyrgyz Republic, Republic of Uzbekistan, Republic of Belarus, and Republic of Armenia. In 2014, the Republic of Armenia also applied to join the SCO. Consequently, the composition of these two organizations is largely identical.

These two organizations have a big difference in the strategic orientation of goals, the nature, and methods of action. The CSTO differs especially significantly from the SCO in the nature of the creation of military alliances. Although the possibility of merging the two organizations is unlikely, but to strengthen ties and cooperation, it is quite possible to expand cooperation, especially in the fight against third forces to maintain regional security and stability, drug trafficking, in the post-war reconstruction of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, in contributing to the creation of a new international political and economic order. Although, the CSTO and the SCO are related structures, since most of the CSTO members are also core members of the SCO, where Russian Federation dominates. Therefore, if relations between the two organizations deteriorate, serious internal conflicts may arise. At the same time, it is obvious that the SCO and the CSTO should be in close partnership, and their cooperation is not illogical.¹²⁸

¹²⁸ Huasheng Zh. SCO: Review and Outlook, *Moscow*, 2012, 279 p.

Since the beginning of 2003, the CSTO has been cooperating with the SCO.¹²⁹ In June 2005, the CSTO declared that it was ready to conduct comprehensive cooperation with the SCO and EurAsEC within the CIS. On October 5, 2007, in Dushanbe, the General Secretaries of the two organizations R.G. Nurgaliyev and N.N. Bordyuzha signed a "Memorandum of Understanding between the SCO and CSTO secretariats", which defined the areas of cooperation between the two organizations, including in the sphere of ensuring regional and international security and stability, combating terrorism, illicit trafficking in drugs and weapons, transnational organized crime and other areas of common interest. In June 2011, in Astana, J. M. Dzhumanbekov,¹³⁰ and N.N. Bordyuzha,¹³¹ signed a "Protocol of Understanding between the CSTO Secretariat and the SCO RATS," which emphasized that both sides would strengthen cooperation in the fight against terrorism. According to the CSTO Secretary General, the signing of the document will make it possible to coordinate the efforts of organizations more effectively in countering extremist and terrorist activities in the Central Asian region.¹³²

The SCO and CSTO member states are mainly represented by Central Asia, so these two organizations will focus on maintaining regional peace and stability. Central Asia is an important area of interest for the two organizations. According to Zhao Huirong,¹³³ Sino-Russian cooperation within the SCO is mainly related to Central Asia, common territorial borders and geographical security and stability, as well as interaction between Central Asia, China and Russia. Close trilateral cooperation between China and Russia with the countries of Central Asia will help to reach consensus on many issues in the field of common affairs and interests.¹³⁴ For China, the situation in Central Asia directly affects security and stability in Xinjiang, as China is implementing a Program for the development of Western China and the Silk Road Economic Belt, which includes China's main interests. It is important for Russian Federation to preserve historical and cultural ties with the countries of Central Asia and continue to develop traditional political and economic relations. Shi Ze¹³⁵ believes that Central Asia is a key area that Russia's resurgent diplomacy in the CIS is focused on.

¹²⁹ Litovkin V. 'CSTO and SCO - in harness'. *RIA Novosti*. 2006, URL: <http://www.rian.ru/analitics/20060619/49717716.html> (access 19.03.2021)

¹³⁰ The Director of the Executive Committee of the SCO RATS

¹³¹ The Secretary General of the CSTO

¹³² Протокол о взаимопонимании между РАТС ШОС и ОДКБ подписан в Астане. *RIA News*. 2011. URL: <http://ria.ru/politics/20110614/388199720.html> (accessed: 19.03.2021)

¹³³ Associate Professor at the Institute of Russian, East European and Central Asian Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

¹³⁴ 'China's neighbourhood policy'. *European Council on Foreign Relations. Asia Centre*. URL: http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/China_Analysis_China_s_Neighbourhood_Policy_February2014.pdf (accessed: 25.03.2022)

¹³⁵ Director of the SCO China Research Center

The Russian Federation pursues an important strategic goal: if it loses the initiative in Central Asia, it will inevitably weaken Russia's international position and significantly limit its development.¹³⁶ Thus, People's Republic of China and Russian Federation have interests and big plans for Central Asia. In addition, they have a great responsibility for peace, stability and economic development in the region, therefore, as leading members of the two organizations, they should promote cooperation between the SCO and the CSTO.

Although the CSTO is still a young organization, its activities are of a much-planned nature. The important areas of functioning of this organization include the formation of a system of collective security of the CIS member States; rendering effective assistance to the Commonwealth states in the construction and training of national armed forces, including national military personnel and technical personnel; conducting joint exercises of operational and tactical scale.

The existence of expanded cooperation between the SCO and the CSTO is a rational necessity from the point of view of the goals and objectives set for them. At the same time, it should be recognized that although the two organizations have many common interests, they cannot be united. However, this fact should not hinder deep and thorough international cooperation, since strengthening ties and close interaction between the two organizations will give great advantages in the fight against three forces (armed conflicts, drugs, terrorism), improve the exchange of intelligence and information in the field of combating terrorism, transnational experience, and will contribute to the development of joint anti-terrorist struggle, organization of military exercises. The SCO does not have anti-terrorist structures that would directly fight terrorism. Considering the opportunities for organizing collective security and joint command of armies, the SCO's participation in countering terrorism and other security threats in the region is also increasing. If the two organizations can integrate existing resources and avoid overspending them while maintaining their own goals and objectives, this will allow us to formulate additional advantages for the better functioning of the Central Asian rapid reaction forces. Emergency response capabilities and the fight against international terrorism will be significantly improved, and the situation in the region will become more favorable, safe and stable.

Despite numerous meetings of the heads of the two organizations and a mutual desire to develop cooperation,¹³⁷ no specific programs have been created and no practical actions have

¹³⁶ Shi Ze. 'A Study on Xinjiang Development Strategy', *Asian Development Bank Press*.

¹³⁷ Memorandum was signed in 2007, a Protocol of Understanding was signed in 2011.

been taken. The organizations have repeatedly invited each other to participate in important international conferences and anti-terrorist military exercises, but no joint military exercises have been held. Therefore, cooperation should begin with joint anti-terrorist military exercises. During serious social unrest in the countries of Central Asia, these organizations can create joint peacekeeping forces to stop the development of the humanitarian crisis in time and reduce casualties among people.

On the issue of UN reform in terms of establishing a fair and rational new international political and economic order, promoting the strengthening of a multipolar world and the democratization of international relations, the SCO and the CSTO can play a constructive role. These organizations contribute to strengthening the nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia, creating a system of nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament, and arms control in the region. The SCO and the CSTO are UN observers, so they can play a positive role in the international political arena and in regional affairs.

Both organizations have a wide space for cooperation in the post-war reconstruction of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the process of national reconciliation. Thus, some SCO members took part in the post-war reconstruction of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, while the CSTO played no role in this process.

The specific geographical location and complex environment of the region seriously affect economic development and social stability, strengthening international cooperation in expanding the field of drug control, creating a joint drug safety zone, which is necessary for establishing regional peace and social harmony, that is, to achieve the goals of the SCO and the CSTO in strengthening international cooperation.

CONCLUSION

“On the way to the SCO Secure” - this is exactly the main theme of the last summit on July 4 2023 in the virtual format of the XXIII. Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), chaired by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The main topic was Iran's official accession to the SCO. In addition, the Republic of Belarus signed a memorandum of commitment on joining the organization, which launched the procedure for its accession to the SCO in the near future.

In 2022, memoranda were signed on granting the status of SCO dialogue partners to three Arab countries – the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the State of Qatar. The decision to grant such status to five more countries – the Kingdom of Bahrain, the Republic

of Maldives, the State of Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and the Republic of the Union of Myanmar – was made following the results of the previous Samarkand summit. Even though the New Delhi summit touched on economic issues more than previous ones, security issues remain a priority for the organization's member countries. This is evidenced by the New Delhi Declaration signed at the end of the summit.

As in the previous Samarkand Declaration, security issues are reduced to six key aspects:

1. The joint fight against terrorism, separatism, extremism and drug trafficking, and preventing interference in the internal affairs of States under the pretext of countering terrorism and extremism,
2. The preservation of outer space free of weapons of any kind and exclusively peaceful use of outer space,
3. The prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and their destruction as one of the pillars of the global security architecture,
4. Prohibition of the development, production, accumulation and use of chemical weapons and their destruction as an effective tool in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation,
5. The settlement of the situation in Afghanistan as one of the most important factors for maintaining and strengthening security and stability in the SCO space,
6. Digital security and equal rights for all countries to regulate the Internet, the sovereign right of states to manage it in their national segment.

Even though most of the paragraphs of the Declaration on security issues duplicate the decisions of last year's summit, in 2023 they have a new fullness. Over the past ten months, most SCO members have faced internal challenges that affect the overall stability in the region. The current contours of the alliance completely cover the territory covering the river basins of the Arctic Ocean, as well as the Caspian Sea and the historical trade corridor of the Silk Road. However, the announced expansion of the SCO extends to the borders of the Inner Crescent, a territory capable of controlling leading maritime communications, including the Suez Canal, the New Suez Canal, and exits to the Red and Mediterranean Seas. In other words, the contours of a new macroregion are being formed in the SCO space, through which the international North–South and East–West corridors, as well as key waterways, pass.

The expansion of mutually beneficial cooperation between integration formats not only contributes to the growth of national economies but can also have a significant impact on the formation of new approaches to the functioning of the global market. The Greater Eurasia area

has unique trade, economic, transport and logistics advantages, while the human potential and resources of the BRICS countries are able to multiply the effect of this cooperation.

The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) is systematically building an infrastructure for dialogue with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO): the states of this association account for over 30% of global GDP. At the same time, opportunities are opening up to promote a broader integration circuit with the participation of BRICS: The issues of unification of payment systems, the use of national currencies in mutual settlements between countries, the promotion of innovation and the exchange of best practices in trade regulation, customs administration, as well as in the transport, logistics and energy sectors are particularly relevant. The SCO Economic Program in the Declaration emphasizes the commitment to gradually increase the share of national currencies in mutual settlements. A similar policy of de-dollarization is typical for the BRICS, which includes Russia, India, and China from the SCO countries. Its primary results demonstrate an increase in the share of the Russian currency in export transactions with the SCO countries – by 2023, more than 40 percent of transactions are carried out in rubles.

At the last summit, a thesis was made about the need to form financial institutions represented by the development bank and the SCO Development Fund. Even though this initiative is not new (it was first proposed by China and Russia more than ten years ago), the need to create their own financial institutions within the organization is gaining a different meaning today. Thus, during the last summit, the SCO members noted the absence of major projects implemented under its auspices. Of course, such statements announce the transformation of the alliance and a departure from the initial tasks of ensuring security in the region. However, the integration of the projects of the Eurasian Economic Union, the Belt and Road and the SCO announced in 2022 demonstrates the intention to develop the economic track of the organization. The SCO and the CSTO are objectively natural partners in the process of ensuring security in the Eurasian region. The development of cooperation between these two organizations seems, in our opinion, a very promising matter, contributing to the strengthening of both the regional security of Eurasia and the national security of Russia and the countries of Central Asia.

The existence of expanded cooperation between the SCO and the CSTO is a rational necessity from the point of view of the goals and objectives set for them. Since strengthening ties and close interaction between the two organizations will give great advantages in the fight against the three threats (armed conflicts, drugs, terrorism), improve the exchange of intelligence and information in the field of combating terrorism, transnational experience, will

contribute to the development of joint anti-terrorist struggle, organization of military exercises. Considering the opportunities for organizing collective security and joint command of armies, the SCO's participation in countering terrorism and other security threats in the region is also increasing. If the two organizations can integrate existing resources and avoid overspending them while maintaining their own goals and objectives, this will allow us to formulate additional advantages for the better functioning of the Central Asian rapid reaction forces. Emergency response capabilities and the fight against international terrorism will be significantly improved, and the situation in the region will become more favorable, safe, and stable.

5. SECURITY POLICY OF THE SCO: FIGHT AGAINST “THE THREE EVILS”

5.1. INTRODUCTION

At the inception of the Organization, the main goals were called the stabilization of the situation in Central Asia, strengthening friendship and good neighborliness between the participating states, the development of cooperation in political, economic, scientific, and other spheres. However, among the directions of the SCO, the most pivotal and important is the collective counteraction of countries to the spread of *terrorism, extremism, and separatism* – the main three "evils" in the Central Asian region. The fight against these challenges remains a priority today.

Member States expressed deep concern about the security threat posed by terrorism, separatism, and extremism in all its forms and manifestations, and strongly condemned terrorist acts around the world. They stressed the importance of consistent implementation of the SCO member States' Cooperation Program in Countering Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism for 2022-2024 (Dushanbe, September 17, 2021).

The Member States, reaffirming their firm commitment to the fight against terrorism, separatism and extremism, are determined to continue taking active measures to eliminate the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, to block the channels of terrorist financing, to curb recruitment activities and cross-border movement of terrorists, to counter extremism, radicalization of youth, the spread of terrorist ideology, as well as to eliminate "sleeper cells" and places that are used as terrorist shelters.

The Member States note the inadmissibility of interference in the internal affairs of States under the pretext of countering terrorism and extremism, as well as the unacceptability of using terrorist, extremist, and radical groups for selfish purposes.

Terrorism, extremism, and separatism in the Central Asian region are complex and multidimensional phenomena that contain political, economic, social, criminal, and military components. International terrorist organizations or their divisions, radical Islamic fundamentalists, and extremist groups operate here, which causes concern for both the States of the region, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the entire world community. It is also important to consider the fact that their occurrence has internal causes that are similar for different countries. At the same time, their activities are strongly linked to ideological trends outside the region. Terrorist organizations in Central Asia are closely associated with the

international criminal community that controls the trade in weapons, drugs, and people. Separatism is a certain political trend, while extremism and terrorism are ways to achieve political goals that are widely used by both separatists and representatives of some other political trends. In other words, if separatism is the content of certain political ideas like separation from a country based on ethnicity or religion, then extremism and terrorism are the forms of their implementation. Although the article deals primarily with issues of terrorism, it demonstrates that it is almost to separate the interconnectedness of these forms in the Central-Asian Region.

After the collapse of the Union, problems related to extremism in Central Asian countries began to play a major role. At the same time, it acts as a holistic phenomenon, on the other – performs a wide range of very diverse functions. Good example for this is the *Budapest Report on Christian Persecution* which examined different aspects of Christian situation generally and regionally (Europe, Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa).¹³⁸ The religion can be studied from different point of view in different region. Among them consolidation of ethnic consciousness, formation of spiritual and moral culture, the formation of ideals of social justice and a sense of duty, a conscious attitude to the duties of a person to the state and the state to a person, etc. can be studied and examined.¹³⁹

One of the challenges in Central Asia at present day is the manifestation of religious extremism. The high importance of studying the phenomenon of religious extremism is since it represents a threat to security and stability, the territorial integrity of the state. As well as due to the growing number of citizens who have left/leaving to participate in armed conflicts in the middle East.¹⁴⁰

5.2. THE SCO POLICY ON COUNTERING TERRORISM

The SCO is not a military bloc, but the uncompromising struggle against the terrorist threat dictates the need to develop and strengthen mechanisms aimed at radical eradication of terrorist activities. In this regard, the SCO continues the practice of holding joint anti-terrorist exercises on a regular basis, including the exercises "Peace mission".

The SCO has a long history of cooperation in the field of information security, and since its foundation in 2001, more than 10 documents have been devoted to the topic of cooperation in

¹³⁸ Kaló, Újházi 2018.

¹³⁹ Rahimov 2011.

¹⁴⁰ Zoltán Szenes 2018. p. 71.

the field of information security. At the fifth SCO summit in 2005, information terrorism was mentioned for the first time in an official document. The statement of the Heads of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Member States on International Information Security, adopted at the 2006 Shanghai Summit, is the first of its kind guiding document in the field of SCO cooperation in the field of information security.¹⁴¹

The statement also mentioned the intention to create an expert group of the SCO member states on international information security.¹ Since then, SCO cooperation in the field of information security has been discussed at almost all summits, and its connotations and extensions have become richer and more specific, including threats to international cooperation in the field of information security, how to guarantee the sovereign right of each member state to Internet security, how to develop cooperation between member states in the field of digitalization and information, how to be vigilant and prevent the use of ICT by terrorist, separatist and extremist organizations, etc.

In 2021, on the 20th anniversary of the SCO, the member states gathered in Dushanbe, developed a Plan of cooperation to ensure international information security for 2022-2023 and adopted the Dushanbe Declaration on the 20th anniversary of the SCO.¹⁴²

At the meeting of the Council of Heads of State on September 16, 2022, in the city of Samarkand, the member States confirmed the importance of cooperation in ensuring international information security and proposed to create the SCO Information Security Center (Republic of Kazakhstan) based on the SCO Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS).

Since the theme of India's SCO presidency in 2023 is "Towards a Secure SCO", information security is also on the agenda. India has organized several international seminars on cybersecurity or information security with SCO member states. On December 14-15, 2022, the Secretariat of the National Security Council (NSC), the Government of India, together with the Data Security Council of India (DSCI) as a knowledge dissemination partner organized a two-day Practical seminar "Ensuring the security of cyberspace borders" for delegates from the SCO member states. The discussion focused on how social media is turning into a "tool kit" of terrorists, as well as their threats and challenges.¹⁴³

¹⁴¹ "Full text of the Joint Communique of the 2006 SCO Summit", June 15, 2006, <http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/meeting/171590.htm> . (accessed: 12.02.2021)

¹⁴² "Dushanbe Declaration for the 20th Anniversary of the SCO", September 17, 2021, <http://eng.sectsc.org/news/20210917/782639.html> (accessed: 12.12.2021)

¹⁴³ "Practical Seminar of the SCO RATS on the topic "SECURING THE BORDERS OF CYBERSPACE", organized by the Secretariat of the National Security Council of India", December 15, 2022, <https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1883880> (accessed: 15.12.2021)

As mentioned earlier, countering terrorism in the Central Asian region is one of the main activities of the SCO. A special role in combating the terrorist threat in the SCO space is played by a specialized body – the SCO Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (hereinafter, the SCO RATS). This structure was established after the historic decision of the Shanghai Five and the signing of the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism of June 7, 2002. The official opening of the SCO RATS headquarters took place on June 17, 2004, during a meeting of the Council of Heads of SCO Member States in Tashkent.¹⁴⁴

RATS has the status of a legal entity and has the right to:

- conclude contracts,
- to acquire and dispose of movable and immovable property,
- open and maintain bank accounts in any currency,
- initiate lawsuits in courts and participate in court proceedings.

These rights are exercised on behalf of the RATS by the Director of the RATS Executive Committee.

The activities of the RATS are financed from the SCO budget. The procedure for financing the RATS is determined by the documents regulating the issues of the SCO budget.¹⁴⁵

The main tasks and functions of RATS are:

- 1) Development of proposals and recommendations on the development of cooperation in the fight against terrorism, separatism, and extremism.
- 2) Assistance to the competent authorities of the Parties in the fight against terrorism, separatism, and extremism
- 3) Collection and analysis of information received by the RATS from the Parties on the fight against terrorism, separatism, and extremism
- 4) Provision of information at the request of the competent authorities of the Parties
- 5) Assistance in the preparation and conduct of anti-terrorist command and staff and operational-tactical exercises
- 6) Assistance in the preparation and conduct of operational search and other measures to combat terrorism, separatism, and extremism
- 7) Assistance in the implementation of the international search for persons who allegedly committed these acts in order to bring them to criminal responsibility

¹⁴⁴ About RATS SCO // RATS SCO URL: <https://ecrats.org/glavnaya-stranica/> (accessed: 06.09.2022).

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

8) Participation in the preparation of international legal documents concerning the fight against terrorism, separatism, and extremism

9) Assistance in the training of specialists and instructors for anti-terrorist units

10) Participation in the preparation and holding of scientific and practical conferences, seminars, assistance in the exchange of experience in the fight against terrorism, separatism, and extremism.

11) Establishing and maintaining working contacts with international organizations dealing with the fight against terrorism, separatism, and extremism.¹⁴⁶

In accordance with the Agreement, the RATS is a permanent body of the SCO and is intended "to facilitate coordination and interaction of the competent authorities of the Parties in the fight against terrorism, separatism and extremism, as these acts are defined in the Convention." The main tasks and functions of the RATS include the formation and maintenance of specialized data banks on international terrorist, separatist and extremist organizations, assistance in the preparation and conduct of operational search and other measures to combat terrorism, separatism and extremism, the implementation of an international search for persons suspected of committing crimes of a relevant nature, the collection and analysis of information, assistance in the preparation and conduct of anti-terrorist exercises, assistance in the training of specialists for anti-terrorist units, establishing and maintaining working contacts with international organizations dealing with the fight against terrorism, separatism and extremism.¹⁴⁷

Quite significant successes have been achieved in recent years of the RATS:

1) Formation and maintenance of specialized databases on international terrorist, separatist, and extremist organizations. The SCO RATS has created a secure data bank and, on its basis – the "Unified Search Register". This database is regularly updated for persons declared on the international wanted list. It is regularly updated on persons put on the international wanted list for committing or suspected of committing crimes of a terrorist, separatist or extremist nature. The RATS also maintains a List of terrorist, separatist and extremist organizations banned on the territory of the organization's member States.

As of the end of 2017, this list includes more than 100 organizations, including the Islamic State, Jabhat al-Nusra, the Islamic Movement of East Turkestan, Hizb-ut-Tahrir al Islami, the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan, Ansarullah, etc.). Both the Register and the List are

¹⁴⁶bid.

¹⁴⁷ Kokoshina Z.A. The role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in countering terrorism and extremism in the post-Soviet space // International relations and world politics. 2017. No. 4 pp. 97-123

regularly updated based on information and decisions of the judicial authorities of the SCO member States.

According to the SCO RATS, in the period from 2013 to 2019, the SCO suppressed more than 960 criminal acts related to terrorism and detained more than 2,600 members of international terrorist organizations.¹⁴⁸ The 38th meeting of the RATS Council was held in New Delhi on October 14, 2022. The meeting was attended by delegations from Republic of India, Republic of Kazakhstan, People's Republic of China, Kyrgyzstan, Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Russian Federation, Republic of Tajikistan, Republic of Uzbekistan, and the Executive Committee of the SCO RATS. The meeting adopted the Executive Committee's work plan, as well as special cooperation programs in the field of border defense and cyberterrorism and decided to continue joint border operations in 2023 to combat terrorist threats from the regions. The parties adopted several resolutions concerning the organization, staff, and finances of the Executive Committee, as well as strengthening the legal framework of the Member States in the fight against the "three evils".¹⁴⁹

2) Assistance in the preparation and conduct of operational search and other measures to combat terrorism, separatism, and extremism. In this area, the key role is played by the implementation of three-year cooperation programs in the fight against terrorism, separatism and extremism, approved by the Council of Heads of SCO Member States since 2007.

3) Scientific cooperation and assistance in the exchange of experience in the fight against terrorism, separatism, and extremism. Back in June 2009, at the SCO summit in Yekaterinburg, simultaneously with the SCO Convention against Terrorism, an Agreement was signed on training personnel for anti-terrorist formations of the SCO member states. Every year since 2013, scientific and practical conferences have been held within the framework of the RATS.

4) Establishing and maintaining working contacts with international organizations dealing with the fight against terrorism, separatism and extremism. Since 2005, the SCO has been an observer at the UN, which has confirmed the place of this organization in the modern system of international relations. Since then, SCO representatives have often participated in international conferences on regional and global security issues, including issues of anti-terrorist activities.

¹⁴⁸ Promote the construction of a closer community of destiny of the SCO", People's Daily Online, September 13, 2022, http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2022-09/13/nw.D110000renmrb_20220913_2-03.html (accessed: 06.12.2022). (in chinese)

¹⁴⁹ "The SCO Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure approves measures to counter threats emanating from terrorist groups operating from Afghanistan," ANI, October 14, 2022, <https://www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/scos-regional-anti-terrorism-structure-approves-measures-to-counter-threats-posed-by-terror-groups-operating-from-Afghanistan-20221014152014/> (accessed: 09.03.2023)

Based on the experience of the activities of international organizations, it can be concluded that the *cooperation of states within one region is the most effective*. Legal and regulatory decisions can serve as a good basis, and often even as a model for concluding universal agreements. It must be emphasized that considering the changing international legal standards for improving national legislation, the system and the comprehensive nature of anti-terrorism measures can increase the effectiveness of state policies in the field of combating terrorism, extremism and separatism.¹⁵⁰

Afghanistan remains the country "most affected" by terrorism for the fourth year in a row, despite a reduction in the number of attacks by 75% and deaths by 58% in 2022.¹⁵¹

The Global Terrorism Index (GTI) is calculated based on data on terrorist attacks and the number of deaths since 2007. The worst terrorist situation is in Afghanistan.

According to GTI, 633 victims of terrorist attacks were registered in the country in 2022. 63% of attacks and 74% of deaths occurred on the border with Pakistan.

The situation in Central Asia is favorable. The Republic of Tajikistan took the 50th place of the rating. The Republic of Uzbekistan is ranked 70th (in 2022 its indicators deteriorated). Republic of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic and Republic of Turkmenistan shared the 93rd place.¹⁵²

5.3. THE SCO POLICY ON COUNTERING EXTREMISM

The term "extremism" in a broad sense means a commitment to extreme measures. If we transfer this concept to the religious soil, it is a commitment in the religious sphere to extreme views and actions, the basis of which are violence, cruelty, and aggression. The purpose of religious extremism is to incite religious enmity and hatred, religiously camouflaged activities aimed at seizing power, leading to changes in the state system. Thus, acting as an extreme form of social destructive action, religious extremism poses a threat to the security of the state, the foundations of the stable development of society.

The adoption of the SCO Convention on Countering Extremism is more than relevant today.¹⁵³

The member states of the Organization not only expressed deep concern about the escalation of the manifestation of extremism in the 21st century, but also united in understanding the connection/ relationship between extremism and terrorism.

¹⁵⁰ Nigmatullin 2014. 166.

¹⁵¹ Global Terrorism Index 2023.

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Alimov 2017.

In 2017, within the framework of the SCO, a convention dedicated exclusively to combating extremism was developed and adopted — the Convention of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on Countering Extremism.¹⁵⁴ This Convention, on the one hand, preserves the continuity of the two acts we have analyzed and introduces new elements into the mechanism of countering extremism, on the other hand, in particular, in comparison with the 2001 Convention. The 2017 Convention: a) expanded the concept of "extremism", it means "ideology and practice aimed at resolving political, social, racial, national and religious conflicts through violent and other unconstitutional actions"; b) introduced a new concept of an extremist act: it includes the acts provided for in subparagraph 3 of paragraph 1 of Article 1 of the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism of June 15, 2001, as well as such acts as "organizing an armed rebellion and participating in it for extremist purposes; creation, leadership and participation in an extremist organization; incitement of political, social, racial, national and religious enmity or discord; propaganda of exclusivity, superiority or inferiority of a person on the basis of his political, social, racial, national and religious affiliation; public calls for the implementation of these acts; mass production, storage and distribution of extremist materials in order to promote extremism."¹⁵⁵

In the SCO Convention 2017, the definition of "extremism" is specified as: "seizure of power or forcible retention, as well as violent changes in the constitutional system of the state, but comparable public security interventions, including the above goals, the organization of illegal armed groups or participation in them, as well as national parties in accordance with the law, means any act of persecution as a crime".¹⁵⁶ It can be seen in the Convention that the concepts of "separatism" and "extremism" are more political than legal.

According to the 2017 Convention, the financing of extremism is understood as "the deliberate collection or provision of funds or the provision of financial services in order to finance the organization, preparation and commission of at least one of the acts covered by the Convention, or to ensure the activities of an extremist organization." The 2017 Convention clarifies what is meant by "extremist materials": information containing the ideology of extremism or calling for, justifying or justifying the need to carry out an extremist act.¹⁵⁷

The 2017 Convention contains the concept of an "extremist organization": an organized group pursuing the purpose of committing crimes covered by this Convention; a public or religious

¹⁵⁴ The 2017 Convention of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on Countering Extremism // URL: <http://docs.cntd.ru/document/436739639> (accessed: 31.05.2022)

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

association or other organization in respect of which, on the grounds provided for by the national legislation of the Parties, a decision has entered into force to eliminate or ban activities in connection with the implementation of extremist activities."¹⁵⁸

The imposition of terrorism on the level of national separatism and political extremism is not scientifically accurate. Extremism is a phenomenon that relates to a problem from a limited point of view. Terrorism is one of the most stringent methods of action. That is why terrorist approaches can be used by political forces and movements that pursue *separatists, nationalists, and extremists*.¹⁵⁹ At the same time, there are procedures in international practice that define extremism as one of the motives of terrorism. Resolution 1373 of the UN General Assembly, adopted on September 28, 2001, recognizes that the number of terrorist acts against extremism is increasing. The Convention provides bodies responsible for the implementation and development of cooperation. And identified the main methods of dealing with destructive phenomena. In this area, attention is drawn to information cooperation among Member States. Considering the theoretical aspect of security in the SCO Convention, this document indicates the official implementation and identification of the fight against terrorism in the SCO security policy. Over time, the SCO documents show not only an increase in the number of definitions in the field of countering extremism common to the SCO space, but also the development of an existing agreement, which indicates a timely response to changes in the political situation and the security situation.¹⁶⁰ In the SCO Convention on Countering Extremism of 2017, this definition is referred to the concept of "extremist act", which has become more meaningful and reveals the forms of this activity.¹⁶¹ The term extremism is revealed not as an "act" but as an "ideology and practice". The concepts of "financing extremism", "extremist materials", "extremist organization", "countering extremism" and others are also enshrined. The document defines extremism as a breeding ground for terrorism, which poses a threat to peace and security, the territorial integrity of the state, the development of friendly relations between them and the protection of human rights and freedoms. The SCO member States emphasized the inadmissibility of using extremism as a tool for the realization of political and geopolitical goals.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Shanghai Convention on combating terrorism, separatism, and extremism 2011. pp. 166-175.

¹⁶⁰ Bekkayrov 2018. pp.213-215.

¹⁶¹ SCO Secretary-General 2017

The most important innovation of the document is a common vision of the legal framework for countering a violent attempt on a legitimate authority and only in the context of growing terrorist threats, the broadest sense of preventing any coup d'état.

The Convention has become a pivotal, system-forming act, around the definitive norms of which the entire array of anti-extremist legislation is formed in the SCO space. This document is the SCO's collective response to new forms, methods, and specifics of extremist activity. In addition to the existing areas of counteraction, the Convention focuses on the development and implementation of measures, including preventing the spread of extremist ideology, preventing the use of the Internet for extremist purposes, strengthening propaganda and patriotic education, interacting with international and regional organizations, research, protecting victims, witnesses, other participants in criminal proceedings and others.

The main military-political, economic, diplomatic, and other steps of the leadership of the countries of the region are dictated, first, by the desire to avoid destabilization of their political regimes. Hence the attention with which the so-called "Islamic State" (IS / ISIS / Daesh (banned on the territory of the Russian Federation and in the countries of Central Asia)) has already turned into a serious problem for Central Asia. This is facilitated by the unification of forces of immigrants from Central Asia - militants in Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Syrian Arab Republic, and Republic of Iraq.¹⁶²

The political elites and governments of Central Asia put the problem of radicalization of Islam on one of the first places in several threats that can radically change the situation in their countries. Islamists are accused of undermining the secular foundations of power and the declared freedom of religion, plans to turn Islam into an alternative to the secular vector of development of the Central Asian States, including by creating a theocratic state in the region. The concern of the governments of Central Asia about the possibility of destabilization of the region with the help of Islamist extremism is justified, given several circumstances:

Firstly, there is the rapid accumulation of a critical mass of internal problems in the Central Asian States. Among them are poverty, corruption, unemployment, interethnic and inter-clan frictions, the growing influence of the drug mafia, the destruction of socially significant infrastructure, and low economic growth rates. The specifics of the "dynasty-permanent" ruling regimes in the countries of Central Asia does not give reason to expect that

¹⁶² Kucera 2015, Shamieh and Szenes 2015

it will be possible to overcome the underlying causes that contribute to the success of agitation by radical Islamist and terrorist organizations.¹⁶³

Secondly, the infrastructure, roads, power plants, hospitals and schools built during the Soviet era are slowly but steadily collapsing, and the last generation of Soviet specialists who have been monitoring their condition is disappearing. In five to ten years, there will be no teachers in the classes of some Central Asian republics, no doctors in the hospitals, and lack of electricity will become the norm. The destruction of infrastructure can cause the fall of weak regimes.

Thirdly, the geopolitical neighborhood of Central Asia with zones of instability and conflicts in Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Xinjiang, China. The gradual degradation of the situation in Islamic Republic of Afghanistan leads to a situation where it will be difficult for Central Asian states to confront emerging problems and reflect, if necessary, the challenges of militant Islamism.

Fourthly, the demonstration effect of the so-called "Arab Spring" remains, initially aimed at socio-political changes, democratization of public life, but eventually facilitating the penetration of religious extremists into power, previously excluded by local secular authoritarian regimes from participation in political life.

The "religious awakening" we observed in the late XX – early XXI centuries, which covered the countries of Central Asia, affected Kazakhstan. Interest in their own roots, religion is manifested in the construction of mosques and acquaintance with religious literature and generally positive phenomena. It should be noted that along with moderate religious literature and preachers, extremist ideas are penetrating the region, capturing the minds of young people. The consequence of this is the outflow of some of the most radical-minded people to the countries of the Near and Middle East to participate in armed operations on the side of Islamists.¹⁶⁴

At present days, the effects of overpopulation are already being felt in Central Asia: incidents of conflict over land and water have become more frequent, and there are not enough kindergartens and schools. The problems will intensify in the coming years, as the population of most Central Asian countries is growing exponentially, and job creation, affordable housing and infrastructure construction lags behind the needs of the population year after year.

¹⁶³ Khalatyan 2016, Kis-Benedek 2016.b.

¹⁶⁴ Ministry of Religious Affairs and civil society of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

Now the problem of employment in Central Asia is largely solved *by mass labor migration to Russia*, where the total number of visitors, according to unofficial estimates, is 4-5 million people, that is, almost 10% of the total population of the region. However, Russian Federation, obviously, will continue to regulate the access of migrants to its labor market, restoring order in the sphere of labor flows. In addition, the economic crisis has already led to a partial outflow of foreign labor and a sharp decrease — in some countries by a quarter - in the volume of transfers from Russian Federation to Central Asia. According to forecasts, this decline will continue.¹⁶⁵

The main reason people turn to extremism and radicalism is discontent, seeking a way out. Dissatisfaction is formed from a complex of factors of external and internal factors.

External factors are:

- processes of global confrontation
- geopolitical influence from outside
- dynamics of the situation in the Central Asian States themselves
- the interest of global network extremist organizations in expanding their social base
- the flow of religious literature from the outside, which does not always undergo an expert examination, is growing uncontrollably in several Central Asian countries
- the activities of recruiters under the guise of missionaries arriving in the countries of Central Asia, conspiring to provide charity, construction and revival of religious buildings, education, etc.¹⁶⁶

The increased interest of external radical groups in Central Asia is largely dictated by the geopolitical position of the country, which is in the center of interests of both Russia and other countries in the region, as well as the United States and Britain. The build-up of extremist resources within the countries of Central Asia is a direct result of the confrontation of these powers. The processes of radicalization in the countries of Central Asia are, of course, associated with events in Syrian Arab Republic, Republic of Türkiye, and Republic of Iraq. However, this link is not so much ideological as geopolitical in nature. Today, extremism and terrorism have become a geopolitical instrument of influence.¹⁶⁷

An *internal factor* affecting the formation and consolidation of extremist motivation is the extreme social situation in society. The protracted socio-economic, political, spiritual crisis, together with it, creates an extreme social situation. One of the main factors influencing the

¹⁶⁵ Trilling 2015.

¹⁶⁶ Weitzel 2015.

¹⁶⁷ Koenkozov 2016

formation of extremist motivation is dissatisfaction with their personal social status. Here, property inequality comes to the fore, which is the primary prerequisite for dissatisfaction with the lives of individuals, a sharp critical drop in the standard of living of several social groups in the Central Asian republics.


The growth of religious extremism and the spread of its influence in regions whose population was not characterized by fundamentalist views in the recent past is a ubiquitous phenomenon in the modern world. Jihadists actively use modern Internet technologies to work with young people and successfully exploit ethnic and social problems of the population. Especially dangerous is the spread of extremism in the conditions of awakening interest in its roots in the post-Soviet countries, where due to religious oppression in Soviet times, traditions are still developing and people, are sincerely interested in religious topics, sometimes uncritically perceiving the teachings of preachers from the Middle East. In these circumstances, the countries of Central Asia need to develop a set of measures aimed at countering the expansion of extremism.

New threats to international security require improved methods of dealing with them and the adoption of adequate and timely measures. The 2017 Convention, signed during the summit in Astana, maintains the continuity of previous acts and aims to improve the mechanism for countering extremism and terrorism in the SCO space, develops the provision of the *SCO Development Strategy until 2025*, echoes the main themes and problems, tackled by the UN global counter-terrorism strategy.

5.4. THE SCO POLICY ON COUNTERING SEPARATISM THROUGH UYGHUR ISSUE

"The problem of Uighur (or even broader - ethnic) separatism" is very complex, multifaceted, multidimensional and at the same time poorly studied. Here it is necessary to clearly understand the extreme politicization and mythologization of the problem of separatism, including Uighur. Today, the "problem of Uighur separatism" remains, perhaps, one of the key ones in terms of preserving regional security, ensuring positive dynamics in the development of cooperation between People's Republic of China, Central Asian countries, Russian Federation, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, and adjacent spaces. Accordingly, the main solutions to this problem should lie in the plane of strengthening cooperation between these countries and, first, within the framework of the SCO.

Map 4. East Turkestan



Source: <https://uhrp.org/report/decolonizing-the-discussion-of-uyghurs-recommendations-for-journalists-and-researchers/>

The Uyghurs are one of the most ancient peoples inhabiting the territory of the present-day XUAR and living in large diasporas in a number of countries Central Asia. The first Uyghur state formation is the Uyghur Khaganate, it was founded in the VIII century and existed for about 100 years. In a later period, the Uyghurs still several times they created their own states, which were not distinguished by strong statehood and longevity. In the XVII century, the Uyghurs founded another formation called East Turkestan. However, in 1760, under the onslaught of Manchurian-Chinese troops, the Uyghurs lost their independence, and the region was finally incorporated into the Chinese Empire and became known as Xinjiang, in Chinese -

"new border". Since the annexation of Xinjiang to the Chinese Empire, the indigenous ethnic groups living in this territory, primarily the most numerous - the Uighurs have constantly fought for independence, using both internal resources and external assistance for this.¹⁶⁸

After the Communists led by Mao Zedong came to power in China in 1949, Beijing, thanks to Moscow's support, completely restored its lost positions in Xinjiang, and since 1955 this region has acquired the status of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region of the People's Republic of China. However, the policy subsequently pursued by the Chinese leadership in Xinjiang often provoked protest from ethnic groups living in Xinjiang, primarily Uighurs, which often took the form of armed confrontation with the authorities. Beijing generally managed to keep the situation under control, but the separatist actions caused the Chinese leadership quite serious concern.

This concern was also reinforced by the fear of a possible repetition of historical precedents of playing the "Uighur card" and support for national separatism from the nearest neighbors, including the USSR. In the early 60s, when the cooling of Soviet-Chinese relations came, by the decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union), several settlements were created in the eastern regions of Kazakhstan for Uighurs from the XUAR, who were then attracted by the relevant structures to conduct anti-Chinese propaganda.

In the second half of the 80s, against the background of the "perestroika" that began in the Soviet Union and a certain liberalization of the internal political situation in China itself, a noticeable intensification of the activities of Uighur separatists began to be noted in Xinjiang, aimed at secession from the PRC and the proclamation of an independent state of East Turkestan.

According to the latest official Chinese data, the population of the region is about 16 million people, of which the Uighurs make up 7.2 million, and the Chinese 6.4 million. In addition, Kazakhs, Kirgiz's, Mongols, Tajiks and other peoples also live.¹⁶⁹

The collapse of the USSR and the emergence of new independent states in Central Asia were a kind of catalyst for another surge of separatist sentiments in the XUAR. The very fact of gaining sovereignty and the creation of national states of ethnically and religiously close peoples of Central Asia had a significant impact on the mood of the local population of Xinjiang,

¹⁶⁸ Brief history of the Uyghurs. URL:

<https://www.oocities.org/idonkari/Brief%20History%20of%20the%20Uyghers.htm> (accessed: 05.05.2023)

¹⁶⁹ Uighurstan (East Turkestan). URL: <http://karty.narod.ru/maps/uygh/uygh.html> (accessed: 17.03.2023)

primarily the Uighurs, who perceived the events in the post-Soviet space as a clear example in achieving national independence.

This could not but cause alarm in Beijing, especially given the presence in the Central Asian countries (Republic of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic and Republic of Uzbekistan) of a fairly large Uighur diaspora, numbering, according to various estimates, from 300 to 500 thousand people. Moreover, in the early 90s, in the conditions of the formation of statehood and the largely objective weakness of the law enforcement structures of the post-Soviet republics of Central Asia, a number of Uighur nationalist organizations became active on the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyz Republic, in particular, the International Committee for the Liberation of Turkestan (formerly the National Front of East Turkestan), the Liberation Organization Turkestan", "The United Association of Uighurs", who began to help their tribesmen in the XUAR with the aim of recreating the independent state of "Uighurstan".¹⁷⁰

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Chinese authorities were forced to take a few preventive measures in order to prevent possible support of Uighur separatist groups in the XUAR from outside. To this end, in the early 90s, China strengthened the border protection regime with the Central Asian states and tightened entry into its territory. The number of border guards and posts were increased, and on the routes of movement of "shuttles", which with the collapse of the USSR began to visit the XUAR masse, the special services of the PRC established tight control.

China's closest cooperation on this issue has been established with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, where significant Uighur diasporas live. Kazakhstan has become China's main partner in the fight against Uighur separatism. The first document concerning the Uighur problem was the *Joint Declaration of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the People's Republic of China (September 1995) "On the further development and deepening of friendly relations"*, in which, in particular, the parties agreed in the field of political relations to oppose any kind of national separatism, not allowing separatist activities directed against the other Side on their territory activities of any organizations and forces; proceeding from mutual respect for the path of development chosen by the people of each of the Parties, taking into

¹⁷⁰ Dosova B.A. Kazakhstan and China: Milestones of Bilateral Relations. URL: https://rep.ksu.kz/bitstream/handle/data/7457/Dosova_Kazakhstan_2019.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (accessed: 22.03.2023)

account the specific conditions of their country, to conduct mutual acquaintance with the policy and practice of ongoing reforms.¹⁷¹

In the "*Joint Declaration of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the People's Republic of China*", the Uighur problem within the SCO (Kazakhstan and China, 1990s - early 2000s). This issue was again touched upon the parties, confirming that they oppose national separatism in any form, will not allow the implementation of its territory by any organizations and forces of separatist activity directed against the other side.

As early as 1992, Xinjiang began to receive ideological literature and financial resources from Saudi Arabia and Turkey through these organizations, whose radical circles supported the supporters of the creation of the Uighurstan state. After the World Uighur Kurultai, held in Istanbul (Turkey) in December 1992, decided to switch to armed methods of struggle for "independence", the transfer of weapons began to the XUAR. A significant part of it came in transit through the territories of the Central Asian republics. There were also attempts to acquire and steal weapons from army warehouses with the aim of further transfer to Xinjiang.

In addition, fleeing the persecution of the Chinese authorities, members of separatist groups from XUAR began to hide in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan in the places of residence of the Uyghur diaspora, who tried to conduct anti-Chinese activities using the capabilities of radical organizations operating in the Central Asian states.

Since the second half of the 1990s, a noticeable activation of various kinds of extremist organizations and groups began to be noted in Central Asia, primarily the Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami party and the so-called Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), members of which the Uighurs also became.¹⁷² Through them, these structures established contact with the separatist underground in Xinjiang, which made it possible to organize practical interaction between them. In 2001, a rather significant event took place, which clearly demonstrated the process of merging the radical circles of Central Asia and Xinjiang. It was announced that instead of the "Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan", the "Islamic Movement of Turkestan" ("Hezbi Islomi Turkiston") was being formed, which, according to the leader of the so-called IMU T. Yuldashev, was supposed to unite several extremist groups of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Republic of Tajikistan, Republic of Uzbekistan and the People's Republic of China. And although the management of the so-called The IMU tried to give wishful thinking,

¹⁷¹ Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Republic of Kazakhstan. URL: <http://https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/rus/wjdt/> (accessed: 29.04.2023)

¹⁷² Chinese Internet Information Center. URL: <http://www.china.com.cn/index.shtml>. (accessed: 19.04.2023)

the very fact of such a propaganda action testified to the growing trend of ever closer interaction of radical forces from Central Asia and the Syrian Arab Republic.¹⁷³

At the present stage, as the law enforcement agencies of the Central Asian states note, the region continues to be the object of the activities of various radical and extremist groups, which, among other things, use Central Asia as a base for carrying out subversive actions against neighboring countries, including China. A clear confirmation of this is the activity of the Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami organization, which since the late 90s has deployed its primary cells in various cities of the XUAR and began to conduct propaganda work with calls for the establishment of a "caliphate" in Xinjiang, which, in principle, coincided with the tasks and goals of the most radical Uighur groups.¹⁷⁴

In 1996, at the initiative of China and with the consent of Russia, the Shanghai Five agreement appeared, in which the Uighur issue was openly put up for discussion, on which the common position of the participants was fixed.

Since that period, Chinese special services have intensified in the fight against Uighur political organizations and their leaders. In addition to the slogan of fighting crime, which is used throughout China, the concept of "fighting national separatism, as well as "fighting Islamic fundamentalism" is used against Uighurs. Since April 1996 During the first 100-day campaign against crime, the Chinese authorities arrested about 20,000 people, 115 people were shot without trial, about 100 mosques and religious schools were closed, more than half a million national printed publications were seized from the population and burned.¹⁷⁵

To combat Uighur separatism, China has made efforts not only in the format of bilateral relations, but also on a multilateral basis. In 1996, at the initiative of China, within the framework of the Shanghai Five, the "Uighur question" was put up for discussion, on which a common position was developed and documented. Already within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization formed in 2001 by People's Republic of China, Russian Federation, Republic of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Republic of Tajikistan and Republic of Uzbekistan, the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Extremism and Separatism was signed. which provided for even closer cooperation between the Central Asian states,

¹⁷³ Safronova E. Problems of Central Asian integration in the context of the SCO E. Safronova, O. Tikhonov // China in world and regional politics: History and modernity: Collection of articles. - M., 2003. - pp.69-96. (in Russian)

¹⁷⁴ Sebastien Peyrouse. In the face of separatism, the European Union, Central Asia and the Uighur question. EU-Central Asia monitoring (EUCAM). URL: <https://eucentralasia.eu/facing-the-challenges-of-separatism-the-eu-central-asia-and-the-uyghur-issue-ru/> (accessed: 11.04.2023)

¹⁷⁵ People's Republic of China: At least 1000 people executed in "strike hard" campaign against crime. URL: <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa17/072/1996/en/> (accessed: 29.01.2023)

People's Republic of China, and Russian Federation in this direction. Subsequently, the SCO member states have repeatedly confirmed the rejection of any manifestations of national separatism and the consistency of approaches in countering separatist activities on their territories.¹⁷⁶

In accordance with sub-paragraph "b" of paragraph 1 of the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism of June 15, 2001, for the purposes of this agreement, the term "separatism" means "any act aimed at violating the territorial integrity of a State, including the separation of part of its territory from it, or the disintegration of the State committed by force, as well as the planning and preparation of such an act, aiding and abetting its commission, and being prosecuted in accordance with the national legislation of the Parties."¹⁷⁷

In September 2004, in accordance with the law "On Combating Terrorism", the National Security Committee of Kazakhstan submitted to the Prosecutor General's Office a list of a number of organizations, among which, along with the Kurdish People's Congress and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, included a Uighur separatist group - the Islamic Party of East Turkestan, whose activities According to the NSC, it is aimed at undermining the existing constitutional order and inciting ethnic hatred. In turn, the Prosecutor General's Office of Kazakhstan sent a submission about these organizations to the Supreme Court, which recognized these international organizations as terrorist and banned their activities on the territory of the republic.¹⁷⁸

In August 2008, at the next SCO summit in Dushanbe, the Organization's member states had to solve a difficult task for themselves - to develop a common position on the events in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, in which Russian Federation was directly involved. The restraint in official assessments of the Central Asian states and the special position of the Chinese delegation on this issue is a direct consequence of how painful the „problem of national separatism”, primarily Uighur, is for China.

China has fully established control over the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, relying on its modern power. He considered it necessary to establish good relations with Russia, since Russia, like the former Soviet Union, using the national liberation movement of the

¹⁷⁶ The Uighur problem within the SCO. URL: https://web.archive.org/web/20071217021251/http://www.analitika.org/?topic=cis_uygurs (accessed: 29.04.2023)

¹⁷⁷ Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of Shanghai Cooperation Organization official page. URL: https://ecrats.org/ru/documents/regulatory_legal_acts/ (accessed: 29.04.2023)

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

Uighurs, could create a situation threatening the PRC in the XUAR. Certain cooperation is also possible with Western countries, primarily with the United States. This is due to the fact that the Uighurs profess the Islamic religion, and religious elements in their national liberation movement put them next to Islamic radicalism and thereby can spoil relations between the Uighurs and the Western world. In this regard, Russian Federation and People's Republic of China share a common opinion.

It is also necessary to take into account the low standard of living in People's Republic of China (and especially in the Xinjiang People's Republic of China), the problem of poverty and the demographic problem coexist in China. One of the ways to relieve tension inside China is the migration of the Chinese population, the "Chinese threat" for the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation. In addition to the possibility of resettlement and solving the problem of lack of space, the Central Asian states represent an excellent market for Chinese goods, which is successfully carried out by Chinese entrepreneurs. However, this kind of problem is carefully hushed up at the official level, almost all independent news agencies of the Republic of Kazakhstan speak about the inaccessibility of data.

Throughout Xinjiang, which accounts for one-sixth of the entire territory of the People's Republic of China, as part of efforts to improve living standards in recent years, the number of railway routes has been significantly expanded, including the construction of tracks through the desert, and the 25th airport has already been opened.

The active involvement of the autonomous region in the Belt and Road project, as well as the rapid development of infrastructure for mass tourism, also gave new economic opportunities to residents. In the pre—pandemic 2019, about 213 million guests, both Chinese and foreign, visited the XUAR, and their number has already exceeded 100 million for the incomplete current year.¹⁷⁹

As a result, the gross regional product of Xinjiang has been growing in recent years. According to the statistical office of the XUAR, in the first six months of 2023, this figure increased by 5.1%, reaching 854.2 billion yuan.¹⁸⁰

One of the conditions for ensuring stability in the XUAR region is its successful economic development. Given the complexity of the situation, China has decided to develop Xinjiang not only on its own, but also with the involvement of international forces. In July

¹⁷⁹ Du Dengwen. Our countries are aimed at expanding cooperation. URL: <https://agro.kg/ru/news/24907/?ysclid=116zv6kv86515028944> (accessed: 10.07.2023)

¹⁸⁰ Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. URL: https://www.wikiwand.com/ru/Синьцзян-Уйгурский_автономный_район (accessed: 10.08.2023)

2000, during the summit of the Shanghai Five at the meeting of the heads of two states (China and Kazakhstan), an agreement was reached on the involvement of the countries bordering the People's Republic of China in economic development projects of the western territories of China.¹⁸¹The PRC solves a number of issues with this: the presence of foreign capital will contribute to the stabilization of the situation in the XUAR, but these capitals will be so insignificant that they will not be able to pose a threat to the influence of the center in the region. For China, the SCO example is unprecedented in the entire political history: before joining the SCO, China did not enter into a political alliance with any state in the world. The solution of border issues with neighboring states took only seven years, and the created organization gradually began to solve other tasks. It has become possible to use the mechanism of the organization's functioning to combat terrorism, national separatism and extremism (the so-called "three evils"). China has begun to participate in the global anti-terrorist movement, although previously it preferred to resolve such issues unilaterally or bilaterally. The fact of joint military exercises in the adjacent territories of the Republic of Kazakhstan and People's Republic of China, as well as joint Kyrgyz-Chinese exercises within the SCO since October 2002, is also unprecedented. Thus, China is creating a multilateral mechanism for influencing the situation in the region in the military sphere. The SCO Regional Anti-terrorist structure (SCO RATS) has been created, in which the Chinese military are present.

Thus, among the priority areas of cooperation within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, we can note the joint solution of the problem of Uighur separatism, religious extremism, terrorism; creating conditions for the successful development of bilateral economic relations with the prospect of economic integration; increasing the authority of the organization and the participating states at the regional and international level.

Despite the declared autonomy of the region, there is no local government here. The Chinese authorities are pursuing a policy of settling Xinjiang by the Chinese. The teaching of the Uighur language and history is difficult, and the implementation of Uighur customs is hindered.

Uighur separatism is a time bomb in the Central Asian region, threatening not only China, but the entire region. The separatist movement in East Turkestan consists of a number of small, marginal Islamist groups, morally supported by Turkey. Military support may be provided by Islamists from the territory of Kashmir, occupied by Pakistan. Support for Pakistan, if any, is heavily conspiratorial.

¹⁸¹ Socio-political website about the activities of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. URL: <http://infoshos.ru> (accessed: 10.08.2023)

In general, it can be stated with a sufficient degree of confidence that as a result of the active steps taken by the SCO in the Central Asian direction, a policy agreed between the PRC and the Central Asian countries regarding the "problem of Uyghur separatism" has been adopted and is currently being implemented.

5.5. GEOSTRATEGICAL RELATIONS OF CHINA AND CENTRAL ASIAN COUNTRIES

The Xinjiang Uyghur region of China, having important geostrategic significance, is located at the intersection of hotbeds of instability, at least having a common border with the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. In the event of an escalation of the conflict potential of the XUAR, it will be much more difficult for China to claim not only the place of a world power, but also the position of a leading state in Asia. It will also deal a serious blow to the economy of Xinjiang, as well as significantly complicate the alignment of the PRC–Islamic world axis, and allied relations with the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as the republics of Central Asia, will be jeopardized.

Of the tense zones in this region, due to their proximity to Xinjiang, the following can be distinguished:

1 Fergana, divided between Republic of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyz Republic and Republic of Tajikistan.

2 The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

3 Northern the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

4 Kashmir.

5 Balochistan, divided between Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Islamic Republic of Iran, and Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

6 The Tibet Autonomous Region.¹⁸²

All these regions and conflicts are interconnected to some extent. So, for example, Republic of Tajikistan meets the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and Ferghana, and through its Kyrgyz Republic part and the Pamirs with Xinjiang. In most of these states, the struggle for social justice goes under the banner of Islamic fundamentalism, sometimes extremism. The Ferghana Valley is also of particular interest and concern since this territory has been and continues to be a kind of trigger mechanism for Uighur movements, mainly in the west and south of Xinjiang. As proof of this, one can recall the sad events of 1871-1881, when a major anti-

¹⁸² Ibid.

Chinese uprising took place in Xinjiang, because of which the Muslim state of Yakub-bek, a native of the Fergana Valley, was formed. Although it was possible to suppress the center of Islamic resistance during that period, nevertheless, this was achieved with great difficulty.¹⁸³ It should also be noted here that due to the proximity to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the stability of both the Fergana Valley itself and the Central Asian state in general is seriously threatened by the presence of the Islamic State group in Afghanistan. Given that the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is a kind of bridge for the transfer of terrorists to Central Asia, as well as the fact that many citizens of these states have joined the IS terrorist group in the Syrian Arab Republic and the Islamic Republic of Iraq, it can be assumed that the peoples of these countries, for example, in the Fergana Valley, are adjacent to the ranks of Islamic State terrorists.

In the early 60s, when the cooling of Soviet-Chinese relations came, by the decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU, several settlements were created in the eastern regions of the Republic of Kazakhstan for Uighurs from the XUAR, who were then attracted by the relevant structures to conduct anti-Chinese propaganda. In the second half of the 80s, against the background of the "perestroika" that began in the Soviet Union and a certain liberalization of the internal political situation in China itself, a noticeable intensification of the activities of Uighur separatists began to be noted in Xinjiang, aimed at secession from the PRC and the proclamation of an independent state of East Turkestan.¹⁸⁴

Kazakhstan, due to the presence on the territory of the republic of the largest Uighur diaspora and various kinds of Uighur nationalist organizations, which became more active in the early 90s, has become China's main counterpart in terms of countering Uighur separatism. It is no coincidence that in the spring of 1993, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, with an official protest note, accused Republic of Kazakhstan of "avoiding taking measures to neutralize the activities of Uighur separatists in the republic seeking to recreate the statehood of "East Turkestan". Already in 1995, the activities of Uighur nationalist organizations in the Republic of Kazakhstan were officially banned. The Prosecutor General's Office of Kazakhstan, having checked and established the illegality of the activities of the "United National Revolutionary Front of East Turkestan" and the "Organization for the

¹⁸³ Pochekaev R.Y. Russian and British travelers about the administrative and legal transformations of Yakub-bek in East Turkestan (1860-1870s). URL: <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/rossiyskie-i-britanskije-puteshestvenniki-ob-administrativnyh-i-pravovyh-preobrazovaniyah-yakub-beka-v-vostochnom-turkestane-1860-1870-e/viewer> (accessed: 31.05.2023)

¹⁸⁴ Kamalov A.K., Yusupov R.K. Oral history of migration from China to Kazakhstan during the "Cultural Revolution" (1966-1976). URL: https://www.academia.edu/100262528/Устная_история_миграции_из_Китая_в_Казахстан_в_период_культурной_революции_1966_1976_гг_2022, Bulletin of Karaganda University. The series "History. Philosophy". No. 3. pp. 91-99 (accessed: 31.05.2023)

Liberation of Uygurstan" and their central bodies - the newspapers "Voice of East Turkestan" and "Uygurstan", issued an order for the immediate termination of their activities. The Kazakh authorities also began to expel from the country those Chinese Uighurs who lived in the republic without official permission. In addition, at the request of China, the law enforcement agencies of the Republic of Kazakhstan began to detain and deport participants of the separatist movement to China, under various pretexts, leaving the XUAR. For example, in 2000, the Kazakh special services established a safe house in Almaty, where Uighur militants from Xinjiang were hiding for some time, who, during their detention, offered armed resistance and three of them were killed.¹⁸⁵

The instability of the military-political situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan began to have an increasingly negative impact on the Central Asian region and Xinjiang since the late 90s of the XX century. And in this regard, the issue of Islamic radicalism and extremism, as well as international terrorism, has become particularly relevant.¹⁸⁶

Similar actions have been taken in Kyrgyz Republic since the mid-90s. In 1996, Uighur activists tried to register the "Party for the Liberation of East Turkestan", but the Ministry of Justice of Kyrgyz Republic refused to do so on the grounds that national legislation prohibits the legalization of parties aiming to isolate the territories of a neighboring state. In Kyrgyz Republic, a ban was also imposed on the holding of mass actions by representatives of the Uighur community aimed at supporting separatists in the XUAR. As a result of the actions of the Kyrgyz authorities, the most active supporters of the idea of creating an independent state in Xinjiang from among the Uighurs living in Kyrgyz Republic were forced to go underground. However, they did not curtail their activities, and with the support of their tribesmen from the XUAR, they increasingly began to use terror tactics. On May 1, 1998, a minibus was blown up in Osh, because of which two people were killed and 12 wounded. Sometime later, Kyrgyz law enforcement agencies arrested five people in this case, three of whom were Uighurs from the XUAR who had been trained in camps in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. In 2000, the chairman of the cultural and educational society of the Uighurs of Kyrgyz Republic "Ittipak" ("Unity") was killed in Bishkek for refusing to donate money to the needs of the separatist movement in Xinjiang. In 2002, the consul of the Chinese Embassy in Kyrgyz Republic of and

¹⁸⁵ The Uighur issue is a bargaining chip of Kazakh - Chinese relations. URL: <https://neweurasia.info/archive/book/AIBOL3.htm> (accessed: 28.05.2023)

¹⁸⁶ Wallace T. China and the Regional Counter-Terrorism Structure: An Organizational Analysis // Asian Security. 2014 V.10(3).pp 627-645

a businessman from XUAR were killed by Uighur militants. In 2003, a bus with Chinese shuttles was shot down, because of which 19 citizens of the PRC were killed.¹⁸⁷

From the early 1990s to the mid-2010s, its militants staged a thousand terrorist attacks. Bus bombings, poisoning of water with pesticides and the largest attack of 2009 in Urumqi with almost two hundred dead. At the same time, if at the beginning such things happened only inside the XUAR, then later the terrorist attacks went beyond it. A jeep hit a crowd of people in Beijing near Tiananmen in 2013, an attack on the Kunming railway station (Yunnan Province) in March 2014 and on the Guangzhou railway station (Guangdong Province) a year later - all these tragedies became evidence that terrorism in the country has not been broken.

This forced the Chinese authorities to strengthen not only security measures throughout the region, but also to redouble the ideological struggle against the "forces of three evils" — terrorism, extremism, and separatism. Thus, re-education centers appeared in the XUAR. In such centers were mainly aimed at young people "infected with extremist ideology." And they decided to re-educate them based on improving the level of their education and professional training: for six months, young people were trained in the Chinese language, knowledge of the laws of the People's Republic of China and taught new professions.¹⁸⁸

However, in the West, there was an instant conviction that national minorities were condemned to forced labor in such camps, which later grew into accusations of torture of men and sterilization of Muslim women. And since 2018, the narrative of a million interned Uighurs has begun to set the tone for all Western news stories concerning the XUAR.

Over time, accusations of Beijing's violation of human rights in Xinjiang became the reason for the introduction of personal sanctions by the United States against several officials of the XUAR and restrictions on the import of goods produced in Xinjiang, mainly related to the cotton industry, which is harvested here over 5 million tons per year.¹⁸⁹

The problem of the activities of Uighur separatists in Uzbekistan was practically not identified since the situation was generally under the control of law enforcement agencies and the local Uighur community (about 40 thousand people) tried to stand aside from any anti-Chinese actions. The Uzbek authorities, adhering to their obligations, tried to prevent the appearance of members of Uighur separatist organizations on the territory of the republic. A

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ Asankanov A. Уйгуры Кыргызстана. Двадцатилетию Ассамблеи народа Кыргызстана и Двадцатилетию общества уйгуров "Иттипак". URL: <https://elkitab.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/قىرغىزىستان-ئۇيغۇرلىرى-قىرغىزىستان.pdf> (accessed: 09.08.2023)

¹⁸⁹ Произошел хлопок. Новые санкции США бьют по легкой промышленности Китая, но неизвестно, помогают ли уйгурам. URL: <https://mediazona.ca/article/2022/07/20/ussanctions?ysclid=ll5r6zo86r710364708> (accessed: 09.06.2023)

clear example of such activity is the case that received media coverage, with the detention by the Uzbek special services in March 2006 and the subsequent extradition to China of a native of Kashgar who arrived from Canada, who in the mid-90s was convicted in absentia in China for participating in the Uighur separatist movement.¹⁹⁰

If we talk about external factors influencing the development of separatism in the XUAR, we must not forget that ethnic conflicts, incited with active support from the outside, played their fatal role in the collapse of more than one state. Here we are talking mainly about the United States. Separatism has become one of the levers of the United States in the fight against the main geopolitical rival now – China. And the object of the close attention of the United States is the Xinjiang People's Republic of China. Xinjiang has an important geostrategic position, it is not for nothing that the interests of the Russian Federation, the Great Britain, Germany, Japan, People's Republic of China, and the United States have already intersected here in turn.

But today it is the United States that has both an interest in destabilizing the PRC, and real institutional and material opportunities to confront the PRC on the issue of the formation of an independent Xinjiang. In the future, it is likely that the Uighur issue may be used by the Americans in their game with the Central Asian states to obtain concessions from China on various issues.

The United States actively sponsors the "World Uighur Congress" through the US National Endowment for Democracy and the American Association of Uighurs, headed by Rebiya Kadeer¹⁹¹. It is important to note that the US National Donor Fund supported the "color revolutions" and their attempts in Georgia, Serbia, Ukraine, and Iran.

The annual number of payments to the World Uighur Congress is \$ 215 thousand. Since 2016, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) The United States provided the separatist organization "World Uighur Congress" in the total amount of 1 million 284 thousand

¹⁹⁰ Stolpovsky O., Paramonov V. "Проблема уйгурского сепаратизма" в китайско-центральноазиатских отношениях: или о необходимости постановки новых задач для ШОС. URL: https://uighur.narod.ru/articles/shos_uyghur_problems3.html?ysclid=115rd2rzmq835684292 (accessed: 09.06.2023)

¹⁹¹ Rebiya Kadeer is an ethnic Uighur, businesswoman and political activist. Born in the city of Altay of China, Kadeer became a millionaire in the 1980s through her real estate holdings and ownership of a multinational conglomerate. Kadeer held various positions in China's parliament and other political institutions before being arrested in 1999 for, according to Chinese state media, sending confidential internal reference reports to her husband, who worked in the United States as a pro-Xinjiang independence broadcaster. After she fled to the United States in 2005 on compassionate release, Kadeer assumed leadership positions in overseas Uyghur organizations such as the World Uyghur Congress.

dollars.¹⁹² Many high-ranking officials of the United States openly support the activities of the terrorist organization "East Turkestan", aggressively seeking to split the PRC. But this is only the official amount. It is obvious that the funding of the Uighur movement is much greater. This is evidenced by the excessively active activity of the organization: meetings in different parts of the world with many delegates, branches of the organization in many countries, the release of numerous propaganda literature, videos, etc.

In 2005 The United States obtained from the PRC the extradition of the Uighur dissident R. Kadyr and created her image as the "mother of the entire Uighur people", advocating for the rights of the Uighur people. R. Kadeer in 2004 became a laureate of the Norwegian International Human Rights Foundation "Rafta" in the field of human rights protection, and in 2006 the Swedish parliamentarian A. Enochson proposed her candidacy for The Nobel Peace Prize, which caused sharp criticism from the official authorities of the People's Republic of China.

Thus, Xinjiang, being an extremely important geostrategic region of the People's Republic of China both economically and politically, is of particular importance to China. The PRC must strictly control the problem regions located in direct proximity to it, so that their conflict potential does not transfer to the XUAR; and take decisive and extremely responsible steps in its foreign policy in a region that is not directly adjacent to Xinjiang, but directly affects not only the XUAR, but also the political and economic weight in general China in the world. In the event of the loss of the XUAR, it will be much more difficult for China to claim not only the place of a world power, but also the position of a leading state in Asia. The separation of the region will certainly deal a serious blow to the Chinese economy. Also, the loss of Xinjiang will significantly complicate the alignment of the axis of the PRC - the Islamic world; allied relations with Pakistan and Iran, as well as the republics of Central Asia, will be put at risk.

5.6. THE SCO'S PEACE MISSION

The SCO is not a military bloc, but the uncompromising struggle against the "Three Forces of Evil" dictates the need to develop and strengthen mechanisms aimed at radically eradicating these activities. In this regard, the SCO continues the practice of conducting joint anti-terrorist exercises on a regular basis, including the Peace Mission exercises.

¹⁹² Ajit Singh. Inside the US-Backed World Uyghur Congress. URL: <https://consortiumnews.com/2020/03/09/inside-the-us-backed-world-uyghur-congress/> (accessed: 29.04.2023)

To ensure security and stability in the region, the SCO regularly conducts joint exercises in bilateral and multilateral formats. Joint anti-terrorist military exercises have already become a key element of the SCO security cooperation mechanism.

The first joint anti-terrorist exercises under the general name Peace Mission of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization took place in August 2003 on the territory of Kazakhstan and China, with the participation of all members of the organization, except Uzbekistan. Further, these exercises were held every two years.¹⁹³

Over time, the composition of the SCO members and participants in the maneuvers expanded. Today, nine States are equal members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The Peace Mission exercises are held annually or once every two years in a bilateral (China and Russia) or multilateral format, but once in 2007, all SCO member states participated in the exercises without exception.¹⁹⁴

Table 18. List of exercises.

Name of the exercise	Time of the event	Venue	Note
"Exercises-01" Participants: China, Kyrgyzstan.	10-11 October, 2002	Border area between China and Kyrgyzstan	The first joint anti-terrorist exercises within the SCO, as well as the first joint practical exercises of the Chinese army with the armed forces of another country.
"Union-2003" Participants: Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan.	6-12 June 2003	Border territories of Kazakhstan and China.	The first multilateral anti-terrorist exercises within the framework of the SCO, in which China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan took part.

¹⁹³ 上合组织 "和平使命" 军演之综合分析. *Eurasian Studies Quarterly* No.6 // URL: https://gioip.nchu.edu.tw/File/Userfiles/0000000001/files/劉承宗_上合組織歷次_和平使命_軍演之綜合解析.pdf (accessed: 03.05.2021)

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

"Peace Mission-2005" Participants: Russia, China.	18-25 August 2005	Vladivostok (Russia), Shandong Peninsula (China)	The first joint military exercises in the history of bilateral relations between China and Russia.
"East-Anti-Terror-2006" Participants: Russia, China.	March 2-5, 2006	Tashkent region (Uzbekistan)	
"Tien Shan-I" Participants: China, Kazakhstan.	August 24-26, 2006	Alma-Ata region (Kazakhstan), Yining (XUAR of the People's Republic of China)	The first joint anti-terrorist military exercises between China and Kazakhstan.
"Coordination-2006" Participants: China, Tajikistan.	September 22-23, 2006	Kulyab (Tajikistan)	The first joint anti-terrorist military exercises between China and Tajikistan, the first case of Chinese troops participating in exercises abroad with their weapons.
"Issyk-Kul – Antiterror-2007" Participants: Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan.	May 28-31, 2007	Kyrgyzstan	
"Peace Mission-2007" Participants: China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan.	August 9-17, 2007	Urumqi (XUAR of China), Chelyabinsk region (Russia)	The first large-scale joint exercises with the participation of the armed forces of all countries of the Organization, (the exercises were observed by the heads of six countries).
"Volgograd – Anti-Terror-2008" Participants: Russia.	September 2-4, 2008	Volgograd Region (Russia)	

"Norak-Antiterror-2009" Participants: Tajikistan.	April 17-19, 2009	Fakhrabad Landfill (Tajikistan)	
"Peace Mission – 2009" Participants: Russia, China.	July 22-26, 2009	Taonan Training Ground, Shenyang Military District (China)	The second joint military exercises of the Russian Federation and China.
"Saratov – Antiterrorism-2010" Participants: Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan.	August 24-27, 2010	Saratov (Russia)	
"Peace Mission– 2010" Participants: Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan.	September 9-25, 2010	Matybulak landfill, Zhambyl region (Kazakhstan).	
"Tien Shan-2– 2011" Participants: China, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan.	May 5-8, 2011	Kashgar district, XUAR (China).	
"Vostok – Anti-Terror-2012" Participants: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan.	June 2-5, 2012	Combined arms mountain range "Forish" of the Jizzakh region (Uzbekistan).	
"Peace Mission 2012" Participants: Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan,	June 8-14, 2012	Chorukh-Dayron landfill, Sughd region. (Tajikistan)	

Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan.			
“Kazygurt – Antiterrorism– 2013” Participants: Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan.	June 13, 2013	South of Kazakhstan	
"Peace Mission– 2013" Participants: Russia, China.	July 27 – August 15, 2013	Chelyabinsk Region (Russia)	
"Peace Mission– 2014" Participants: China, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan.	August 24-29, 2014	Zhuzhihe Landfill (Inner Mongolia, China)	
"CentrAsia – Antiterrorism– 2015" Participants: China, Russia, Kyrgyzstan.	September 16, 2015	Kyrgyzstan	
"Peace Mission– 2016" Participants: Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan.	September 15-21, 2016	Balykchy (Kyrgyzstan)	
"Cooperation– 2016" Participants: Tajikistan.	October 19, 2016	Tajikistan	
"Tien Shan-III– 2017"	June 27, 2017	Artush, XUAR (China)	

Participants: Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan.			
"Yaroslavl- Antiterrorism- 2017" Participants: Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan.	August 10, 2017	Yaroslavl (Russia)	
"Peace Mission- 2018" Participants: Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, India, Pakistan.	August 22-29, 2018	Chelyabinsk Region (Russia)	India and Pakistan took part in the SCO exercises for the first time.
"Sary-Arka – Antiterrorism- 2019" Participants: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan.	June 27, 2019	The Spassk landfill in the Karagandy region (Kazakhstan)	
"Peace Mission- 2020"	August	"Yurgin" landfill of the Kemerovo region (Russia).	Due to the pandemic, postponed to 2021.
"Peace Mission- 2021" Participants: China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan,	September 20-24, 2021.	"Donguz" landfill in the Orenburg region (Russia).	

Uzbekistan, India, Pakistan.			
“Peace Mission- 2023”		Russia	

Source: <http://rus.sectsco.org/documents/> (own editing based on the official documents of the SCO)

The fight against international terrorism is the main goal of the joint exercise of the member countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Peace Mission-2018, which was held in the Chelyabinsk region. Chebarkul training ground hosted the largest international SCO exercise Peace Mission, the purpose of which is the fight against international terrorism. Terrorism, separatism, extremism, unfortunately, are the sore points of many states and unions. This topic is especially relevant today, when terrorists squeezed out of Syria are moving to Central Asia and the Middle East in search of new areas and camps.

With the support of aviation, artillery and armored vehicles, the military personnel of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization liberated a settlement captured by a conditional enemy. According to the legend of the exercises, the "militants" captured the settlement. After that, the united group of troops blocked it and conducted a special operation to destroy the "terrorists". Russian, Chinese, and Kazakh pilots dropped 30 thousand kilograms of bombs on the positions of the "gang groups".¹⁹⁵ Special forces from China, Kyrgyzstan, India, and Pakistan descended from Russian helicopters directly onto the roofs of buildings on a tightrope. After the capture of the settlement, the retreating "terrorists" were destroyed from all types of weapons, blowing up minefields on their way. The peculiarity of these exercises is that each side has its own commander, but in general the troops act as a single fist.

The anti-terrorist exercises Peace Mission - 2018 have become the largest for the entire duration of such maneuvers. The scale lies in the fact that for the first time the military contingents of the Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan took part in the exercises. It is also important that the Republic of Uzbekistan sent its representatives to these exercises. In total, more than 3 thousand servicemen, more than 600 pieces of equipment and weapons, about 60 aircraft, combat helicopters and about 20 drones took part. Units of the ground forces and aviation of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Republic of Tajikistan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of

¹⁹⁵ “和平使命-2018”：两大亮点值得关注. China National Defense News // URL: http://m.xinhuanet.com/mil/2018-08/24/c_129939733.htm (accessed: 09.12.2019)

India, and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Representatives of the Republic of Uzbekistan are present as observers.¹⁹⁶

During the exercises Peace Mission-2021 were carried out considering the development of the military and political situation in Asia. The units worked out new ways of countering terrorists, tested new tactics used by international terrorist organizations. Special attention was paid to the fight against UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles). We also worked out the prevention of terrorist acts, considering the use of chemical and biological weapons.

Objectives of the Peace Mission — 2021 exercise:

- training of joint actions of the command structures of the united group of troops with participation in special anti-terrorist actions
- exchange of experience in countering terrorist actions

- mastering the basic tactical techniques and methods of action of forces (troops) under a single management.

The military administration bodies and units of the armed forces of the Russian Federation, the Republic of India, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the People's Liberation Army of the People's Republic of China, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the Republic of Tajikistan, and the Republic of Uzbekistan took part in the practical actions of the forces (troops). A contingent from Belarus joined for the first time.

The Peace Mission –2021 exercise, which ended on September 24, doubled the scope of previous such maneuvers conducted in 2018. Then 3 thousand military personnel from all countries were involved in them. This year, the number of participants reached 5.5 thousand people, and the number of military equipment and firepower more than doubled, over 1.2 thousand.¹⁹⁷

Most of the military arrived from Kazakhstan, this is the reconnaissance and assault company of the regional command "West", reinforced with tanks and the calculation of UAVs. Su-25 aircraft of the Kazakh Air Force are also involved in the maneuvers.

China was the largest foreign contingent. His Ministry of Defense reported that more than 550 military and 120 pieces of equipment from this country overcame a record 6.3 thousand km by rail. The PRC formed four railway echelons and two air groups to deliver its weapons, which were sent from different regions of the country.¹⁹⁸ The first group arrived at the site by rail,

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁹⁷ Mei Shixiong. 肩负和平使命 共护友谊之舟——写在“和平使命-2021”上合组织联合反恐军演落幕之际. Xinhua News Agency // URL: <http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/jsxd/ly/4895536.html> (accessed: 12.12.2021) (in Chinese)

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

having traveled more than 6,300 km, which was the longest distance traveled by the Chinese military by rail to participate in exercises abroad. Thus, the military airfield near Orenburg saw not only Indian Il-76MD, but also new Chinese military transporters Y-20, which took off from Shenyang (Liaoning Province). The advance group and the headquarters arrived at them.¹⁹⁹

Russia is represented by army units of the Central Military District, special forces, flight crews from five regions of the Russian Federation and the united Russian military base "Kant" in Kyrgyzstan. 30 aircraft and helicopters are involved in the maneuvers: Su-34 fighter-bombers, Su-24MR reconnaissance aircraft, Su-25 attack aircraft, Mi-24 attack helicopters, Mi-8 transport-combat and Il-76 military transport.²⁰⁰

The peace mission is of a practical nature. This is a preparation for real interaction in case the situation with the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan goes down a worse path. In addition, against the background of the confrontation with the United States, Beijing is demonstrating growing cooperation with the Russian Federation. The PRC also takes the terrorist threat in the Central Asian region quite seriously. Over the past few years, they have been campaigning to increase security and strengthen control over Xinjiang Province. In general, the counter—terrorism factor is one of the priorities of China's diplomacy in Central Asia. Although China's border with Afghanistan is small, it is only a few tens of kilometers, but they consider that threats can spread through those territories of Tajikistan and Northern Pakistan that are not very well controlled. At this stage, all SCO member states have a common interest — to prevent the spread of civil war beyond the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. The members of the organization, despite internal differences — for example, between the Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan or between People's Republic of China and the Republic of India — are united in their position. An urgent intra-Afghan settlement is needed, and in no case should the fighting be allowed to spread from this country beyond its borders.

Following the meeting of the defense ministers of the SCO member states, it was decided to hold joint military anti-terrorist command and staff exercises "Peace Mission - 2023" in August on the territory of the Russian Federation, but there is still no exact news when they will be held. During this mission, ways to counteract the new tactics used by international terrorists were to be worked out, including issues of combating unmanned aerial vehicles, issues of ensuring information security, preventing terrorist attacks using chemical and biological weapons were worked out.

¹⁹⁹ Central Asia Military Exercises Database // URL:<https://oxussociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Central-Asia-Military-Exercises-Database.xlsx> (accessed: 02.03.2023)

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

Participation in the "Peace Mission" of other countries is allowed, but the final decision will be made during appropriate consultations by all member States of the organization based on consensus.

5.7. CONCLUSION

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization has created a set of mechanisms and arrangements capable of regulating security processes in the region. Putting the fight against the "three forces of evil" at the forefront, the organization began to take shape in a structural and legal way. First, in 2001, the Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism was signed, containing clear definitions of the relevant terms, aimed at developing practical cooperation between law enforcement agencies and special services in the fight against these problems, and other agreements were signed.

Later, in June 2002, at the summit in St. Petersburg, the "Agreement between the SCO member States on the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure" was signed, the SCO heads of State officially opened the headquarters of the Executive Committee of the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS), which began its work in January 2004.

Developing the legal support for the activities of the RATS, at the Astana summit, the Council of the Structure reported on the signing of an Agreement on the Data Bank of the SCO Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure and an Agreement on ensuring the protection of Classified information within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure. Its participants note that the signing of these agreements will allow "to establish a mutually beneficial exchange of classified information for all full members of the SCO RATS, as well as to ensure the proper level of its safety in the interests of the parties."

From the very first days of its existence, the Regional anti-terrorist Structure began to fulfill its duties systematically and effectively to implement the principle of "Russia, China and Central Asia - a terror-free zone". In a short time, the transition from organizational work to practical activity was successfully overcome, a good mechanism for combating terrorism was formed. The structure has filled its activities with real content. The SCO RATS managed to coordinate the work of the special services of the countries, establish a mechanism for informing state bodies on issues related to countering terrorism, separatism, and extremism, and begin developing an action plan of the participating countries in the event of terrorist and extremist threats. Of course, the threat of terrorism in Central Asia remains, but it is also worth

recognizing that the RATS has not become a formal organization following the example of the CIS, but really performs the functions that were reflected when it was created.

Since its formation, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has paid close attention to military exercises, realizing that in the modern world, the fight against terrorism involves not only mutual awareness of the special services, but also force. Only a year has passed since the official formation of the SCO and the signing of the convention on combating three types of evil, as in October 2002, the People's Republic of China and the Kyrgyz Republic organized the first anti-terrorist exercise. A year later, the multilateral exercises of the member states "Interaction 2003" were already held in Kazakhstan and the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, on the release of hostages in a locality and the elimination of terrorists in a mountainous area.

Thus, joint anti-terrorist exercises are not limited only to the fight, search and neutralization of terrorist groups on some territory, measures are also being taken to release hostages, protect state facilities that pose a potential danger. The RATS undertakes various measures to combat terrorism, separatism, and extremism, both through anti-terrorist exercises, and in general, through fulfilling the tasks assigned to it by the relevant agreement of the participating countries and separately by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and its charter.

In general, the fight against the three forces of evil within the SCO is a struggle of the participating countries, and not the Shanghai Cooperation Organization itself, which acts as a unifying structure coordinating the work of the special services of all six countries in the fight against the "three types of evil". The fight against terrorism has become the most successful area of cooperation, in general, because of the well-developed strategy of action. Extensive and fruitful cooperation has been established between all the competent authorities of the SCO member States, both in the exchange of information and in the coordination of practical work. A concept on combating terrorism has been signed, a regional anti-terrorist structure has been created, and there is no such elaboration of policy in other areas.

6. ECONOMIC SECURITY COOPERATION

6.1. INTRODUCTION

The development of international relations using the potential of inclusive multilateral cooperation institutions, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), is of particular importance to eliminate negative consequences and mitigate risks in conditions of escalating global uncertainty. Multilateral cooperation is the only effective way to overcome systemic crises.²⁰¹ This simultaneously increases the importance of regional formats as institutions that consider national specifics to a greater extent, which is connected with the peculiarities of the development of lower levels of the international system – its regional and macro-regional subsystems. In this regard, the SCO acquires new impulses for its development.

The key goal of the strategic partnership, defined in the SCO Charter, is "the development of multidisciplinary cooperation in order to maintain and strengthen peace, security and stability in the region, and to promote the construction of a new democratic, just and rational political and economic international order".²⁰²

Quite often, the fact that the SCO deals with issues not only of political cooperation and security, but also of economic cooperation, does not quite deservedly fade into the background. The tasks of promoting economic growth, coordinating approaches to integration into the world economy, and improving the standard of living of the peoples of the organization's member states have been laid down in the SCO Charter since its inception. Multilateral economic cooperation could help solve many social problems in the countries of the region, especially in the young states of Central Asia.²⁰³ This idea is confirmed in the SCO Development Strategy until 2025, according to which "economic cooperation is an important element of ensuring stability in the SCO space, one of the tools for achieving the sustainability of the organization itself for the long term. The work in this direction is designed to contribute to ensuring the economic development of the Member States, as well as improving the living conditions of citizens. The SCO will contribute to ensuring the harmonious development of all member States in the interests of balanced economic growth in the region".²⁰⁴

²⁰¹ Shokhin A.N. Multilateral cooperation is the only effective way to overcome systemic crises. URL: <https://ru.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/mnogostoronnee-sotrudnichestvo-effekt/> (accessed: 03.03.2021)

²⁰² Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (adopted in St. Petersburg on June 7, 2002)

²⁰³ Titarenko M.L., Petrovsky V.E.. Russia, China, and the New World Order: theory and practice. *Moscow*, 2016. pp.188, 190, 208.

²⁰⁴ Development Strategy of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization until 2025 (Ufa, July 10, 2015). URL: https://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=33755348 (accessed:25.05.2021)

Mutual trade between the member countries is a key element of the SCO economic cooperation. The SCO member states have managed to find their own identity in the global economy. The rapid economic development of reforms and openness gives a unique production potential. Since the establishment of the SCO, the scale of mutual trade between the member countries has been constantly growing, and their activities are monitored and analyzed by scientists and international experts from various fields and fields of activity.

The Framework Agreement on Strengthening Economic Cooperation was signed by the SCO member States on September 23, 2003. At the same meeting in China, Premier Wen Jiabao proposed a long-term goal of creating a free trade zone within the SCO and other more urgent measures to improve the flow of goods in the region. Accordingly, a plan consisting of 100 concrete actions was signed a year later, on September 23, 2004.²⁰⁵

Now, there is a change in the macroeconomic climate in the Asian zone. In particular, the states that are members of the SCO, BRICS and EAEU associations are acquiring sustainable and unshakable economic development. This is manifested in the formation and initiation of a unified economic, cultural, and political development strategy. The states that are members of the above-mentioned international associations, in addition to forming a unified policy in different directions, create a legislative framework for the functioning of uniform norms and rules in individual sphere of life. In addition, the integration member states are working to create a "single space" of interaction (this should be understood as a common platform, the main purpose of which is the mutual exchange of the latest technologies, information, experience; improvement of scientific and technical knowledge bases, and more).

6.2. THE ECONOMIC WEIGHT OF THE SCO

The international Association of the SCO, BRICS and the EAEU are three inseparable partners on the continent, which occupy a dominant geographical position in the region.

In 2000, a year before the creation of the SCO, the total volume of mutual trade between the six member states was only 30.33 billion dollars. According to the theory of the international trade balance, according to which the total imports of the six member States are equal to their total exports, the net value of trade was only \$15.16 billion. Of these, Russian Federation's trade with other SCO member states amounted to \$12.86 billion, People's Republic of China - \$8.97 billion, Republic of Kazakhstan - \$560 million US.

²⁰⁵ M. Igibayeva. *A Haza szolgálatában*. 2021. pp.119

On October 26, 2005, during the SCO Moscow Summit, the SCO Secretary General announced that the SCO would give priority to joint energy projects that would include the oil and gas sector, the development of new hydrocarbon reserves and the sharing of water resources. At this summit, an agreement was also reached on the establishment of the SCO Interbank Council to finance future joint projects.

The first meeting of the SCO Interbank Consortium was held in Beijing on February 21-22, 2006.²⁰⁶ On November 30, 2006, within the framework of the SCO International Conference: Results and Prospects, held in Almaty, a representative of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that Russian Federation was developing plans to create the SCO Energy Club.

The SCO countries account for about 40% of proven oil reserves and over 50% of gas reserves on Earth, which makes them important actors in the global energy sector. The SCO countries strive to contribute to global efforts to achieve carbon neutrality and advocate "the formation of a system of clean, low-carbon, safe and efficient energy, as well as the diversification of types of energy carriers and energy sources. It is important, considering the conditions and characteristics of each State, to use the common and complementary advantages of fossil fuels and clean energy sources and, in this regard, to increase investments in the exploration and production of fossil fuels by leading supplier countries and exporting countries of oil and gas. It is also necessary to increase our own production capacities, effectively use the export potential to increase global oil and gas supplies, electricity, ensure the safety and sustainability of energy, sustainable use of clean and low-carbon energy sources".²⁰⁷

One of the SCO's priorities is cooperation in the financial sphere. The lack of a mechanism for financing joint projects has long been the main obstacle to the further development of the organization. To solve this problem, a Development Bank, and a Development Fund (special account) are being created within the SCO. In 2010, China initiated the creation of a Development Bank for the organization's member countries. The Bank will focus on financing interstate infrastructure projects and foreign trade operations. The creation of the SCO Development Fund was proposed in 2013 by Russian President Vladimir Putin. In 2015, the SCO countries announced their intention to create an International Project Finance Center based on the Interbank Association of the organization.²⁰⁸

²⁰⁶ SCO Interbank Consortium. URL: https://ru.qaz.wiki/wiki/SCO_Interbank_Consortium (accessed: 29.07.2023)

²⁰⁷ Statement of the Council of Heads of Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on Ensuring International Energy Security // URL: <http://www.kremlin.ru/supplement/5845> (accessed: 29.03.2023)

²⁰⁸ M. Igibayeva. *A Haza szolgálatában*. 2021. pp.120

In 2013, the SCO Energy Club, created on the initiative of Russian Federation, began its work. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Republic of Belarus, Mongolia, Republic of India, Republic of Kazakhstan, Republic of Tajikistan, Republic of Türkiye, and Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka signed a memorandum on the establishment of this organization along with the Russian Federation and People's Republic of China.²⁰⁹

In 2015, it was decided to start developing a regional economic cooperation program for the next five years. Cooperation will develop in 10 areas, within their framework, about 100 projects are planned for a total of \$ 100 billion. The main direction is the development of transport infrastructure.²¹⁰


The SCO's most important task is to develop anti-crisis measures and collective actions considering the global economic downturn caused by the pandemic, which is the deepest since the Second World War. The Heads of Government of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization approved the Program of Multilateral Trade and Economic Cooperation on November 2, 2019. It defines the tasks until 2035 in the areas of trade and investment, banking and finance, transport and logistics, industry, agriculture, energy, customs, digitalization, innovation and ICT, spatial development, tourism, ecology, and education, as well as international cooperation. The relevant section also provides for the development of an action plan. Given that COVID-19 has made its own adjustments to the process of economic interaction, it is obvious that this can affect both the program itself and the action plan for its implementation. The leaders of our countries have approved an Action Plan for the implementation of the SCO Development Strategy until 2025, which includes about 150 practical measures. Special attention during its implementation will be paid to measures to restore the economy in the post-pandemic period. The COVID-19 pandemic has clearly demonstrated the interconnectedness and interdependence of the modern world and has put on the international agenda the issue of improving mechanisms for multilateral cooperation at the global and regional levels.²¹¹

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

²¹¹ Ibid.

Table 14. GDP ranked by Country (2023)



Source: GDP 2023 // URL: <https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/by-gdp> (accessed: 20.10.2023)

Table 15. Macroeconomic indicators of the SCO countries (2023)

Rank ^	Country	GDP (IMF '20)	GDP (UN '16)	GDP Per Capita	Population
1	United States	26.70 Tn	18.62 Tn	\$78,516	339,996,563
2	China	21.87 Tn	11.22 Tn	\$15,337	1,425,671,352
5	India	3.89 Tn	2.26 Tn	\$2,725	1,428,627,663
13	Iran	1.78 Tn	425.40 Bn	\$19,990	89,172,767
14	Russia	1.71 Tn	1.25 Tn	\$11,860	144,444,359
54	Kazakhstan	225.93 Bn	135.01 Bn	\$11,523	19,606,633
73	Uzbekistan	81.81 Bn	67.78 Bn	\$2,327	35,163,944
146	Tajikistan	7.70 Bn	6.95 Bn	\$759	10,143,543

206	Pakistan		282.51 Bn	\$1,175	240,485,658
-----	----------	--	-----------	---------	-------------

Source: GDP 2023 // URL: <https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/by-gdp> (accessed: 20.10.2023)

The economies of the SCO countries demonstrate high growth rates from 4% to 9% per year. In 2021, the total GDP of the SCO countries amounted to almost a quarter of the world - \$23.3 trillion, and GDP at purchasing power parity (PPP) about one third of the world - \$44.2 trillion. The largest economy in the SCO is China, which ranks second in the world in terms of GDP at \$17.7 trillion. and the first place in GDP by PPP is \$27.2 trillion.

Next are the economies of India and Russia, ranking 5th, and 10th in the world in terms of GDP of \$3.1 trillion and \$1.8 trillion, and in terms of GDP by PPP, 3rd, and 6th in the world with \$10.2 trillion and \$4.5 trillion. accordingly.

At the same time, the share of GDP of China, India and Russia in the total GDP of the SCO is 76.2%, 13.5% and 7.6%, respectively. Other SCO countries account for less than 3% of the total SCO GDP the share of Islamic Republic of Pakistan is 1.5%, Republic of Kazakhstan 0.8%, Republic of Uzbekistan 0.3%, Republic of Tajikistan, and Kyrgyz Republic 0.04% each.²¹²

The SCO countries account for 15.4% of world trade. In 2021, the total foreign trade turnover of the SCO countries amounted to \$8.1 trillion, including exports of \$4.4 trillion, imports of \$3.7 trillion.

Almost three quarters (74.4%) of the total trade turnover of the SCO countries is accounted for by People's Republic of China - \$6.1 trillion, about 13% by Republic of India - \$ 1.0 trillion. and about 10% for Russian Federation - \$0.8 trillion.²¹³

The indicators of foreign trade turnover of other SCO countries amounted to: Islamic Republic of Pakistan - \$102.0 billion. (1.3%), Republic of Kazakhstan - \$101.7 billion. (1.3%), Republic of Uzbekistan - \$42.1 billion. (0.5%), Kyrgyz Republic - \$7.2 billion. (0.1%) and Republic of Tajikistan - \$6.4 billion. (0.1%).

In 2021, the volume of domestic trade between the SCO countries amounted to \$803.7 billion, of which exports were \$396.3 billion, imports - \$407.4 billion.

²¹² World Economic Outlook database: April 2023 // URL: <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2023/April/download-entire-database> (accessed: 23.05.2023)

²¹³ Ibid.

At the same time, the largest shares in the volume of domestic trade between the SCO countries were occupied by People's Republic of China - 42.7%, Russian Federation - 24.1%, Republic of India - 20% and Republic of Kazakhstan - 6.3%.²¹⁴

The main indicator of trade activity within an international association is considered to be the share that domestic trade between its participants occupies of their total foreign trade turnover with all countries.

In 2021, the share of domestic trade between the SCO countries (\$803.7 billion) in their total foreign trade turnover (\$8130.9 billion) it was only 10%.

It should be noted that 10% is the overall average for the SCO, but separately, the shares of domestic trade within the organization in the total foreign trade turnover of the member countries differ significantly.

Thus, the share of the SCO countries in People's Republic of China's foreign trade turnover is only 5.7%, Republic of India – 15.5%, Russian Federation - 24.6%, Islamic Republic of Pakistan - 24.8%.

At the same time, despite the higher share of trade within the SCO, the bulk of Republic of India and Islamic Republic of Pakistan's trade in the internal trade of the SCO countries falls on People's Republic of China (more than 90%), and Russian Federation has China (74%) and Republic of Kazakhstan (14%).²¹⁵ Other SCO countries, which have a relatively smaller volume of foreign trade, form more than half of their foreign trade turnover at the expense of domestic trade with the SCO countries.

The SCO's authority and influence continues to strengthen, and interest in the activities of the association from other countries of the world is growing. For the first time in the last 6 years, the composition of the union has expanded. With the admission of Iran, the total number of the "SCO family" will increase by almost 86 million people, and the total GDP will reach almost 30% of the world. This clearly illustrates the effect of Iran's accession to the SCO. The total population of the SCO countries is almost 3.4 billion people. This is about half of all people living on the planet.

The SCO is a huge space. The total GDP of the SCO countries is more than \$23 trillion, or a quarter of the world's GDP. If we talk about railways, this is 340 thousand kilometers. If we talk about cargo turnover, then 2/3 of the world's cargo turnover falls on the SCO countries.

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ Ibid.

Such a scale imposes its obligations, but also allows us to make certain decisions that the SCO member states need today.

The participating countries occupy 60% of Eurasia - 34 million square kilometers. Despite the sanctions pressure, the SCO member states have proven their ability to withstand new challenges. The SCO economy demonstrates stable and high growth rates. In 2010-2022, the average annual growth rate of total GDP was almost 5% against 2.8% of world GDP. Over the same period, the share of the SCO economies in world GDP increased from 15.3% to 24.4%.²¹⁶

With the expansion of the SCO membership, the spheres of interaction of the participating countries have been significantly expanded, covering today not only the problems of regional security and countering terrorism, but also issues of economics, transport logistics, energy, financial and banking relations. At the same time, energy cooperation has become one of the priorities in the Organization's activities and, in accordance with the Program of Trade and Economic Cooperation of the SCO states adopted in 2019 for the period up to 2035,²¹⁷ it was allocated in a separate direction. In 2013, an Energy Club was created within the framework of the Organization, which has become not only a broad platform for interaction between all interested producers and consumers of energy resources of the SCO countries, but also capable of turning into a full-fledged regulator of the energy market of the Asia-Pacific region in the near future. Nowadays, about 19% of the world's oil reserves are concentrated on the territory of the SCO (considering Saudi Arabia, this figure will increase to 35%), 44% of the world's natural gas reserves, 42% of the world's coal reserves. If we talk about renewable energy sources (RES), the total installed capacity of wind power generation in the SCO countries reaches more than 45% of global indicators, solar power plants — about 40%, hydropower — more than 40%, nuclear power — about 25%.²¹⁸

To date, such major energy projects as the Power of Siberia 2 and its continuation Soyuz Vostok are in the process of implementation, the estimated capacity of which should be about 50 billion m³ annually, which is comparable to the Nord Stream. At the end of 2022, the construction project of the Pakistan Stream gas pipeline with an estimated length of more than 1 thousand km was announced, which will connect the gas infrastructure of the south and north

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ Address by SCO Secretary-General Zhang Ming at a meeting of the SCO Heads of State Council, 4 July 2023, via videoconference. *SCO official website*. URL: <http://eng.sectSCO.org/archives/20230704/948756/-Address-by-SCO-Secretary-General-Zhang-Ming-at-a-meeting-of-the-SCO-Heads-of-State-Council-4-July.html> (accessed: 14.07.2023)

²¹⁸ Alimov R. SCO facing a new challenge. *Valdai Discussion club*. URL: <https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/sco-facing-a-new-challenge/?ysclid=lm3msshida674997593> (accessed: 01.01.2023)

of the country. Sea and land options for laying Iran—Pakistan—India gas pipelines with a capacity of up to 30 billion m³ per year are being considered. Such an extensive system of new gas pipelines at the junction of Central and South Asia will significantly increase the volume of Russian pipeline gas supplies, which will largely offset the negative consequences of losses on the European gas market.

Russian Federation, People's Republic of China, and Republic of India are the main players and competitors in the economic field of the SCO and largely determine the direction of further development of the organization.

Over the past few years, *Russian Federation* has been carefully focusing on trade and economic cooperation in the SCO. The "turn to the East", which began to be actively talked about after February 2022, but which was a strategic choice of the country made even before the introduction of economic sanctions by Western countries, became possible to a large extent due to the realization of the potential of the SCO.

The Russian economy in 2022 experienced one of the toughest crises in its history, losing only about 3% of GDP. The main reasons for the economy's decline were large-scale sanctions introduced in stages after the events of 24 February, the outflow of the working population outside the country, restrictions on imports, currency transactions and the departure of large companies from the country. Although the most pessimistic forecasts for this year did not come true, next year could be much worse than 2022 for the country's economy.

Russia's gross domestic product (GDP) grew by almost 3% in January-September 2023, with growth exceeding 5% in September. Based on the results of nine months, the GDP increase was 2.8%, this is the preliminary estimate of the Ministry of Economic Development. If we take September separately, the figure was almost twice as high - more than 5% in annual terms. In September, during a meeting on the draft federal budget for 2024-2026, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that the stage of recovery of the Russian economy was over. He drew attention to the fact that the current economic situation is stable and balanced.²¹⁹

It is not only about replacing the supply of individual components, but also the development of new logistics routes, providing opportunities for uninterrupted payments, increasing scientific, technological, and cultural cooperation.

Russia is ready to work in these areas with all SCO partners on mutually beneficial terms, while avoiding the risks of applying secondary sanctions.

²¹⁹ Совещание по экономическим вопросам. *Russian Government*. URL: <http://government.ru/news/49940/> (accessed: 31.10.2023)

The first results of such work are already visible today. For example, Russia's trade turnover with the SCO member states in January-May 2022 increased by more than a quarter compared to the same period in 2021 and reached more than \$80 billion.²²⁰

People's Republic of China is developing economic cooperation with the SCO countries, primarily in areas related to the establishment of reliable supplies of energy resources to the country, as well as in the creation of transport corridors for the export of Chinese products both to European countries and to the domestic markets of the SCO member states.

In this regard, the priority markets for China remain the countries of the European Union, the United States, Hong Kong, Japan, and the South Korea, to stay in which for China means to maintain the current growth rates of the economy and provide jobs to the population, which is important for domestic political stability in the country. To ensure reliable delivery of Chinese goods to European markets, China is implementing the BRI, in which the Central Asian countries are assigned the role of transit territories, which is important for the development of their economies.

Conditions for the supply of Chinese goods to the American market have become somewhat complicated because of the diplomatic and trade war initiated by the United States. However, given the importance of the American market for China, there is always a compromise with Washington in the end. As for Russian Federation, the PRC and the Russian Federation expect to increase the volume of bilateral trade to \$ 200 billion this year against \$ 147 billion in 2021. According to the General Customs Administration of China, only in the first 7 months of 2022 year, the trade turnover increased by 29% and amounted to 97.7 billion dollars.²²¹

Republic of India needs reliable supplies of raw materials and energy resources for its fast-growing economy and is interested in cooperation with the countries of the region, including within the framework of the SCO. In addition, People's Republic of China and Russian Federation are partners for India in another association – BRICS. The trade turnover between Russian Federation and Republic of India was estimated at \$ 27.1 billion in the first 5 months of 2023, which is the largest indicator in the history of trade relations between the two states, with People's Republic of China — about \$ 41.1 billion, with Republic of Kazakhstan

²²⁰ According to the World Bank.

²²¹ General Administration of Customs People's Republic of China

– about \$ 2.5 billion.²²² At the same time, the United States remains the main consumers of the Republic of Indian goods abroad, accounting for more than 17 percent of India's total exports. Among the Central Asian countries, Republic of Turkmenistan may be the most important partner for Republic of India, which is not a member of the SCO, but with which India is working on the possibility of building a gas pipeline from Republic of Turkmenistan through Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to Islamic Republic of Pakistan and Republic of India.

6.3. THE SCO ECONOMIC POLICY

According to statistics provided by the information center of the CIS Internet portal, the share of the SCO's GDP is more than 30%. In addition, the world trade of the members of the association is 16% of the total world trade, the total population of the SCO and EAEU member states has taken the value of 40%.

In addition, the membership of the organization this year may be replenished with new states, among which: Republic of Belarus (a member state of the EAEU), Iran (the new member from 2023). The names of other states that have expressed a desire to join the SCO and be a permanent participant have not yet been disclosed due to unnamed reasons.

It can be stated that under the "unnamed reasons" there are measures of negative impact from other states, considering the current situation on the world stage – the imposition of sanctions on the Russian Federation. In turn, Russia is a member of the EAEU, SCO and BRICS, so such a condition may provoke the imposition of sanctions on the member states of international associations, since they indirectly interact with the sub-sanctioned state represented by Russia.

At the same time, the SCO and the EAEU have carried out large-scale work in 2022 to improve the logistics supply chains of goods: completely new routes for the movement of transit vehicles have been built.

In addition, it is planned to hold more than 100 events covering the political, economic, cultural, and humanitarian spheres, as well as security issues among the SCO members.

Also at the Samarkand SCO summit, the participants approved a single development program in the economic sphere – the "road map". The essence of the "road map" as a program of mutual economic development is to increase the share of national currencies in mutual

²²² Foreign Trade CIS. Functions of the Division. *Government of India. Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Department of Commerce*. The data of the Indian Commerce and Industry Ministry // URL: <https://commerce.gov.in/about-us/divisions/foreign-trade-territorial-division/foreign-trade-cis/?hilite=%27kazakhstan%27> (accessed: 01.08.2023)

settlements on concluded commodity and other property transactions with a material component or cross-border transfers.²²³

The development program contains specialized measures aimed at creating conditions for mutual investments, as well as measures to support international financial projects of the association's participants.

At the same time, the SCO and the EAEU have agreed and signed another document that assumes close cooperation between the countries of the two international associations – «the Memorandum of Understanding between the EEC and the SCO secretariat».

However, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is not the only international organization that is a permanent economic partner of the EAEU. On the agenda is the rapid development of relations with the BRICS members. It is necessary to consider the policy of economic development within the framework of the EAEU and BRICS.

The EAEU and BRICS, now, are aimed at forming a single financial structure, such as:

1. Integration of payment and settlement infrastructures.
2. Creation of a single currency basket.
3. Cooperation of national banks
4. Payments in national currency.

The SCO space is a colossal platform for mutually beneficial trade and economic cooperation, the implementation of joint projects covering almost all sectors of the economy. The total GDP of all countries of the Organization in 2020 reached 23% of the global figure, by 2030 it is expected to grow to 35-40% of global GDP. The foreign trade turnover of the SCO member states amounted to more than \$6.3 trillion.²²⁴ Targeted programs and other documents have been adopted to realize the huge potential to ensure the growth of our countries' economies, there is advanced experience in the fields of economic cooperation, industry, food security, transport, interregional measurements, digitalization, energy, high technologies, development of remote territories, transition to mutual settlements in national currencies.

Currently, specific project activities are being carried out with the participation of interested SCO member States, observers, and dialogue partners to implement the adopted documents. In addition, proper prerequisites have been created for reaching a fundamentally new level of economic cooperation. There are reasons to expect a qualitative breakthrough in

²²³ Pepe Escobar. The SCO summit of Asian power players delineated a “road map” for strengthening the multipolar world. *Geopolitika.ru*. URL: <https://www.geopolitika.ru/en/article/sco-summit-asian-power-players-delineated-road-map-strengthening-multipolar-world?ysclid=lm3oswqp5d520449825> (accessed: 23.09.2022)

²²⁴ M. Igibayeva. *A Haza Szolgálatában*. 2021. pp83.

innovative areas, such as green energy, digital economy. At the same time, the development of the digital economy and modern IT technologies can play a decisive role in overcoming the negative consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and creating new sources of growth in the SCO space, which is a huge market for the introduction of relevant innovations. The SCO has withstood the coronavirus test, the Member states have demonstrated a high level of solidarity, mutual support and cohesion throughout the Organization. Currently, the SCO member States face a common task - the fight against the epidemic, the restoration and development of the economy, the fight against poverty and ensuring an adequate standard of living for people. Russian Federation and People's Republic of China remain the most significant players, despite the process of transformation of the Organization. The admission of large new countries into its ranks remains an important strategic direction for the SCO. In addition, People's Republic of China and Russian Federation are holding back US dominance in the region. Despite common goals and assurances of friendly relations, there are contradictions between Russian Federation and People's Republic of China within the SCO. Membership in the SCO has allowed People's Republic of China to expand its zone of influence in Central Asia, which is why Russia and China compete mainly in the economic and energy spheres of the region. In part, the Government of the People's Republic of China has made progress in creating a free trade zone thanks to the signing of the free trade agreement between the EAEU and the People's Republic of China in 2018 within the framework of the Chinese initiative " Belt and Road" (agreement of May 17, 2018 "On trade and Economic Cooperation between the Eurasian Economic Union and its member states, on the one hand, and the People's Republic of China, on the other hand").²²⁵ The energy vector in the foreign policy strategy of the SCO member states serves mainly as an instrument of "soft power", thanks to which states can strengthen their positions in Greater Eurasia. To promote energy projects, the SCO "Energy Club" was created, which, however, today is rather declarative in nature. Moreover, the accession of new members to the SCO has become a challenge for Russian- Chinese cooperation. The recent border conflicts between China and India, India and Pakistan have a negative impact on cooperation between the SCO member states. However, Russia strives to remain neutral, not supporting any of the SCO member states in border disputes.

It is the activation of multilateral trade and economic cooperation that should become the main strategic task of the upcoming decade of the SCO's activities. The SCO is an effective and efficient platform for combining the national interests of the member states with regional

²²⁵ M. Igibayeva. *A Haza Szolgáltatában*. 2021. p. 84.

ones, implementing transcontinental and regional initiatives such as *the Belt and Road, North-South, the Greater Eurasian Partnership, the SCO Green Belt* and others.²²⁶ Within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative, China welcomes the efforts of all countries to combine national development strategies and regional integration initiatives, followed by joining the global partnership of interconnectedness. Together with all partners, they will increase the capacity of China-Europe container trains and ensure regular operation of the China-Tajikistan-Uzbekistan highway soon. The organization intends to strengthen cooperation for the sustainable development of practical cooperation in the region within the framework of the launched second stage of the target loan program of the Interbank Association.

6.4. THE SCO AND THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE

The construction of the Belt and Road has a certain relation to the SCO. The BRI initiative was launched in the Republic of Kazakhstan, one of the founding countries of the SCO, and is an important platform for deepening cooperation and strengthening mutual ties within the SCO. The parties can make a new breakthrough in development thanks to the historic opportunity provided by the Qingdao summit to start a new path of cooperation.²²⁷

From the point of view of mechanisms, China is the initiator of the creation of the SCO and the BRI, China is actively involved in building an international system of regional and global governance. The efforts of China and many other countries are focused on the development of these two projects. As for the principles, the SCO and the Belt and Road have revealed the spiritual essence of a new type of international relations. The BRI initiative firmly adheres to the principles of joint discussion, construction and use. The SCO is guided by the "Shanghai Spirit", which is based on "mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, joint consultations, respect for the diversity of cultures and the desire for joint development. As for the spiritual connection, the countries of the two mechanisms are making efforts to participate in the reform of the unfair international order.

It is obvious that the SCO space has a huge economic potential, including in terms of foreign investment. The share of the organization's countries currently accounts for 11% of the total volume of foreign investment. In June 2022, during the St. Petersburg Economic Forum, it was noted that more than 600 thousand new enterprises were registered in the SCO member states, and this is excluding China. The value of the members' gold and foreign exchange

²²⁶ Ibid.

²²⁷ . Iqibayeva M. *A haza szolgálatában*. 2021. p. 121.

reserves is approaching \$4 trillion. Even though not all Member States have a positive balance, the total trade balance is 193 billion dollars. The volume of exports of goods in the structure of the SCO countries' GDP exceeds 23%.²²⁸

In addition, the SCO accounts for 17% of oil reserves, 40% of gas.²²⁹ Pakistan's accession to the organization has become an important moment in the development of the SCO. There are about 2 billion economically active people in the SCO countries, and cluster development is proceeding rapidly. All this allows us to conclude that this club of like-minded people is strong, first, in economic terms. Economic interests underlie the national security of any State and, therefore, are not affected by political upheavals in the world. This is what can allow the SCO to remain a competitive organization in the world, surpassing the consolidation of such associations as the EU, NATO and the Group of Seven.

As for construction, the SCO and the Belt and Road initiative have a close mutual connection between an important direction and the content of cooperation. Most of the six economic corridors that will be promoted within the framework of the Belt and Road are within the scope of SCO cooperation, moreover, they relate to the political attitudes of the member countries of the association. The SCO's security needs for more than 10 years have laid an important mechanism for the development of the Belt and Road and provided a guarantee of coordination.²³⁰

Since 2014, the declarations of the SCO heads of state and bulletins following the meetings of the prime ministers of the member states of the association show obvious support for the "BRI", the member states also seek to combine their development strategies with the initiative. Thus, they hope to dispel the fears of individual figures. More importantly, the development of the Belt and Road Initiative over the past five years has played a stimulating role in establishing mutual ties within the SCO, the main connecting nodes in Eurasia. The political framework of the Belt and Road will stimulate SCO cooperation in the field of security, infrastructure communications, trade contacts and investment integration, and will contribute to the faster implementation of various agreements within the framework of trade and economic cooperation within the SCO. The connection of people between the countries along the Belt

²²⁸ Documents signed during the meeting of the Council of Heads of SCO Member States, available for viewing. *Official website of the SCO*. 2022. URL: http://rus.sectsc.org/archive_news/20220916/913194/Dokumenty-podpisannye-na-zasedaniya-Soveta-glav-gosudarstv.html (accessed: 09.04.2023)

²²⁹ Перспективы продвижения деловой повестки дня деятельности ШОС на новом этапе развития. *St. Petersburg International Economic Forum*. URL: <https://forumspb.com/news/news/perspektivy-prodvizhenija-delovoj-povestki-dnja-deyatelnosti-shos-na-novom-etape-razvitiya/?lang=ru> (accessed: 29.03.2023)

²³⁰ Igibayeva M. *A Haza szolgálatában*. 2021. p. 122.

and Road will increase social and humanitarian contacts, as well as public recognition by the SCO member states.

The initiative "Economic belt of the silk road and Maritime silk road of the XXI century" put forward by the Chinese government is a large-scale project of our time. The aim of this idea is to form a new model of international cooperation. The initiative covers more than 60 countries in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Europe. The GDP of the participants, which are included in the project according to the plan, is 55% of the world; 70% of the world's population lives in these states. The "belt and road" aims to connect countries with an extensive logistics and transport network using roads, ports, railways, pipelines, airports, transnational electric networks and even fiber optic lines. Creating a modern infrastructure can attract more investment, develop trade along the route. This policy also helps stimulate the domestic economies from overseas demand and can absorb some of the excess capacity in China's industrial sector. Officially, the proposal for the construction of the "silk road Economic belt" was announced by President of the people's Republic of China XI Jinping in Kazakhstan during a speech at Nazarbayev University on September 7, 2013.²³¹ The name implies that the initiative "one belt, one road" has two components. The idea of the "Maritime silk road of the XXI century" was put forward by Chinese President XI Jinping in the Council of people's representatives of Indonesia on October 3, 2013.²³² This project is not limited to the countries that were previously part of the great silk road. It is open to all countries, international and regional organizations. This explains the initiative as flexible, open with a comprehensive framework of cooperation, allowing all "Belt and Road" countries, both developed and developing, to cooperate with greater parity. The initiative establishes five areas of cooperation: the development of political dialogue, the strengthening of road transport links between countries, the intensification of free trade (through the elimination of trade barriers and restrictions), the strengthening of monetary circulation and the strengthening of ties between nations.

²³¹ XI Jinping's speech at Nazarbayev University (full text). URL: <http://kz.chineseembassy.org/chn/zhgx/zxdt/t1074174.htm> (accessed: 20.10.2023)

²³² Speech by Chinese President XI Jinping in the Council of people's representatives of Indonesia. URL: <https://rus.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/ydylzt.htm> (accessed: 21.12.2022)

Map 2. BRI routes



Source: <https://southfront.org/the-polar-silk-road-comes-to-life-as-a-new-epoch-in-history-begins/> (Accessed: 19.12.2022.)

In the process of implementing the project, People’s Republic of China is determined to use the comparative advantages of the country's regions, strengthening the interaction between the Eastern, Western and Central regions and comprehensively increase the level of economic openness.

In May 2015, Russian Federation and People’s Republic of China signed a Joint Statement on cooperation in conjunction with the construction of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Silk Road Economic Belt, thereby showing that the Russian Federation will be involved in “Belt and Road” and is an important partner and support in this project. After that, the idea of developing the Northern Sea Route (NSR) began to appear more and more as part of the New Silk Road strategy and its conjunction with the EAEU.²³³

In March 2017, during the forum "Arctic — territory of dialogue" and in April at the conference of the discussion club "Valdai", the Russian side proposed China to invest in projects of the Northern Sea route. In May 2017, Vladimir Putin, pointing out in his speech at the 1st forum "one belt and one road", called for its joint development, development, and


²³³ Igbayeva M. Implementing the Belt and Road Initiative in Kazakhstan. *A haza szolgálatában*. 2019. p 287.

prosperity. On May 26, Chinese foreign Minister Wang Yi said that China supports the Russian proposal to develop and create of the "Ice silk road".²³⁴

On June 20, 2017, the People's Republic of China published the concept of cooperation at sea within the framework of the "one belt and one road" initiative, which formulated the basic principles and proposed actions for the construction and development of the "Maritime silk road of the XXI century". This document States that the Chinese side will intensify efforts to form a "blue economic corridor" across the Arctic ocean, as well as participate in the development, use and development of the Arctic, which is one of the first official confirmations of China's interest in the Northern Sea route.²³⁵

In July 2017, the Russian and Chinese sides noted that bilateral cooperation is developing dynamically in almost all areas, and Chinese President XI Jinping said that China is ready to deploy together with Russia the construction of the "Ice silk road".²³⁶

Map 3. Economic corridors of BRI



Source: <https://www.weforum.org>

Economic corridors

The main routes of the "Economic belt of the silk road" will be held:

²³⁴ Ibid.

²³⁵ Ibid.

²³⁶ Ibid.

- from China through Central Asia, Russia to Europe (to the Baltic sea)
- from China through Central Asia and West Asia to the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean sea
- from China to Southeast Asia, South Asia, to the Indian ocean.

The main directions of the “Maritime silk road of the XXI century”:

- from the seaports of China through the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean and further to Europe
- from Chinese ports through the South China Sea to the South Pacific.²³⁷

In these areas, it is planned to form international corridors of economic cooperation: China-Mongolia-Russia, China-Central Asia-West Asia, China-Indochina, China-Pakistan, and Bangladesh-India-Myanmar-China.²³⁸

To finance the projects of the "One Belt — One Road" concept, two new financial institutions were established in China in 2014: the Asian infrastructure investment Bank (AIIB) and the Silk Road Fund.²³⁹

The Silk Road Fund was registered in December 2014 in Beijing. The total capital of the FSP is to be \$ 40 billion, but its formation will take place in several stages. The fund was launched with an initial capital of \$ 10 billion.²⁴⁰

6.5. THE SCO AND COVID - 19

The American English language dictionary Merriam-Webster, better known as Webster's Dictionary, has chosen the word pandemic as the word of the year 2020²⁴¹. On the portal ELIBRARY.EN, the search query "pandemic" for 19 October 2023, can be found more than 38,000 publications, of which 23,142 publications, or 70%, refer to 2019-2021. And interest in studying the impact of the pandemic on all areas of society has not waned.

The new COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic started in Wuhan city in central China's Hubei province in 2019 and has spread to more than 200 countries in Europe, Asia, the United States

²³⁷ Ibid. p 288

²³⁸ Ibid. p 288

²³⁹ Ibid. p 286



²⁴⁰ The Silk Road Fund official web page // URL: <http://www.silkroadfund.com.cn> (accessed: 12.05.2023)

²⁴¹ Webster's Dictionary named the word of the Year.

https://news.rambler.ru/world/45337388/?utm_content=news_media&utm_medium=read_more&utm_source=copylink (accessed: 07.12.2022).

and Africa,²⁴² threatening the very existence of the global economy and causing it to stagnate.²⁴³

Table 16. **Coronavirus cases**













Source: Last updated: October 19, 2023, <https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/>

²⁴² McKibbin W. J., Fernando R. (2020). The global macroeconomic impacts of COVID-19: Seven scenarios. // CAMA working paper. No. 19/2020. <https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3547729> (accessed: 07.01.2023).

²⁴³ Salisu A. A. Revisiting oil-stock nexus during COVID-19 pandemic: Some preliminary results. // International Review of Economics & Finance, 69, 280–294. (accessed: 09.01.2023).

Table 17. Number of cases in the SCO states

Name	Cases - cumulative total	Cases - newly reported in last 7 days	Deaths - cumulative total	Deaths - newly reported in last 7 days	Vaccines - Total doses administered per 100 population	Vaccines - Persons vaccinated with a complete primary series per 100 population	Vaccines - Persons vaccinated with at least one booster or additional dose 100 population
Global	771,407,825	15,707	6,972,152	120	173.41	66.12	31.74
+ By WHO Region							
+ By World Bank Income Group							
 United States of America	103 436 829		1 136 920		202,08	68,87	35,23
 China	99 315 684	387	121 742		239,03	87,3	56,69
 India	44 999 588	150	532 037	2	159,91	68,99	16,58
 Russian Federation	23 061 960		400 102		127,9	54,93	
 Iran (Islamic Republic of)	7 619 981	1 254	146 480	44	185,07	69,75	34,02
 Pakistan	1 580 631		30 656		153,95	63,59	23,65
 Kazakhstan	1 502 857		19 072		204,3	68,09	35,43
 Kyrgyzstan	88 889		1 024		48,5	20,5	4,61
 Uzbekistan	174 123		1 016		241,1	54,1	47,3
 Tajikistan	17 786		125		215,2	53,25	54,16

Source: <https://covid19.who.int/table>

The United States remains the leader in the number of infected and deceased people, where more than 103 million infected with COVID-19 were detected more than 1 million deaths were recorded.

Coronavirus arrived in India much later than in Europe and the United States, a reminder of the country's relatively peripheral role in global economic relations, but the pandemic appears to have been a much more serious challenge for its economy than for People's Republic of China. Back in March, epidemiological reports from Republic of India were not particularly worrying, with a national quarantine only imposed in May, but in the months that followed, the country saw a rapid rise in the incidence of the disease. In 2020, India ranked second in the world after the US in the number of diagnosed coronaviruses (about 10.7 million people), and third after the US and Brazil in the number of deaths (more than

154,000 people). At the end of the pandemic, Republic of India ranked third after People's Republic of China in terms of the number of people infected.

The pandemic triggered an economic and health crisis in the world as a whole and in the economies of individual countries. This, in turn, has increased uncertainty and fears about the expected impact of the pandemic on the world economy.²⁴⁴ On 30 January 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the COVID-19 outbreak a global emergency, given its public health risk,²⁴⁵ and subsequently declared COVID-19 a global pandemic on 11 March 2020.²⁴⁶

To contain the exponential spread of the virus, countries around the world have taken measures ranging from complete isolation, border closures, quarantines, travel restrictions and complete business closures.²⁴⁷ This led to a reduced supply of goods, exacerbated by panic stockpiling and a precipitous drop in demand due to people's self-isolation. But most importantly, what the pandemic led to be a huge increase in demand for medical products. The global spread of the coronavirus was a common challenge facing all humankind. It not only posed a serious threat to the security of life of the peoples of all countries, but also dealt a severe blow to the economic, social, and other spheres of life of all countries. It was necessary for the international community to join efforts and take comprehensive measures to provide a joint response.

The SCO attached great importance to this issue. At the meeting of the SCO Council of Heads of State in November 2020 in Moscow, a special profile statement on joint counteraction to the new coronavirus infection was adopted, calling on the international community to strengthen cooperation to overcome the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, protect human life, restore stability to the global economy and ensure its sustainable growth.

In substantive terms, opportunities for cooperation in overcoming the negative consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic were considered at the meetings of the Council of

²⁴⁴ Torkanovsky E. P. The global environmental agenda, the COVID-19 pandemic and the new normal. *Economic relations*. - 2020. - Volume 10. - No. 3. - pp. 663-682. - doi: 10.18334/eo.10.3.110600

²⁴⁵ Nicola M. The socio-economic implications of the coronavirus and COVID-19 pandemic: A review. *International Journal of Surgery* 2020, 78, 185–193 Phan D. H. B., Narayan P. K. (2020). Country responses and the reaction of the stock market to COVID-19: A preliminary exposition. // *Emerging Markets Finance and Trade*, 56(10), 2138–2150. (accessed: 09.02.2023).

²⁴⁶ Zhang D. Financial markets under the global pandemic of COVID-19. *Finance Research Letters*. 36, 101528.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/340714575_Financial_markets_under_the_global_pandemic_of_COVID-19 (accessed: 09.02.2023).

²⁴⁷ Kulkova I. A. Adaptation of the behavior of entrepreneurs to the changes caused by the coronavirus. Pandemic. *Economics, Entrepreneurship and Law*. - 2020. - Volume 10. - No. 10. - pp. 2529-2540. - DOI: 10.18334 / epp.10.10.111051.

Heads of Government of the SCO member states in New Delhi in 2020 and in Astana in 2021, as well as at the Meetings of Ministers in charge of foreign economic activities.

In September 2021, the SCO Heads of State Council meeting in Dushanbe approved the Plan of Joint Recommended Measures of the SCO Member States to Overcome the Negative Socio-Economic Consequences of the COVID-19 Pandemic for 2021-2023, which will play an active role in facilitating economic recovery. The volume of SCO internal trade is steadily recovering.²⁴⁸

In Chinese, the word "crisis" is made up of two characters: "crisis" and "opportunity". This is the same truth as when people say that crisis and opportunity are two sides of the same coin. At a time when the negative effects of the pandemic were being fought, SCO countries also paid attention to seizing the new opportunities that emerged in the pandemic, as well as jointly opening up new perspectives for cooperation within the SCO. With the development of 5G technology, big data, cloud technology and artificial intelligence, the digital economy, as a completely new form, has accelerated its growth against the backdrop of the pandemic. New forms of manufacturing, retail, and logistics have developed rapidly. Telemedicine, distance education, e-commerce is on the rise. The SCO pays great attention to the development of cooperation in the digital economy.

The SCO Secretary-General drew attention to the fact that the socio-economic crisis caused by the pandemic forms "a breeding ground for the spread of destructive ideas among young people via the Internet", since "terrorist sleeper cells carrying out recruitment and propaganda work can take advantage of the political and economic chaos caused by the pandemic to become more active". In this regard, there is a special demand for international cooperation, including within the framework of the SCO, to prevent the spread of terrorist and extremist ideology in the information space, to cut off sources and channels of financing of terrorists and their accomplices, including at the expense of proceeds from drug trafficking and other forms of cross-border crime.²⁴⁹

A special place in the SCO activities is occupied by the fight against the abuse of narcotic drugs and their illicit trafficking. It is carried out within the framework of the "Anti-Drug Strategy of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Member States for 2018-2023" and

²⁴⁸ Min Zh. Генсек ШОС: цели и принципы нашей организации получили широкое признание. *TASS News Agency*. URL:

https://tass.ru/interviews/14158013?utm_source=yxnews&utm_medium=desktop&utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fyandex.ru%2Fnews%2Fsearch%3Ftext%3D (accessed: 12.09.2023)

²⁴⁹ Генеральный секретарь ШОС выступил на открытии Виртуальной контртеррористической недели ООН. *SCO official website*. URL: <http://rus.sectesco.org/news/20200707/661221.html> (accessed 20.07.2023).

the "Convention on Cooperation in Drug Abuse Prevention" approved at the SCO summit in Qingdao, China (9-10 June 2018).

To form an effective system of joint efforts to combat the drug threat, the SCO is currently working on the prospects of implementing a project to establish *the SCO Anti-Drug Centre* in Dushanbe (Tajikistan) as a separate permanent body.

Speaking of the serious difficulties and challenges facing the global economy, it is impossible not to mention another factor that is having a devastating impact on the world economy, perhaps as great as a pandemic. In recent years, some countries have taken a series of unilateral, protectionist measures, including sanctions, tariff and trade wars, stigmatization, and others. These have caused enormous damage to global production chains, supply chains, capital flows and investment activities, and have damaged the energy market.

This has hit the global economy hard and is having an increasingly painful impact on the socio-economic situation in a growing number of countries, not to mention the boomerang effect on the initiators of these actions themselves. This kind of political action is contrary to the "Shanghai spirit", which the SCO family opposes and firmly rejects.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization countries jointly fought the pandemic: they not only effectively suppressed the epidemic and protected people's health and safety, but also promoted mutual learning, exchanges, and advice. Member States' cooperation in public health and emergency management was well established long before the COVID-19 outbreak. An Agreement between the governments of the SCO member states on co-operation in the field of public health was signed in 2011, and the first meeting of the heads of agencies responsible for emergency situations took place as early as April 2002. This laid a solid foundation for rapid response to the COVID-19 pandemic and for anti-epidemic co-operation.

Of course, the emergence of a new type of coronavirus has stimulated the medical and public health sectors of the SCO Member States to further expand their cooperation programs, including not only the prevention and treatment of existing diseases, but also the development of joint action measures to respond to possible future epidemics and epizootics.

A clear example of this is the fact that even the War Production Act was invoked to meet the increased need for essential medical supplies in the USA.

Health experts immediately put forward several recommendations as a first line of defence to reduce the spread of the coronavirus, such as the use of masks, frequent hand washing, social distancing, and self-isolation.

COVID-19 also had an impact on the increasing percentage of the underground economy. Vaccination against the infection was mandatory. In case of refusal to vaccinate, the following facilities were banned:

- commercial facilities (shopping malls, construction shops, hypermarkets)
- service sector (beauty salons, cosmetic and massage parlours, hairdressers)
- catering (cafes, coffee shops, bars)
- sports facilities (stadiums, sports palaces, fitness centres)
- entertainment (theatres, cinemas, concert halls, circus).

However, there is a certain part of the population that did not want to be vaccinated. In most cases, they argue that this is due to distrust of domestic medical products, or because of religious beliefs. Another reason is that people have already had the disease but did not go to a medical institution in time, therefore they were not recorded in the database and did not receive the necessary document. In this case, the number of antibodies is enough not to get sick again, and vaccination may aggravate the situation. This situation has led to an increase in corruption in the health sector. We are talking about the purchase of certificates of vaccination.

Negative economic processes have also affected the largest geo-economic project of the modern world economy - the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This project, as follows from its official website, was supported by 143 foreign countries on 5 continents.

Together with People's Republic of China, these countries account for about 60% of the world's total population, 35% of global GDP and 43% of global trade in goods.²⁵⁰ During the 7 years of the BRI project's existence, China's direct investment in the BRI member countries exceeded \$110 billion, and China's total trade with these countries amounted to \$7.8 trillion. More than two thousand joint projects have been launched.²⁵¹ Naturally, the pandemic shock in the global economy could not but affect the BRI. At the same time, the degree of its impact on different participants of this project is not the same, so the speed and pace of recovery of their economies will differ.

²⁵⁰ Trade set to plunge as COVID-19 pandemic upends global economy / Trade forecast press conference: Remarks by DG Azevêdo. *World Customs Organization*. URL: https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres20_e/pr855_e.htm (accessed: 15.01.2023).

²⁵¹ Maximizing the Positive Impacts and Minimizing the Risks of the BRI in the Central Asia and South Caucasus Region: A Policy Paper. *The Emerging Markets Forum (2019) September*. <https://www.emergingmarketsforum.org/policy-paper-maximizing-the-positive-impacts-and-minimizing-the-risks-of-the-bri/> (accessed: 15.01.2023).

China has become the world's largest creditor, providing more than 150 countries with direct financial and trade loans worth about \$1.5 trillion. The debt owed to China by the BRI participants is huge, and it will be difficult to resolve it only by deferring payments.

China's domestic consumption is expected to nearly double in the next five years, from \$8 trillion in 2020 to \$12 trillion in 2025. According to Chinese President Xi Jinping, the country intends to import \$22 trillion worth of goods over the next 10 years.²⁵² China's domestic consumption is expected to increase by almost one and a half times, from \$8 trillion in 2020 to \$12 trillion in 2025.²⁵³

At the same time, China has capitalized on the coronavirus pandemic situation by launching initiatives for its foreign expansion within the framework of the IPP, which is a win-win in the current context. This was the idea behind the new Health Silk Road project to help distribute medical support and food aid. This was more relevant as the height of the first wave of the pandemic saw an increase in national protectionism in this area. For example, by mid-April 2020, more than 80 countries had banned the export of medical devices and personal protective equipment needed to combat the spread of COVID-19.²⁵⁴ At the start of the pandemic, China began providing medical assistance and consultations bilaterally in Malaysia, the Republic of the Philippines and Greece. Medical assistance to "jointly combat COVID-19" as well as any co-operation was also offered to Italy.

As the main goal of the Silk Road to Health, China proclaims the establishment of a global health management system and its sustainable infrastructure. This demonstrates China's vision of a new approach to improving global health governance.

However, with the advent of lockdowns, traditional trade has given way to online shopping, which has affected the supply of food and vegetables. This also had a great impact on the economies of the countries. Online shopping and home delivery of food from chain supermarkets started to develop. Thanks to this it was possible to avoid contact with the virus and reduce the growth of the disease.

²⁵² Xinhua news // URL: <http://news.cn> (accessed: 15.12.2022).

²⁵³ S. Horn, C.M. Reinhart, C. Trebesch. How Much Money Does the World Owe China? *Harvard Business Review*. URL: <https://hbr.org/2020/02/how-much-money-does-the-world-owe-china> (accessed: 15.01.2023).

²⁵⁴ China has suspended debt collection from developing countries. *Katehon*. URL: <https://katehon.com/news/china-has-suspended-debt-collection-developing-countries> (accessed: 05.12.2022)

In addition, large Chinese companies joined the fight against the pandemic. For example, the Jack Ma Foundation and Alibaba delivered humanitarian aid packages to dozens of countries, from Uganda and Ukraine to the United States.²⁵⁵

Within the framework of the Digital Silk Road, the direction related to combating COVID-19 and improving its information support is also strengthening. For example, the COVID-19 diagnostic system with artificial intelligence support, developed by two Chinese companies Baidu and Tencent, is already being used in hospitals in Ecuador.

But the main first economic blow that shook the world was the biggest one-day collapse in oil prices in the last three decades. The SCO countries in Central Asia, whose economies depend on crude oil production, were particularly hard hit.

Between 30 December 2019 and 20 April 2020, the price of Brent crude oil fell from \$68.60 per barrel to \$21.44 per barrel, an unprecedented drop in decades. This represents almost 70 per cent of the cost of a barrel of oil. Like Brent crude, WTI crude also fell sharply in price from \$63.05 per barrel on 30 December 2019 to a low of \$16.94 per barrel on 20 April 2020. This represents about 73% of the recurrence.²⁵⁶

6.6.CONCLUSION

Today, the SCO is one of the largest regional organizations in the world, whose members account for about one third of the world's GDP, about 40% of the world's population and almost two thirds of Eurasia's territory. Undoubtedly, these are great achievements for an organization that has been in existence for just over 20 years.

Despite the undoubtedly positive developments in the SCO member states in the economic sphere, largely due to fruitful cooperation on the organization's platform, several Western experts view the SCO as a geopolitical association of like-minded countries. Obviously, against the background of disagreements between the West and Russian Federation over the conflict in Ukraine, the SCO member states are becoming even closer than before. This to a certain extent worries the West, which wants to see Russian Federation isolated and exhausted.

²⁵⁵ BCG Redrawing the Map of Global Trade. URL: <https://www.bcg.com/publications/2020/redrawing-the-map-of-global-trade?> (accessed: 15.01.2022).

²⁵⁶ Kulkova I. A. Adaptation of the behavior of entrepreneurs to the changes caused by the coronavirus pandemic. *Economics, Entrepreneurship and Law*. - 2020. - Volume 10. - No. 10. - pp. 2529-2540. - doi: 10.18334/epp.10.10.111051. (accessed: 18.01.2023).

Obviously, as long as a member state has such partners as the SCO member states, Russian Federation is not afraid of Western economic sanctions.

Besides, the SCO accounts for 17 per cent of oil reserves and 40 per cent of gas. The Islamic Republic of Iran's accession to the organization was an important moment in the development of the SCO. The SCO countries have about 2 billion economically active population, and cluster development is progressing rapidly. All this allows us to conclude that this like-minded club is strong, first, in economic terms. Economic interests are at the heart of the national security of any state and therefore are not affected by political upheavals in the world. This is what can allow the SCO to remain a competitive organization in the world, surpassing in its consolidation such associations as the EU, NATO and the G7.

There is reason to hope that the coronavirus pandemic that affected the SCO countries and challenged the Organization's members to adapt to the new realities has forced them to become more active in developing a collective response to the challenges of biological security.

One option for such a response could be a combination within a new international center, but more importantly, in the SCO, Russian virology, Indian pharmacology and China's socially oriented health care system have helped protect people in the member states. In addition, the SCO has a well-established and working mechanism of meetings and consultations in various spheres and at various levels - expert, political, youth, even on-line, even in complete isolation. Based on a common legal and regulatory framework and using a flexible institutional basis for cooperation, the SCO covers a wide range of anti-drug policies, carrying out joint operational and investigative activities and implementing a range of preventive, medical and rehabilitation measures.

The SCO countries have established close cooperation with WHO and other international organizations and associations. In a complex sanitary and epidemic situation, the SCO, based on the principles of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, and mutual consultation, has convincingly confirmed its considerable potential as an effective platform for responding to emerging challenges and building up work to overcome the political, social, trade and economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The pandemic could be defeated only through coordinated and consistent efforts and cooperation at the global level. Develop national and region-wide strategies to ensure the continuity of emergency-related sectors, especially health, electricity, utilities and telecommunications infrastructure, and food supply and distribution.

Developing and implementing a region-wide approach to reduce the critical dependence of the region's countries on imports of medical equipment and facilities and medicines, establishing

regional co-operation in the development of vaccines and in the production of medical equipment and materials.

Further implementation of measures to develop the digital economy and digitalization of society is important. The development of common approaches to the introduction and development of digital medicine, digital and distance education at all levels, the development of digital communications, the development of Internet commerce and e-business.

Having considered the economic situation of Central Asian countries, we can draw conclusions:

1. The current coronavirus pandemic has shown that the countries of the region lack a clear and coordinated system of measures and mechanisms to counter such threats.

2. The countries of the region are critically dependent on imported medical equipment and medicines of anti-epidemic nature because of the lack of production of their own medical devices, equipment, and a significant range of medicines.

3. All the talk about regional co-operation has not ensured even a minimum level of interstate co-operation at the regional level. The borders were closed even for the transit of humanitarian aid (medical equipment, medicines, food, etc.)

4. Providing security through hi-tech gadgets, internet recruitment of youth, protection of population from terrorist waves.

The coronavirus pandemic has shown that systemic and institutional measures are needed to ensure greater coordination of national policies in dealing with various pandemics.

In any case, the pandemic provided a respite to analyze and correct the mistakes of previous phases. It once again demonstrated the policy flexibility of the SCO countries, which increasingly began to emphasize that SCO projects are "open, green and clean". It can be said that COVID-19 has made significant adjustments to both China's strategy and foreign participants' policies toward the SCO. However, the pandemic has only slowed down, but not stopped, the SCO's external expansion and the strengthening of its influence in the global economy.

7. ROLE OF KAZAKHSTAN IN THE SCO

7.1. INTRODUCTION

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation has today become the largest regional structure with great opportunities for creating mutually beneficial relations. Kazakhstan has managed to achieve certain results within the SCO, which contributes to the gradual process of integration into the world economy.

As a large multi-ethnic and multi-confessional State located in the very centre of Eurasia at the crossroads of completely different civilisations, the Republic of Kazakhstan is interested in creating a zone of good-neighbourliness, security and stability in its environment on the basis of universally recognised principles of international law, in particular such principles as the sovereign equality of States and their territorial integrity, non-use of force or threat of force in international relations, non-interference in the internal affairs of States, and peaceful settlement of disputes.

7.2. EURASIAN SECURITY: THE SCO AND KAZAKHSTAN

The Republic of Kazakhstan's foreign policy aimed at building systems of international security and cooperation both at the global (within the United Nations (UN) and regional levels (primarily within the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). In that connection, it should be noted that Kazakhstan is an initiator of CICA and an active participant in the CSTO, the OSCE and the SCO.

In August 1969, an armed clash took place on the territory of Lake Zhalanashkol along the Soviet-Chinese border, which threatened to turn into a full-scale war between the United Socialist Soviet Republic (USSR) and the People's Republic of China (PRC). Nevertheless, both Soviet and Chinese leaders had the wisdom to stop the bloodshed and begin negotiations on the border and the resolution of territorial disputes (the Soviet government delegation included representatives of all Soviet Union republics neighbouring China).²⁵⁷

257 Marcus Cloud. The conflict at lake Zhalanashkol: how the Soviet guards fought with the Chinese. URL: <https://www.ilawjournals.com/the-conflict-at-lake-zhalanashkol-how-the-soviet-guards-fought-with-the-chinese/> (accessed: 25.05.2023)

The mutual rapprochement of the parties continued after the collapse of the USSR, now within the framework of five states (the so-called "4 + 1" formula - four post-Soviet states: the Republic of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic of, Russia, and the Republic of Tajikistan plus the People's Republic of China). In this connection, in July 1992, the Republic of Kazakhstan (as well as other post-Soviet states) formed its national delegation, whose tasks included (based on the 1990 Soviet - Chinese agreement) not only the resolution of border issues, but also the mutual reduction of armed forces, as well as confidence-building in the military field in the Kazakhstan-China border.²⁵⁸

The resolution of the issue of disputed territories between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the People's Republic of China was facilitated by the personal relations of the first president of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, with Chinese President Jiang Zemin.²⁵⁹

At that time, a difficult decision on the disputed territories could be made as follows: 53 per cent – the Republic of Kazakhstan, 47 per cent – the People's Republic of China. Demarcation of the state border with China was carried out in the period from July 1996 to December 2001 and ended with the signing of the Intergovernmental Protocol on Demarcation of the Kazakhstan-China State Border by the then Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan and China Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Tan Jiaxuan on 10 May 2002 in Beijing.²⁶⁰

Finding a compromise on the principles of resolving territorial issues allowed to start an effective solution to the problems of strengthening mutual trust along the entire perimeter of the borders of the post-Soviet countries with the People's Republic of China. A breakthrough step in this direction was the agreement signed in Shanghai on 26 April 1996 between the four post-Soviet states and the People's Republic of China on confidence-building in the military field in the border zone (in particular, it was stipulated that the armed forces of the parties stationed in the border zone would not conduct any military actions threatening the other side and disturbing peace and stability in the border zone. The parties also agreed to inform each other about the activities of the troops within a radius of 100 kilometers from the border).²⁶¹ It

258 Kaukenov A.S. Казахстанско-китайские отношения в условиях геополитического разлома. 30 лет дипломатическим отношениям Республики Казахстан и Китайской Народной Республики: от становления до стратегического партнерства. Collection of the scientific conference materials, 23 december, 2021, pp. 91-95 // URL: <https://dku.kz/content/Сборник%20материалов%20науч.%20конф.%202023.12.2021.pdf> (accessed: 25.04.2023)

²⁵⁹ Nazarbayev N. Эра Независимости. 2017, pp. 24-34 // URL: <https://nazarbayev.kz/sites/default/files/pagefiles/2019-06/423d7253d66cad2c6f68758bc6f33782.pdf>

²⁶⁰ The Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan "On the State Border of the Republic of Kazakhstan" No. 70-V dated January 16, 2013. // Kazakhstanskaya Pravda. 2013. – 22.01. – No 22–23. – P. 27296–27297.

²⁶¹ Дипломаты России и Китая рассказали об истории создания ШОС // URL: <https://ria.ru/20170424/1492950144.html?ysclid=lj64jzaybn839397896> (accessed: 25.04.2023)

was from this moment that the notion of the Shanghai Five entered the political and legal lexicon. A year later, on 24 April 1997, in Moscow, the five countries signed another important document - an agreement on mutual reduction of armed forces in the border zone.²⁶² The five heads of state also agreed to meet annually, and in 1998-2000 they met alternately in Almaty, Bishkek and Dushanbe, where, in a friendly atmosphere based on equality, mutual trust and the desire for joint development (what came to be known as the "Shanghai spirit"), the most important issues of both regional and global security were fruitfully discussed. In addition, the sides have significantly expanded the range of issues under discussion to include economic co-operation, environmental protection, water resources management, culture, etc.

The establishment of the SCO and the activities of this organization are, without any exaggeration, of great importance for the Republic of Kazakhstan, which is due to the following important factors. Firstly, the legal nature of the SCO, which in its activities firmly adheres to the universally recognized principles of international law. Secondly, the nature of the goals pursued by the SCO, namely: 1) maintaining both global and regional security through joint action based on equal partnership; 2) establishing close economic, social, and cultural co-operation between the member states to promote comprehensive and balanced economic growth and steady improvement of living conditions of the peoples of the member states. For its part, the Republic of Kazakhstan, in carrying out its foreign policy, firmly adheres to a policy of cooperation and good-neighborly relations with all States and proceeds from unconditional respect for the principles and norms of international law (article 8 of the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan). In addition, the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan enshrines (as the first two) the following fundamental principles of the Republic of Kazakhstan: 1) social harmony and political stability; 2) economic development for the benefit of all people (paragraph 2, Article 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan).²⁶³

Thus, there is every reason to assert that the SCO's activities are fully in line with Kazakhstan's vital interests, as it is obvious that achieving stability within the country and ensuring economic growth stipulate both global and regional security and the development of trade and economic relations with neighboring states. As a result, the Kazakh state is one of the active participants in the SCO (and even its driving force in many areas of co-operation) and contributes in every possible way to the full achievement of its goals.

²⁶² Agreement with the People's Republic of China 1997.

²⁶³ The Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan // URL: https://www.akorda.kz/en/official_documents/constitution (accessed: 05.04.2023)

The Republic of Kazakhstan's President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, in his speech at the summit in Samarkand on 16 September 2022, noted that the key issues for SCO members are regional and food security, logistics and energy.²⁶⁴

He explained that the SCO's activities had convincingly demonstrated the relevance of the fundamental principles formulated in its charter documents: combating the "three evils", i. e. extremism, terrorism and separatism. As well as defense of sovereignty and territorial integrity of states and non-interference in internal affairs.

In this regard, he suggested strengthening cooperation in the military-political sphere between defense agencies and intelligence services. It is noteworthy that China has repeatedly expressed readiness for closer cooperation with Kazakhstan on law enforcement, intelligence, and defense agencies. During Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to the Republic of Kazakhstan on 14 September 2022, he said that despite changes in the international environment, China will support Kazakhstan in defending its independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.²⁶⁵ It is important to note that leaders of other SCO member states also express their readiness for closer co-operation with the Republic of Kazakhstan not only in the economic, but also in the military and political spheres.

To date, the Republic of Kazakhstan has successfully demarcated its border along the entire perimeter of its land and maritime borders, completing it with almost all of them. Kazakhstan has also gained a reputation as an honest mediator in the international arena, thanks to its balanced neutrality in international affairs. Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, the president and an experienced diplomat, deserves much of the credit for this.

The Republic of Kazakhstan, as the ninth territory of the world, located in the center of Eurasia, between the West and the East, bordering with 5 countries – Russian Federation, People's Republic of China, Republic of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyz Republic, and Republic of Turkmenistan, and having the longest continuous land border with the Russian Federation, cannot stay aside from what is happening. In addition, external risks for the Republic of Kazakhstan play a very important role, given the fact that inside the country, which is learning the lessons of the tragic January-2022, the mechanism for the complete renewal of the state apparatus and the entire political system has been launched. And while we are only on the way

²⁶⁴ Tokayev called on SCO to strengthen cooperation in military-political sphere. URL: <https://sputnik.kz/20220916/toqaeu-shyu-da-askeri-sayasi-yntymaqstasyq-27636417.html> (accessed: 05.11.2022)

²⁶⁵ China pays great attention to relations with Kazakhstan- Xi Jinping. URL: <https://sputnik.kz/20220914/qytay-qazaqstanmen-qarym-qatynas-27584787.html> (accessed: 05.11.2022)

to stability inside the republic, foreign policy factors will continue to strongly influence all spheres of our life.

September 2022 was particularly "impactful" for the head of our state. Kassym-Jomart Tokayev held personal talks with the heads of Russian Federation and People's Republic of China - Putin and Xi Jinping, participated in the SCO summit, held several meetings on the margins of the UN General Assembly, including with the leadership of the European Union, spoke at the general debate of the UN General Assembly and travelled to New York. In addition, the focus of attention of Kazakhstan's leadership is rapprochement with the Turkic world - the countries of Central Asia, Republic of Türkiye, and the Republic of Azerbaijan.

The President of the People's Republic of China also made his first state visit in almost three years of the pandemic to the Republic of Kazakhstan - in September 2022. This shows the importance of both the Republic of Kazakhstan for the People's Republic of China and the People's Republic of China for the Republic of Kazakhstan. For example, the huge Chinese investment - about \$14 billion - is mainly in oil and gas infrastructure. Because of the conflict between Russian Federation and Ukraine, the Republic of Kazakhstan is more important than ever for China's energy security.

Also, the Republic of Kazakhstan is China's trade corridor to Europe under its " Belt and Road" initiative, while Russia's transport infrastructure is vulnerable to international sanctions. People's Republic of China and the Republic of Kazakhstan have confirmed their intentions to actively work on creating a highly efficient and convenient multimodal transport artery in Eurasia. Today, the Republic of Kazakhstan and People's Republic of China are looking for joint ways to diversify supplies and restore the balance that has been disrupted by the aggravation of the geopolitical situation and the destruction of important transport and production chains, which has led to a threat to food and energy security. This is why the Republic of Kazakhstan's economic and political stability is so important to the People's Republic of China. And Xi Jinping's statement that China will not allow interference in the Republic of Kazakhstan's internal affairs and will support the territorial integrity of our country is a strong proof of this.

The Central Asian Summit in Cholpon-Ata, Kyrgyz Republic, held on 21 July 2022, has gone down in history as the first step towards discussing the prospects for regional integration. The five Central Asian countries have been striving for this for a long time, but today, against the backdrop of turbulence and uncertainty in international relations and the sanctions wars between the West and the Russian Federation, this issue has gained special significance. The Treaty on Friendship, Good Neighborliness and Cooperation for the

Development of Central Asia in XXI was adopted at the IV Consultative Meeting of the Heads of Central Asian States in Kyrgyz Republic. The document was signed by the presidents of the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Republic of Tajikistan, the Republic of Turkmenistan, and the Republic of Uzbekistan. The head of the Republic of Kazakhstan called this document unique in its content and historical perspective, which marks a new milestone in the five-sided strategic partnership. According to him, it enshrines "the special nature of our relations".

The President of the Republic of Kazakhstan emphasized that "the threat of an impending global recession, largely provoked by sanctions wars and growing protectionism, brings to the forefront the issue of accelerated development of regional economic cooperation. In the context of collapsing production and trade supply chains, the trend towards regionalization is becoming more and more evident everywhere". Over the past 5 years, trade turnover between the Republic of Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries has grown by 42 per cent to \$6.3 billion. Given the presence of huge reserves for increasing mutual trade, in the foreseeable future K.J. Tokayev considers it desirable to bring this figure to 15 billion dollars.

In 2022, Pontiff Francis visited the Republic of Kazakhstan to participate in the Congress of Leaders of World and Traditional Religions. The Pope, a spiritual leader with a huge flock, recognized the role of our state as a unifying bridge, gave the Republic of Kazakhstan the epithet of the Land of Encounters, quoted Abay and admired the dombra, explaining to the Western world the origins of tolerance and religious tolerance of the Kazakhs. The Western world received an important message about our country from the pontiff: just as the dombra is played by plucking two strings, so too Kazakhstan is characterized by its ability to move forward, creating harmony between two parallel strings: harsh winters and hot summers; tradition and progress. "But first and foremost, the melodies of two souls - Asian and European - are heard in this country, which defines its incessant mission to connect two continents; a bridge between Europe and Asia, between East and West."

For both Russian Federation and People's Republic of China, it is important to "synchronize the clock" with the Republic of Kazakhstan on the future of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The two heavyweights have clear positions on this issue, and the Republic of Kazakhstan balances these two points of view, considering the views of the entire Central Asian region, due to its geographical position in the middle ground between the powers, which has historically predetermined its role as a mediator. For example, while the Russian

leader is in favour of preserving the SCO's anti-terrorist component, the Chinese President is in favour of developing economic projects within the framework of the Organization.

Therefore, the Kazakh trend prevails in approaches to SCO development: security remains a priority, but the immediate goal is the economy. Speaking at the SCO summit in Samarkand in September 2022, Tokayev said the main mission of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, for which it was created, remains unchanged - regional security, the fight against the "three evils", i. e. extremism, terrorism and separatism. The fight against cybercrime and the strengthening of cooperation between defence agencies and intelligence services were added. Much of Tokayev's speech was devoted to the economic prospects of the SCO. According to Tokayev, the implementation of large-scale economic projects within the framework of the SCO, affecting transit and transport, food and energy security, should become a driver of growth within the organization.

This trend in the SCO's development, Tokayev said, is quite logical - increasing military cooperation within the organization is fraught with an imminent opposition between the SCO and NATO, which is already being pursued by Western politicians. The intensification of sanctions pressure, which is not accepted by the Republic of Kazakhstan, Russian Federation, People's Republic of China, or the other SCO members, predetermines the international organization move to involve economic tasks.

7.3. KAZAKHSTAN'S FUTURE IN THE SCO THROUGH THE PRISM OF NATIONAL INTERESTS

Another important area for the Republic of Kazakhstan within the framework of cooperation with the SCO member states is the creation of new transport corridors in the Eurasian space. The Republic of Kazakhstan supports the implementation of promising projects aimed at ensuring the interconnectivity of the region's countries between Central and South Asia and the development of the North-South and East-West trans-Eurasian corridors.

The Republic of Kazakhstan considers the Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran railway as a promising direction that opens the shortest route from East Asia to the Persian Gulf countries. Firstly, it will give the country additional funds to transport oil from Iran to China. Next, logistics means jobs, which means that the treasury will be replenished with foreign currency. And it will also contribute to the growth of the Aktau port. This will strengthen Kazakhstan's role and influence as a transit country.

Map 5. The Caspian Sea



And if we look at the map: the Islamic Republic of Iran, the south of the Caspian Sea - this is Republic of Turkmenistan, this is the Republic of Kazakhstan, this is the Russian Federation and the Republic of Azerbaijan. That is, with the Islamic Republic of Iran's accession to the SCO, the issue of turning the Caspian Sea into a sea of security is solved to a certain extent. In addition, the Islamic Republic of Iran can control the exit from the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and beyond. Thus, the Islamic Republic of Iran's accession to the SCO and

Source: <https://theconversation.com/the-caspian-sea-is-set-to-fall-by-9-metres-or-more-this-century-an-ecocide-is-imminent-152229>

control over the exit from the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman sharply increase the importance of the Republic of Kazakhstan as an oil transporter *to the People's Republic of China*.

From January 2024, the Secretary General of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) will be the representative of the Republic of Kazakhstan.²⁶⁶ The Republic of Kazakhstan assumes that the dynamics of interaction and areas of co-operation of the SCO are expanding in connection with its core mission, as well as with the need to develop adequate responses to security challenges in the context of global turbulence and transformation of the world system. After the SCO summit in Samarkand, the organization has become an even more important element of the emerging security and cooperation architecture in the Eurasian space. A country determines the prospects of its participation in a regional organization from the point of view of its interests and the motives that prompted its participation in this association. In this regard, Kazakhstan should determine its priorities in the SCO for 2024-2025 within the

²⁶⁶ Казахстан готовится принять председательство в ШОС в этом году // URL: <https://bizmedia.kz/2023/02/21/trashed-11/?ysclid=lj7mkn13rv486119221> (accessed: 05.03.2023)

framework of its own interests. In addition, when determining priorities, it is necessary to consider a set of problems and difficulties faced by the Organization that prevent it from moving to a qualitatively new level of development.

Over the course of its existence, the SCO has become an important factor in the regional and international security and co-operation architecture, establishing itself as an effective and open multilateral association.

On 16 September 2022, at the summit of the heads of SCO member states in Samarkand, the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan K-Zh. Tokayev noted in his speech that the ideological and institutional foundations of the SCO lack confrontational and locality, which contributes to the growth of the SCO's international authority and popularity. In general, membership in the SCO largely meets the Republic of Kazakhstan's geopolitical interests.²⁶⁷

The Republic of Kazakhstan's priorities in the SCO should be centered around the following interests in this structure:²⁶⁸

1. It is in the Republic of Kazakhstan's interests to rationally utilize the potential of economic cooperation within the SCO. First of all, this concerns such areas as investment cooperation (in non-resource and innovative industries), development of transport links and transit opportunities, modern information and communication technologies, energy cooperation, to which special attention should be paid.

The development of infrastructure and energy projects within the SCO framework will create alternative routes for energy exports and will also have a favorable impact on the development of the Republic of Kazakhstan's transport and communication system. However, trade liberalization, as well as real economic integration in general, should be carried out within the framework of the EAEU and the SCOs, since the countries that are members of these organizations are relatively equal in terms of economic development.

2. It is important to pay special attention to developing breakthrough projects in the non-resource sector and making them multilateral rather than bilateral.

For example, it is beneficial for the Republic of Kazakhstan to expand the geography of infrastructure projects in favor of the Middle East.

267 SCO can contribute to solving current problems – president. URL: <https://sputnik.kz/20220916/shyu-qazirgi-zamannyn-ozekti-maselelerin-sheshuge-ules-qosuga-tiis--prezident-27631960.html> (accessed: 05.12.2022)

268 ШОС через призму приоритетных перспектив председательства Казахстана. URL: <https://articlekz.com/article/10165?ysclid=lj7n4di7d3517534891> (accessed: 05.03.2023)

For example, in recent years the SCO has been actively discussing the use of Central Asia's transit potential, while no practical results have been achieved in Central Asian countries' access to world markets via People's Republic of China and Russian Federation.

The adoption of the Concept of SCO Cooperation on the Development of Efficient Economic and Transport Corridors was a great success for the Republic of Kazakhstan in improving logistics interconnection. At the same time, given the strengthening of the Middle East direction of the SCO, the Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran railway, which opens the shortest route from East Asia to the Persian Gulf countries, has serious potential.

In general, the Republic of Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries are in favor of creating new and upgrading existing multimodal transport corridors and logistics centers.

Table 19. Logistics Performance Index (LPI)-Global Index 2023

Country	Year	LPI Rank	Customs Rank	Infrastructure Rank	International shipments Rank	Logistics competence Rank	Tracking & tracing Rank	Timeliness Rank
China	2023	19	31	14	14	20	23	30
India	2023	38	47	47	22	38	41	35
Kazakhstan	2023	79	74	80	91	81	80	93
Russian Federation	2023	88	90	68	121	92	98	93
Uzbekistan	2023	88	74	89	91	92	105	101
Tajikistan	2023	97	110	80	102	76	134	93
Kyrgyz Republic	2023	123	110	89	111	126	117	129
Iran, Islamic Rep.	2023	123	110	89	111	133	105	109

Source: The World Bank // URL: <https://lpi.worldbank.org/international/global> (accessed: 19.10.2023)

In the World Bank's Logistics Performance Index (LPI), the Republic of Kazakhstan ranks 79th on average in 2023.²⁶⁹ Although this is a relatively high ranking compared with other Central Asian countries, there is still significant potential for improvement in terms of the availability and quality of logistics services in an international context.

In comparison, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Uzbekistan are ranked 88th, the Republic of Tajikistan 97th, and Kyrgyz Republic and the Islamic Republic of Iran 123rd. The leaders in this list remain the People's Republic of China in 19th place and the Republic of India in 38th place. The Republic of Kazakhstan has a huge transit potential, having a common border with the leader of world trade - the PRC. In fact, the country's active

²⁶⁹ The World Bank. Logistics Performance Index (LPI) // URL: <https://lpi.worldbank.org/international/global> (accessed: 19.10.2023)

development began in 1991, with the start of rail junction on the border with the People's Republic of China, and in the last ten years - just with the start of the Belt and Road project - the development has become more intensive.

The Belt and Road Initiative was announced in 2013 in the Republic of Kazakhstan, in the capital of our country, when, during his tour, Chinese President Xi Jinping first presented the Belt and Road programme, which is now known throughout the world. This was a breakthrough project for the Republic of Kazakhstan. Container transportations through the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan from the People's Republic of China to Europe have grown more than 100 times. The country has become a central link in such projects as "Chinese Yiwu - English London", "Chinese Lianyungang - German Duisburg", railways and motorways from the People's Republic of China through the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Republic of Turkmenistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran and to the entire Middle East. There are also northern routes - through the Russian Republic of and the Republic of Belarus. There are many projects within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative, the effect of which is already being felt today.

Several routes of the New Silk Road pass through the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan.²⁷⁰ In particular, these are:

1. Central Corridor of the Silk Road Economic Belt: Lianyungang - Urumqi - Dostyk/Khorgos - Astana - Aktobe - Kazan - Moscow - Minsk - Brest. At present, this overland route is the shortest motorway connecting China and Europe. The advantage of this corridor, in addition to the reduced time of trains in transit, is the passage of most of the route in one transit zone - the Eurasian Economic Union. The availability of a modern transshipment points with a large capacity at the border of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the People's Republic of China - Khorgos station - will reduce the time spent on switching wagons to another track. Further the train passes through the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus in one customs zone. The route continues to the transshipment point in Brest, on the border with Poland, where the train is rearranged on the European track and enters the European market. This route is currently considered the most optimal route in the New Silk Road project.

2. Southern Corridor of the Silk Road Economic Belt: Lianyungang - Urumqi - Khorgos - Almaty - Bishkek - Shymkent - Tashkent - Tehran - Istanbul. This route allows connecting

²⁷⁰ Belt and Road Initiative: Status and Prospects. - Almaty: Research Institute of International and Regional Cooperation at the Kazakh-German University, 2018. - C. 183-191.

the port cities of eastern China and Central Asian cities with subsequent access to the Black Sea. This route is considered faster for trains to pass through the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea, compared to the traditional route via the Indian Ocean and the Suez Canal. The route will also expand Iran-China cooperation in energy production and distribution in the region, which will provide the underdeveloped west of the People's Republic of China with the necessary raw materials from Central Asia and energy resources from the Islamic Republic of Iran.

3. The TRACECA project, which unites the countries of Central Asia, Transcaucasia and Eastern Europe is planned to be integrated into the Silk Road Economic Belt. The railway line from Western China, passing through Khorgos to the Aktau seaport is now almost operational. Then, at the port of Aktau, the trains are reloaded onto ships, from where they sail to the Azerbaijani port of Baku. From Baku the trains move to the Black Sea coast in Georgia. In the Georgian ports (Batumi, Poti), the vessels sail to Turkish ports, from where they can further go to Europe via motorways, as well as to Ukrainian ports on the Black Sea.

The TRACECA project initially met resistance from Russia, as it bypassed its territory. However, in addition to the countries of Transcaucasia and Central Asia, Moldova, Ukraine, Mongolia, Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria and Iran joined the project. This project is considered to be one of the largest intermodal transport projects. The high logistics costs of intermodal transport are planned to be eliminated by using a single document of carriage along the entire route.

4. Western Europe-Western China express motorway. This transport corridor passes through the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan, connecting St. Petersburg in the north-west and the port of Lianyungang in the east. The length of this motorway is 8,445 kilometers. The Chinese part of the road has already been built. The Kazakhstan part is ready for operation. However, the Russian Federation side is still not finished with its part of the road and this motorway is expected to be launched before 2030.

5. Also other projects and routes include the North-South project, which acts as an alternative route for the passage of goods from Northern and Western Europe to the countries of South Asia. The Russian Federation, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Turkmenistan, and the Islamic Republic of Iran take part in this project. Its essence is to organize a route from St. Petersburg to Tehran and further to Persian ports in the Indian Ocean. It is planned to actively use the Caspian ports. According to the plan, this route

will significantly reduce travelling time compared to the current route through the Suez Canal.

271

These land routes are the principal highways connecting the European Union and highly developed areas of the People's Republic of China.²⁷² This is due to the peculiarities of the geographical area of Central Asia, political and economic components of the countries of this region, as well as reducing the time of cargo transport in Eurasia in the direction of East-West and vice versa. Due to these features the Republic of Kazakhstan is the main transit area between China and Europe, also due to the stable political situation in the country and partnership relations of the Republic of Kazakhstan with both China and other neighbors (Russia, Transcaucasia, Central Asia). The possibility of economic cooperation and expansion on the territory of Kazakhstan, the existing transport base and logistics network in the country, also positively influence the development of the " Belt and Road" project in the Republic of Kazakhstan.

The "Belt and Road Initiative " is a global economic and political project. It involves more than 120 countries of the world.²⁷³ The Republic of Kazakhstan has an important role in this initiative. Playing the main role in the Silk Road Economic Belt project, the Republic of Kazakhstan clearly tracks the likely positive and negative effects of this project for the Republic of Kazakhstan.

The main positive result of the implementation of the project "Belt and Road Initiative" for the Republic of Kazakhstan is the transformation of the country into a major transport and logistics hub on the Eurasian continent.²⁷⁴ Within this framework it can be stated that all roads lead to the Republic of Kazakhstan. Three corridors of the New Silk Road, as well as the TRACECA corridor, the route of the North-South project pass through the country. The unique geographical position and reasonable policy will allow the Republic of Kazakhstan to occupy an important niche in the field of international logistics. Active development of transport infrastructure and promotion of optimization of technical support of infrastructure facilities allows the Republic of Kazakhstan to take the path of economic expansion on a global scale.

²⁷¹ Myrzakmetova A.M. Transit potential of Kazakhstan within the EAEU // *Almaty: Bulletin of KazNU*. - 2015. - No1 - P. 43-46.

²⁷² BRI: clarifying the path and expanding the belt. [Electronic resource] // URL: <https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2019/05/03/odin-poyas-odin-put-utochnenie-puti-i-rasshirenie-poyasa> (accessed: 03.05.2023)

²⁷³ Nazarbayev N.A. Programme "Strategy Kazakhstan 2050" // *Akorda*. - 2015. - 16 January. - 8 c.

²⁷⁴ Transport Corridors of the Republic of Kazakhstan. // Ministry of Transport and Communications of the Republic of Kazakhstan and Trade Representation of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the Russian Federation. - 2013.

Despite the impossibility of realizing such a project without significant risks, the Republic of Kazakhstan feels confident in this new economic reality. Our country is a key participant of this project, the positive effects significantly outweigh the negative ones, and the possibility of realizing the huge transit potential of Kazakhstan allows us to consider the "Belt and Road Initiative" project as the most important project for the modern history of the Republic of Kazakhstan.²⁷⁵

Another extension of cooperation between the Republic of Kazakhstan and People's Republic of China within the framework of the implementation of the Silk Road Economic Belt project is major water and environmental projects, the need for which is felt both in China and in the Central Asian region. In addition, it is in the field of ecology that prospects are opening for creating a mechanism of scientific and technological achievements into production. Here, as a separate direction, we can also talk about the practical implementation of the idea of creating an energy club, and in the future - the formation of a common energy space in the Asian region.²⁷⁶

In addition, there is an active work on the conjugation of the "Belt and Road Initiative" and the Eurasian Economic Union, which started after the signing of the "Joint Statement of 8 May 2015 on cooperation on the conjugation of the construction of the Eurasian Economic Union and the Economic Belt of the Silk Road Project."²⁷⁷

Sino-Kazakhstani cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been fruitful in such areas as connectivity, productive capacity, economy and trade, people-to-people, and cultural exchanges.

During Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev's visit to the People's Republic of China in 2019, the two countries decided to develop a permanent comprehensive strategic partnership. The strategic leadership of the heads of state guarantees and promotes a sustainable and high level of development of China-Kazakhstan relations.

In 2022, the volume of rail freight between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Kazakhstan was 23 million tons, up 20 per cent from the previous year. Today, China-Europe goods trains passing through the Republic of Kazakhstan are steadily increasing, making the Central Asian country an artery for transit traffic.

²⁷⁵ Shakhrat Nuryshev. Kazakhstan and China: strategic partnership and good neighbourliness // *Diplomatiya jarshysy*. - 2018. - No3. pp 107-108.

²⁷⁶ 55 Kazakh - Chinese projects worth \$27 billion will be implemented. [Electronic resource]. - URL: <https://www.zakon.kz/4969716-budut-realizovany-55-kazahstansko.html> (accessed: 14.05.2023)

²⁷⁷ The Silk Road Economic Corridor and Kazakhstan: Status and Prospects. - Almaty: Research Institute of International and Regional Cooperation at the Kazakh-German University, 2015. pp 89-92.

Under the initiative, which was proposed 10 years ago, the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Kazakhstan are actively involved in production capacity and investment cooperation, forming a list of 52 projects with a total value of more than \$21.2 billion. Such co-operation also extends to the green, digital, scientific, and technological fields.²⁷⁸

The Shymkent refinery modernization project and the launch of a petrochemical complex in the Atyrau region have helped the Republic of Kazakhstan improve its industry. Renewable energy programs, including the Zhanatas wind farm, the Turgusun hydroelectric power plant and a photovoltaic power plant in Almaty, have helped the country move towards low-carbon development.

According to official data, by the end of 2022, the total installed capacity of renewable energy projects involving Chinese enterprises in the Republic of Kazakhstan exceeded 1,000 megawatts.²⁷⁹

At the same time, People's Republic of China and the Republic of Kazakhstan have intensified cooperation in inspection and quarantine, creating a favorable environment for agricultural trade. To strengthen cooperation in the agricultural sector, the two countries have strengthened policy coordination and harmonization of standards.

Last year, agricultural trade between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Kazakhstan reached \$930 million, a year-on-year increase of 61.3 per cent.²⁸⁰ In addition to trade, cooperation in agricultural science and technology is also growing rapidly, with the two sides building joint laboratories and conducting research on new seeds and breeds.

As the two economies are highly complementary, the People's Republic of China has been the Republic of Kazakhstan's second-largest trading partner, largest export destination and second-largest source of imports for many years.

According to China's General Administration of Customs, the total trade in goods between People's Republic of China and the Republic of Kazakhstan in 2022 was 31.17 billion U.S. dollars, up 23.6 per cent from the previous year.²⁸¹

²⁷⁸ China Daily Global. Bilateral relations between China, Kazakhstan get new push // URL: <http://epaper.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202309/15/WS65039388a31020d7c67bca45.html#:~:text=In%202022%2C%20the%20volume%20of,Asian%20country%20a%20transit%20hub.> (accessed: 19.10.2023)

²⁷⁹ Urban Planning Society. Chinese companies are contributing to the energy transformation of Kazakhstan // URL: <https://en.planning.org.cn/belt/view?id=1062> (accessed: 08.09.2023)

²⁸⁰ Xinhua news: Overview: China and Kazakhstan join hands to build "Belt and Road" and bear fruit // URL: http://www.news.cn/world/2023-05/18/c_1129624141.htm (accessed: 08.06.2023)

²⁸¹ Ibid.

The Republic of Kazakhstan was the second country to open a national pavilion on Alibaba's e-commerce platform, and more than 200 Kazakh enterprises do business on the Chinese platform.

For a long time, the Republic of Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries were part of the USSR. After the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, relations with People's Republic of China deteriorated sharply, and for a long time we found ourselves in a brutal confrontation, in a state of cold war, where propaganda from both sides insinuated that we were enemies. Whole generations of people grew up who lived in confrontation. This is a historical process, which should not only be treated with understanding, but also overcome it. How to overcome it? We must realize that relations with any state – People's Republic of China, the USA, the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Saudi Arabia - are based on what our country's interests are there. Our task is for the Republic of Kazakhstan to be able to travel around the world, to be able to do business, to be able to get the most out of this co-operation. For example, People's Republic of China has opened the possibility for Kazakhstani citizens to visit the country without a visa - this has already given Kazakhstani entrepreneurs the opportunity to come and sign new contracts and deals and visit exhibitions. It is a plus that we can attract Chinese investments within the framework of the "Belt and Road Initiative".

During the official visit of the head of the Republic of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev to China, 30 commercial documents worth \$16.5 billion were signed, including investment, trade agreements, agreements on technology transfer for production, opening credit lines.

Several advantages of this strategy are highlighted for Kazakhstan, these include:²⁸²

1. Geographical advantage, as Kazakhstan itself, due to its neighborhood, needs the development of transport and logistics infrastructure.
2. The advantage of tradition, as the Silk Road is perceived favorably by the country's leadership due to historical analogies.
3. Assistance from the countries of the Caucasus region, which also hope for the implementation of the Chinese project with their participation. First, we are referring to expectations for the "sea branch" of the Silk Road Economic Belt through the port

282 Expert: "One Belt, One Road" has become a breakthrough project for Kazakhstan URL: <https://informburo.kz/stati/ekspert-odin-poyas-odin-put-stal-dlya-kazaxstana-proryvnyom-proektom?ysclid=lo941jrv4j611610384>

of Aktau, with which a high-quality land infrastructure is already connected, as well as the active construction of branches to expand opportunities.

4. Financial advantage, due to which China will be able to actively participate in transport projects, investing funds, thus securing its share of ownership. In fact, what is important here is not even the mere availability of finance, but the creation of a situation where Kazakhstan will depend on new funding streams.

7.4. THE STATE PROGRAM OF INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT “NURLY ZHOL”

Kazakhstan and China are friendly neighbors and jointly make efforts to develop relations of comprehensive strategic partnership, strengthen equal and mutually beneficial cooperation in all areas. In recent years, the scope and level of cooperation has been continuously expanding and increasing. The Kazakh side expressed interest in the initiative of joint construction of the "Economic belt of the silk road", put forward by the President of The People's Republic of China XI Jinping in September 2013 during a state visit to Kazakhstan. The Chinese side fully supports the New economic policy "Nurly Zhol"(further – the Program), put forward by the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev in November 2014.²⁸³ In December 2015, the heads of government of the two countries signed a "Joint communique between the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Government of the People's Republic of China" based on friendly negotiations and noted the need to start joint work on the joint preparation of a cooperation Plan for the pairing of the New economic policy "Nurly Zhol" and the construction of the "Silk road Economic Belt" (SRB).

The Program implemented by the Kazakh side is aimed at promoting the construction of internal infrastructure of Kazakhstan in such areas as transport, industry, energy, social sphere and institutional development to ensure sustainable economic development and social stability and is open to the participation of the international community.

The Program and the “SRB” have created significant potential for bilateral cooperation in the fields of infrastructure, investment and trade, industry, transport, cultural and humanitarian exchanges, and others. The parties note that the Program and the “SRB” are

²⁸³ План сотрудничества по сопряжению Новой экономической политики "Нурлы Жол" и строительства "Экономического пояса Шелкового пути" между Правительством Республики Казахстан и Правительством Китайской Народной Республики // URL: www.adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/P1600000518 (accessed: 05.10.2023)

mutually reinforcing and have many similar tasks, and therefore intend to strengthen cooperation on their interfacing.

Cooperation priorities:

1. The Field of transport infrastructure.

To strengthen cooperation in the field of complex interconnectedness of infrastructure, the Parties are making efforts to further promote the creation of transport corridors, improve transport infrastructure along the route from the North-Western edge to the South-Eastern coast of China, as well as increase the capacity of roads and Railways of the Countries, lay a solid Foundation for the creation of the economic corridor "new Eurasian continental bridge". The parties intend to actively encourage the participation of enterprises in the construction and development of logistics terminals, both on the territory of the two countries and in third countries, which will help to increase the export-import potential of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the People's Republic of China.

The Republic of Kazakhstan and the. People's Republic of China intend to strengthen cooperation in the field of railway transport, create an enabling environment for it, increase competitiveness by revealing potential sources of cargo, reducing logistics costs, increasing the efficiency of operations, and creating sorting centers and operating network points. The parties intend to accelerate the development of regular freight trains from China to Europe and Central Asia, including container transportation in the directions of "China - Kazakhstan - Central Asia", "China - Kazakhstan - Europe" and "China - Kazakhstan - the Gulf countries".

2. The scope of trade.

The parties intend to stimulate trade in such products as: components and electrical equipment, electronic and information products, products with a national brand, non-ferrous metals, oil, natural gas, petroleum products, petrochemical, chemical, agricultural products and others.

3. Manufacturing industry.

The parties intend to strengthen cooperation in such areas of the new industry as new-generation biotechnology, new energy sources and new materials, jointly select and develop potential joint projects in the field of production facilities, practically improve the quality and competitiveness of the relevant products. The parties intend to promote cooperation in the field of construction materials. The parties encourage Chinese companies to invest in the construction of production facilities on the territory of Kazakhstan in accordance with its infrastructure needs.

4. Other areas.

The parties intend to strengthen cooperation in the construction of infrastructure in the field of public utilities and water supply systems. The Chinese side actively supports the reconstruction and modernization of the city heating and water supply network in the Republic of Kazakhstan.

The parties are ready to intensify contacts and cooperation on monitoring in the field of securities and stimulate the healthy development of the capital market of the two countries on the basis of the Memorandum of Understanding in the field of cooperation on securities and futures markets between the National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Commission on Regulation of the Securities Market of China of May 13, 2015. The parties welcome the decision to include the Kazakh - Chinese commission for cooperation in the field of environmental protection in the Kazakh - Chinese Cooperation Committee.²⁸⁴

The parties will continue to strengthen cooperation in the sphere of rational use and protection of water resources of transboundary rivers based on existing agreements reached at the highest, high, and other various levels.

The parties intend to strengthen cooperation on the exchange of information on the epidemiological situation caused by infectious diseases, including the establishment of a cooperation mechanism for the prevention and control of infectious diseases within the framework of the Shanghai cooperation organization.

The parties intend to strengthen cooperation in the field of tourism, open cross-border tourist routes with national characteristics, study and disseminate a joint tourism product, and make more efforts to build tourism infrastructure.

7.5. WESTERN CHINA - WESTERN EUROPE

The focus for the implementation of the strategy of innovative and industrial development of the country should be directed to the strategic objects of the economy of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Among them is the construction of the international transit corridor "Western Europe Western China", which is one of the stages of implementation of the President's Address.


Reconstruction of the main road "Western Europe – Western China" began in 2009 at the initiative of the first President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev. It was he who, five centuries later, proposed to revive the idea of the "great silk road" trade highway connecting

²⁸⁴ Cheang Chris, Russo-Kazakh Relations: The China Factor- Analysis, *Eurasian Review*, Nov 20. 2019. <https://www.eurasiareview.com/20112019-russo-kazakh-relations-the-china-factor-analysis/> (accessed: 28.01.2023)

the West and the East. As a result, several memorandums were concluded with neighboring States and an agreement was reached to start the project.²⁸⁵

For Kazakhstan this project is attractive both from the point of view of realization of transit potential of the country, and creation of reliable transport communication of the southern and Western regions of the Republic. The total length of the corridor on the route St. Petersburg-Moscow-Nizhny Novgorod-Kazan-Orenburg-Aktobe-Kyzylorda-Shymkent-Taraz-Kordai-Altay-Khorgos-Urumqi-Lanzhou-Zhengzhou-Lianyungang is 8,445 kilometers. Of these, the largest part (3425 kilometers) passes through the territory of China, 2787 kilometers - on the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan and 2233 kilometers - on the territory of the Russian Federation.²⁸⁶

Map 6. New Silk Road



Source: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/a-new-silk-road/2011/04/30/AFDOQUNF_graphic.html (accessed: 19.12.2022)

Cargo trains of the China-Europe route through the China-Kazakhstan International Border Cooperation Center Khorgos and the China-Kazakhstan International Logistics Base in the port of Lianyungang, Jiangsu Province in eastern China helped Central Asian countries open doors to world markets. The expansion of connectivity has prompted many Chinese companies to actively invest in the region. In March 2023, the logistics base in Lianyungang


²⁸⁵ Madina Igbayeva. Implementing the Belt and Road Initiative in Kazakhstan. A haza szolgálatában. 2019. 291.

²⁸⁶ Ibid. p 292

recorded more than 5,000 flights of freight trains that have passed along the China- Europe route since the beginning of its operation. In total, the trains transported more than 440 thousand twenty-foot containers with goods.²⁸⁷

In the Republic of Kazakhstan, the corridor passes through the territories of five regions: Aktobe, Kyzylorda, South Kazakhstan, Zhambyl and Almaty. And if using the sea corridor, the travel time reaches up to 45 days, and along the Transib 14 days, then along the corridor “Western Europe - Western China”, from the port of Lianyungang to the borders with European states, the travel time will be about 10 days .²⁸⁸ The project will provide cargo transportation in three main directions: China - Kazakhstan, China - Central Asia, China - Kazakhstan - Russia - Western Europe.

Map 7. The map of the BRI member-countries 2023



Source: <https://www.quora.com/profile/Will-Rice-2> (accessed: 10.06.2023)

In 2013 China forwarded a world-wide society committed to augmenting of nation-by-nation 'bootstrap' recovery with, in effect, 'brain raising' — cooperation — mainly in the form of capital and expertise. The Belts & Roads Initiative was born. The decade since has seen 150

²⁸⁷ Gu Hua, Zhu Xiaoying. 中哈（连云港）物流合作基地累计到发中欧班列 5000 列. China News Network // URL: <https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/p/310902.html> (accessed:01.04.2023)

²⁸⁸ Ibid.

nations join. 77% of all the world's nations. Overlapping the BRI is its main capital reservoir — the AIIB.

The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank is a global 'credit union' 105 nations are invested — including all the 'developed' economies except outliers America and Japan. As their fortunes rise AIIB client nations become investors too. Meaning that when America smuts the BRI a “debt-trap” — America's smutting smears all its own 'allies' but one (Japan). And it smears the 'bootstrapping' nations themselves. Only 25% (and dropping) percent of America's spit lands on China.

The green region is 'China & Associates' -the BRI (Map 7). They are 'The World'. The red bits are 'America & Co.' — with the entire European region in 'flux' as disparate priorities strain the EU's basted seams. Over half the EU (the new eastern portion) is in the BRI — with (the old rich western) half deeply invested in the BRI's AIIB.

SWOT-analysis of the implementation of the Economic belt of the Silk Road in the Republic of Kazakhstan.

Strengths:

1. The favorable geographical location of the country that allows the shortest routes through the continent. Developed transport and logistics infrastructure.
2. The consonance of the state program of Nurly Zhol and the New Silk Road.
3. The stable socio-political situation within the country and on its borders.
4. Growth of production and employment of the population, due to the development of transport infrastructure.
5. High transport security of transit cargo flows. The multimodal transport system, providing a wide range of choices of routes and means of delivery.

Weaknesses:

1. The lack of a unified concept for the development of the transport and logistics system in the Republic of Kazakhstan.
2. Low level and deterioration of the technical condition of the transport infrastructure.
3. The high cost of transit of goods.
4. Presence of transport and customs barriers.
5. Lack of qualified staff and weak use of IT technologies.

Opportunities:

1. Diversification of transport links to enter international markets.
2. Development of the transport, logistics and information and financial system to the level of the international hub.

3. Improvement of the investment climate and investment attractiveness of the Republic of Kazakhstan.
4. Profitable self-sustaining logistics with a high level of reinvestment in its own development.
5. Increase in commodity turnover.
6. Research of the needs of the world market, for the production of export-oriented products.
7. The need for the development of dry ports for container transportation along intercontinental routes.

Threats:

1. Possible natural hazards and man-made disasters.
2. Preservation of the raw orientation of the national economy.
3. Strengthening China's trade, economic and migration expansion to the Kazakhstan market.
4. Increasing competition for Kazakhstani enterprises.
5. Increase the load on the ecological state of the natural environment.
6. Strengthening of Chinese priorities in the country.

BRI is a long-standing initiative that will change China's interaction with the world. It will create infrastructure in Asia, Africa, Europe and the Middle East: new markets for Chinese and foreign products. BRI is the next stage in China's efforts to reach a global level and expand its commercial and political influence. For the Chinese side, the driving force is the desire to restructure the domestic economy with an export-oriented economy based on services, domestic consumption and technology. Unloading production capacities abroad, improving the underdeveloped provinces, such as the landlocked central and western regions, internationalizing their currency, striving to reform and shape the global economic and financial architecture that will be more favorable for the interests of China.

Thus, the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Kazakhstan are ahead in the construction of "Belt and Road", such as:

Firstly, it is the deepening of political coordination and the integration of development strategies. After the signing of the "cooperation Plan for the interfacing of the construction of the silk road Economic belt" and the new economic policy "Nurly Zhol" in September 2016, the level of political coordination between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Kazakhstan has risen to a high degree of interfacing of state strategies. Pointing out the right direction of strategic cooperation, the two Heads of state deeply studied the specific issues of

mutually beneficial cooperation, ensured the constant deepening of bilateral mutual trust and continuous strengthening of cooperation.

Secondly, it is the promotion of free trade, optimization of trade and economic structure. However, under the influence of complex factors such as the international economic crisis and the decline in crude oil prices, etc., statistics at one time began to decline. Faced with difficulties, the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Kazakhstan on the East wind of the joint construction of BRI went forward, jointly overcame temporary difficulties, directed efforts to optimize the bilateral trade and economic structure, expanded cooperation in the non-resource sector, successfully carried out the growth of trade turnover after the fall.

Thirdly, it is the acceleration of the interconnections of infrastructure, the creation of a logistics network. There is direct communication between 6 cities of the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Kazakhstan, 5 permanent counter checkpoints, 5 cross-border oil and gas pipelines, 2 cross-border railway lines and 1 international center for cross-border cooperation. China and Kazakhstan have a Western Europe-Western China highway and have opened 72 international freight and passenger routes, including many Sino-European flights, such as Chang'an, Chongqing-Xinjiang-Europe, Zhengzhou-Xinjiang-Europe, Wuhan - Xinjiang-Europe, Lianyungang-Xinjiang-Europe, Yiwu-Xinjiang-Europe, and others. In addition, relying on the Chinese-Kazakh transit logistics base in Lianyungang, the Kazakh side for the first time in history received access to the Pacific Ocean. Indeed, thanks to the construction of the "Belt and Road", the Republic of Kazakhstan has transformed from an inland land into an important transport hub connecting the Eurasian continent with the Asia-Pacific region.

Fourthly, the promotion of monetary circulation, joint opposition to financial risks. Through financial platforms such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, China-Eurasia Economic Cooperation Fund and targeted loans to promote cooperation on production capacities, the two states provide protection for the joint construction of BRI.

Fifth, the promotion of the mutual rapprochement between the aspirations of the peoples, ensuring the transfer friendship from generation to generation. In recent years, the boom in Chinese language learning has been rising in the Republic of Kazakhstan. And the Republic of Kazakhstan's boom has firmly entered the life of the People's Republic of China. Currently, 5 Confucius institutes are working on Chinese language pedagogy in the Republic of Kazakhstan. At the same time, 5 cultural and linguistic centers of the Republic of Kazakhstan settled in the People's Republic of China. This is the largest number among Central Asian countries. Today,

about 14,000 students' study in China, and about 1,400 Chinese students have come to study in the Republic of Kazakhstan.

The Republic of Kazakhstan was chosen for the purpose of promulgating the concept of the "Belt and Road". The leadership of the People's Republic of China regards the Republic of Kazakhstan as the main and prospective trade and economic partner in Central Asia. Moreover, the Republic of Kazakhstan accounts for more than 70% of the People's Republic of China's trade turnover with Central Asian countries. For the Republic of Kazakhstan, as well as for other countries of Central Asia, it is important to participate in the implementation of the Chinese initiative "Belt and Road", effective use of new opportunities and advantages of regional cooperation, at the same time, minimizing risks and threats. It is important to ensure, within the framework of the Chinese concept of the revitalization of the Silk Road, the possibility of expanding trade, economic and investment cooperation between the states along the Silk Road, which are also participants in various regional integration associations.

7.5. CONCLUSION

Contributing to the development of the SCO, as well as proceeding from its own interests, the Republic of Kazakhstan will actively support the idea of a multipolar world. It is obvious that attempts to create any other alternatives to the geopolitical structure in the current realities may lead to inherently catastrophic conflicts. The consequences, which in this case are very likely to unfold on the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Therefore, the Republic of Kazakhstan will defend the position that the SCO should not only deal with purely regional problems, but also become a powerful and responsible global player and thus transform its potential into a real influence on world processes. At the same time, the SCO's activities will contribute to strict compliance with international law, lay a solid foundation for peaceful coexistence and mutually beneficial cooperation between different countries and civilizations, and provide alternative solutions for overcoming large-scale crises. In addition, the Republic of Kazakhstan associates with the SCO its hopes for the transformation of the world financial architecture, global regulation of markets and the reformatting of the world economy on a more equitable basis.

It should also be emphasized that Kazakhstan's vision of "constructive multipolarity" presupposes peaceful coexistence and close interaction of powerful integration associations, one of which soon should be the Eurasian Economic Union. Thus, it can be argued that the Republic of Kazakhstan views the SCO not as a single geopolitical bloc, but as a successful

model of peaceful and economically mutually beneficial interaction between two different poles of world politics: the emerging united Eurasia and China. By advocating stronger cooperation with the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Kazakhstan expects to achieve even greater mutual cohesion among Eurasian countries (indeed, one cannot help but notice that the consolidation of the Shanghai Alliance in recent years has coincided with the intensification of integration processes in the Eurasian space) and turn the SCO into an equal organization. The Eurasian-Chinese alliance as one of the main factors in ensuring international security and developing economic, social, and cultural co-operation at both global and regional levels.

8. FINAL CONCLUSIONS

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is a regional Eurasian organization, involving countries that were initially grouped around Central Asia, and now with a possible gradual expansion to the south and west. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, founded in 2001, includes the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of India, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Republic of Uzbekistan. The observer States are the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the Republic of Belarus and Mongolia. The dialogue partners are the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Kingdom of Bahrain, the Kingdom of Cambodia, the Arab Republic of Egypt, the State of Kuwait, the Republic of Maldives, the Republic of the Union Myanmar, the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal, the State of Qatar, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, the Republic of Turkey and the United Arab Emirates. Last year, the Republic of Belarus officially applied to join the SCO as a full member.

The total territory of the SCO member states (without observers and dialogue partners) is more than 34.3 million km² (60% of the territory of Eurasia). The total population of the SCO countries (without observers and dialogue partners) is more than 3.275 billion people (2022), or 42.5% of the world's population. The Organization is a key Eurasian platform for international cooperation. The dominant position in the SCO is occupied by China (the emergence and development of the organization, which is the strategic pillar of the PRC on the world stage, serves the national interests of the state, contributes to stability and security in the north and west of the country) and Russian Federation (the organization is an instrument for the realization of Russian strategic interests in the Central Asia region and on the eastern borders of the state).

It is important to note that the SCO is not a "Club of Interests" like for instance the BRICS (we gathered, talked, and dispersed), it is a solid organization with rules and obligations to each other. Military maneuvers were also held within the framework of the SCO, and there is a more enhanced economic development program. This is a regional interstate union, a very serious association, although less regulated than the EU or even the CIS. In the future, it can continue to develop in this direction.

It is important to underline that there are countries in the SCO that are completely different from the point of view of foreign policy, but there is the possibility for them to

establish an additional platform for negotiations. The Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the Republic of India, the People's Republic of China are a rather complicated triangle, and now Iran. Therefore, access to the Persian Gulf zone and access to the territory of the Near East are great promising areas. Again, the Islamic Republic of Iran possesses hypersonic missiles and conducts constant military maneuvers with the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China. In this case, we are talking about additional strengthening of the security system to the SCO.

If we talk about further development, then the obvious direction is the Republic of Belarus, which speaks about itself, and the possible one is access to the South Caucasus. It is unclear, however, how things will be developing with the Republic of Armenia in terms of integration development — after the inclusion of the Republic of Belarus, it will be the only EEU country that is not part of the SCO. But in the current political situation, the Armenian leadership, on the contrary, is playing on integration with the EU and NATO. This is a Western Euro-Atlantic project, not a Eurasian one. Therefore, the situation in the South Caucasus may develop according to an alternative scenario. The Republic of Azerbaijan's entry into the organization is also quite probable, and even more promising than Armenia. This can be discussed, among other things, from the point of view of transportation and logistics. We are talking about the North-South corridor, which already includes both Russia and Iran. It is logical that Azerbaijan will be here, and the corridor will be closed. There is a question of the Caspian Sea. That is, there are clear and extremely important development trajectories.

In the longer term, Syria could also join the SCO, after the end of hostilities, and other countries of the Arab world. That is, development on the Eurasian continent is quite likely. In terms of potential participants, the SCO may be similar to the BRICS in many ways. But if the BRICS is a structure that is located on all continents, then the SCO will remain in Eurasia. Therefore, the inclusion of Latin American and African countries in the SCO is unlikely, and it is not a goal. *Most likely, the SCO will remain a regional bloc with its own geographical limitations.* In general, almost half of humanity already belongs to the SCO, considering the Republic of India and the People's Republic of China, and the prospects for development are serious.

It is very often observed by experts about the allegedly insufficient attention of the SCO leadership to the Ukrainian conflict. In particular, the head of India did not touch on this topic at all in his speech. The topic of Ukraine is not the most important for most SCO countries. This is due to the geographical location of India and Ukraine, as well as the location on the map of Pakistan and Ukraine. Most countries are in favor of ending the conflict: it is

disadvantageous for them in terms of trade restrictions, sanctions pressure, and restrictions on banking activities. In their understanding, this is a local conflict somewhere on the borders of the association. The war in Ukraine cannot be resolved through the "freezing" of the line of contact — the solution lies in the geopolitical plane.²⁸⁹

Everyone understands the geopolitical nature of what is happening, they understand that without solving the main geopolitical problem, it is impossible to resolve any crises either in Ukraine or in other parts of the world. At the same time, Sergey Lavrov stated in his speech at international forums about Moscow's readiness to engage in dialogue with the West.²⁹⁰

For the SCO, the issue of relations between India and China, the Indo-Pakistani conflict, the situation with the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is more significant — these problems effect on a much larger number of participants.

The breakthrough issue for the last summit was Iran's accession to the SCO. Iran is especially important for the SCO, to take a deeper look at logistics, to work out the entire military infrastructure, which is being promoted jointly. Conditions are being created for this now.

In general, the topic of Iran's accession to the SCO is actively discussed in the media. The consequences of this step are important both for this State itself and for others. Iran's accession to the SCO will allow us to get out of the international isolation created by Washington and will enable the organization to gain access to the Middle East. Also, after the end of the special military operation, Iran's presence in the organization "will contribute to strengthening military cooperation."

Belarus' accession to the organization will be important for Russia in terms of strengthening security. In turn, Belarus will strengthen its weight in the international arena as a fully European country within an organization consisting almost entirely of Asian states. It is also a step towards overcoming Western isolation and pressure for Belarus.

Previously, the SCO was perceived solely as a simple regional organization that did not really have the capacity to solve global security problems. Now it is recognized as a structure that can influence solving the security issues because it connects several important regions, on which security issues depend on a broad regional or global scale. These are issues related to

²⁸⁹ Лавров назвал условие разрешения конфликта на Украине. URL: <https://www.rbc.ru/politics/05/05/2023/6454b7ff9a79473f224af4a7?ysclid=lta1665m9z101262369&from=copy> (accessed: 23.01.2024)

²⁹⁰ McIntosh N. Lavrov: Moscow is Open to Dialogue with the West, Not a Threat // URL: https://www.newsdelivers.com/2023/08/25/lavrov-moscow-is-open-to-dialogue-with-the-west-not-a-threat/#google_vignette (accessed: 23.01.2024)

the Middle East or Indo-Pakistani issues, where the People's Republic of China or the Russian Federation in the position to solve or help solving the security problems in the region. We can see that the expansion of the Eurasian members in the SCO allows to agree on common approaches in this platform.

The main feature of permanent neutrality is that a state with this status is obliged to adhere to it not only during war, but also in peacetime, including without joining military alliances. Thus, this institution is of paramount importance for maintaining peace and preventing military conflicts.

Currently, the following States have the status of permanent neutrality: the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of Cambodia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Turkmenistan, and the Swiss Confederation.²⁹¹

The Republic of Turkmenistan is a young and permanently neutral state recognized by 185 UN member states. Not only does the new way of establishing its status distinguish Turkmenistan from other holders of the same status, but also its active participation in conflict resolution in Central Asia. The Republic of Turkmenistan can be considered as one of the successful examples of a permanently neutral State that faithfully fulfills all the rights and obligations arising from its status, while successfully maintaining cooperation with other States in the field of collective security.

The Republic of Turkmenistan's neutrality serves as a favorable platform for the development of friendly and mutually beneficial relations between the two states during a period of global instability, especially given its favorable geographical location. The country actively promotes international partnership in the formation of modern transport and transit infrastructure in combination with land, water, and air transport capabilities. Combined transit and transport corridors in the North-South and West–East directions, uniting the countries of the Middle East, South–East and Central Asia, the Caucasus with access to Europe and Central Asian states, as well as those with access to the Persian Gulf, are called upon to play an important role here. A positive example of international partnership in the formation of modern transport and transit infrastructure is the commissioning of the transnational railway "Kazakhstan - Turkmenistan – Iran".

Today, neutral the Republic of Turkmenistan is one of the recognized peacekeeping centers not only in Central Asia, but in the world. On a global scale, the Republic of

²⁹¹ Neutral Countries. 2024. URL: <https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/neutral-countries> (accessed: 23.01.2024)

Turkmenistan has managed to build partnerships with the main world centers – the Russian Federation, the People’s Republic of China, the European Union, and the United States. At the regional level, the Republic of Turkmenistan has established good-neighborly and equal relations with neighboring countries and major regional powers – the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Republic of Turkey, the Republic of Pakistan, and India. The interests of these states have never been in conflict on Turkmen soil. Thus, the essence of the philosophy of neutrality can be defined as follows: to be friends and maintain good relations with everyone equally, but not to be friends with anyone against someone.

The neutral status allows Turkmenistan to carry out bilateral and multilateral military-technical cooperation, to have armed forces at its disposal to cooperate in the fight against threats common to the region - terrorism, drug trafficking, transnational organized crime. The country's military doctrine is exclusively defensive in nature, which stipulates a ban on the use of the Turkmen Armed Forces outside its borders. Next year, the Republic of Turkmenistan celebrates the 30th anniversary of the international recognition of its neutral status.²⁹² A significant date, the most important event in the independent history of the Turkmen state, a milestone in its foreign policy. Based on the results of more than a quarter of a century, we can talk about the obvious positive results of Turkmenistan's neutral status.

Now the main vector of the SCO's development is the expansion of the Organization, which contributes to the growth of its importance in international affairs, as well as increases the interest of participants in mutually beneficial cooperation. The first important point for the SCO member states is the search for new directions of development in difficult external conditions, when it is necessary to respect the interests of all parties. After the expansion of the membership, the overall power and influence of the Organization increases significantly, which, on the one hand, complicates the process of developing and making unanimous decisions, but, on the other hand, allows it to set more ambitious goals and objectives.

The second important point is that the SCO representatives really agree that security cannot be individual for any country or individual groups, and security can only be collective. This means that they are ready to negotiate, and there will be no more difficult moments that are thrown under the carpet. That is, in this case, we receive guarantees of security in our immediate environment, which is extremely important given that everything is not easy for the Organization on the western borders. Iran's participation is significant from the point of view

²⁹² Iran and Saudi Arabia agree to restore ties after China-brokered talks. URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/10/iran-saudi-arabia-agree-restore-ties-china-talks> (accessed: 31.01.2024)

of strengthening security. In fact, all the countries that are members of the SCO are those countries that guarantee security.

The SCO has always been committed to playing a constructive role in responding to common threats and challenges to the human community. The SCO is not a military alliance, and there are no confrontational components in its genotype. The Organization adheres to the principles of non-alignment and non-orientation towards other countries and regions, opposes the solution of major international and regional problems through bloc politics, ideologization and confrontational thinking. The SCO member States are committed to strengthening mutual trust, good-neighborliness, and friendship, maintaining, and strengthening regional peace, security, and stability, as well as promoting the economic, social, and cultural development of the member States through cooperation. These concepts are concentrated in the "Shanghai spirit" and are a unique "generic feature" of the SCO spirituality. I believe that it contains the "source code" for solving the current unresolved problems of the international community.

Also, in accordance with the "Shanghai spirit", the SCO conducts a broad dialogue and cooperates with various international organizations. The SCO received observer status in the UN General Assembly back in 2004, in the early days of its existence. She also established official contacts with the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Tourism Organization (WTO) and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOHA) and implemented joint action plans in many areas. In early March 2022, the SCO took part in a high-level meeting on *"Regional cooperation between Central Asian countries within the framework of the implementation of the United Nations Joint Global Action Plan on Combating Terrorism"*, which was held in Tashkent. On March 15 of the same year, a high-level meeting between the SCO and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime was held within the framework of the 65th session of the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs. In addition, the SCO has established cooperation relations with the CIS, ASEAN, and the Eurasian Economic Union. Currently, the above-mentioned contacts and cooperation are continuing to expand and deepen.²⁹³

²⁹³ Генсек ШОС: цели и принципы нашей организации получили широкое признание // URL: <https://tass.ru/interviews/14158013?ysclid=lta2f4hvru48749436> (accessed: 23.04.2023)

Currently, grandiose projects are unfolding on the largest continent of the Earth for the development of states and peoples, the creation of a global transport infrastructure and the development of new sources of energy and raw materials, natural resources of the Arctic space. The implementation of these projects can only be achieved through peaceful, creative collaboration. On XXth Petersburg International Economic Forum in June 2016, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced a large-scale geopolitical and geo-economic project "Greater Eurasia", the essence of which is to achieve a technological breakthrough through expanded forms of cooperation between states and integration associations. Greater Eurasia is not an abstract geopolitical scheme, but, without any exaggeration, a truly civilizational project aimed at the future.²⁹⁴

Thus, Eurasianism, developed by scientists and thinkers, turns from a speculative idea into a geostrategy of partnership between civilizations and associations of Greater Eurasia. Today, Greater Eurasia appears as a launching pad for the formation of a stable polycentric world.

The BRICS, EAEU and SCO organizations have great market, resource, and technological opportunities to expand trade and investment ties, create joint projects and enterprises, and develop transport and energy infrastructure.

In addition, countries can actively use national currencies in settlements, which will reduce dependence on the dollar and the euro, strengthen financial stability and sovereignty.

The SCO and the CSTO are objectively natural partners in the process of ensuring security in the Eurasian region. The development of cooperation between these two organizations seems to be a very promising matter, contributing to strengthening both the regional security of Eurasia and the national security of Russia and the countries of Central Asia.

The existence of expanded cooperation between the SCO and the CSTO is a rational necessity in terms of the goals and objectives set for them. Since strengthening ties and close cooperation between the two organizations will give great advantages in the fight against three threats (armed conflicts, drugs, terrorism), improve the exchange of intelligence and information in the field of combating terrorism, transnational experience, will contribute to the development of joint anti-terrorist struggle, the organization of military exercises. Considering the possibilities of organizing collective security and joint command of armies, the SCO's

²⁹⁴ Институты и механизмы партнерства цивилизаций и объединений на всем Евразийском пространстве // URL: https://eurasianeconomic.org/news_ecco/2017/12/22/document3184.phtml?ysclid=ltaed2dxih290052252 (accessed: 23.04.2023)

participation in countering terrorism and other security threats in the region is also expanding. If both organizations can combine existing resources and avoid overspending them while maintaining their own goals and objectives, this will allow us to formulate additional advantages for the better functioning of the Central Asian rapid reaction forces. Emergency response capabilities and the fight against international terrorism will be significantly improved, and the situation in the region will become more favorable, safe, and stable.

Terrorism in Central Asian countries poses a serious threat to the stability of State power. Therefore, the SCO and the CSTO can unite troops to quickly respond and protect the population of the region. Close cooperation in developing ties and deepening cooperation between the two organizations remains only a matter of time. The positive effect of this kind of cooperation far outweighs the negative consequences and will be another breakthrough of the SCO in strengthening international cooperation in the field of security. During serious social unrest in Central Asian countries, these organizations can create joint peacekeeping forces to stop the development of the humanitarian crisis in time and reduce casualties among people.

The SCO and the CSTO can play a constructive role in the issue of UN reform from the point of view of establishing a fair and rational new international political and economic order, promoting the strengthening of a multipolar world, and democratizing international relations. These organizations contribute to strengthening the nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia by creating a system of nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament, and arms control in the region. The SCO and the CSTO are UN observers, so they can play a positive role in the international political arena and in regional affairs.

From the very first days of its existence, RATS began to perform its direct duties, to perform its direct duties systematically and effectively. In a short time, organizational activities have been transformed for the successful implementation of their activities, this is a good system for combating terrorism. Undoubtedly, the threat of terrorism will persist in Central Asia, but it must also be recognized that the RATS has not become a formal model of the CIS system but performs the functions that were reflected when it was created. In situations where modern terrorism takes all sorts of measures that can lead to numerous victims, the protection and experience of protecting probably unsafe radioactive, chemical and biological objects are becoming more important than ever. Thus, the SCO anti-terrorist organization forces in the future will have to carry out similar exercises on rapid response and protection of similar facilities.

Even though the SCO was originally created with the aim of collective protection of the borders of neighboring countries, almost immediately its activities *acquired an economic focus*. A few months after the start of the SCO's activities, at their first meeting in Almaty, the prime Ministers of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization member countries considered issues of regional trade and economic partnership, SCO development and other issues, signed a Memorandum between the governments of the SCO member states on the key goals and directions of regional economic partnership, as well as the launch of the process of creating favorable conditions in the field of trade and investment.

The long-term prospects for trade and economic cooperation within the SCO are linked to the need for a gradual transition to the free movement of goods, capital, services, and technologies. Currently, the work of various specialized cooperation mechanisms is, in fact, aimed at creating the necessary conditions for this. An important factor in this context is the consistent expansion by Member States of the practice of using national currencies in mutual settlements.

During the meeting of the Council of Heads of SCO Member States in Samarkand in September 2022, a Roadmap was adopted to gradually increase the share of national currencies in mutual settlements of the SCO member states.

The practical implementation of this document is on the agenda today. The relevant work is carried out within the framework of a specially created and regularly meeting expert group represented by representatives of the central banks of the member states. Issues of expanding the use of national currencies are also being promoted on the site of the SCO Interbank Association, a public structure created to organize a mechanism for financing and banking services for investment projects supported by the governments of the SCO member states.

The expansion of the use of national currencies in trade finance operations, the intensification of work on the formation of a system of cross-border payments in national currencies and the exchange of relevant financial information are considered relevant today. Obviously, the development of mechanisms for financing investment projects acceptable to all parties, the creation of a Development Bank and a Special SCO Account will help to fill practical cooperation with new content.

The development of healthy economic relations in the modern world is also impossible without deepening interconnectedness within the organization. The most convenient and shortest transportation routes, simplification and digitalization of documentation and procedures for improving transport infrastructure play an important role in creating favorable conditions for trade development.

In this regard, in September 2022, the Samarkand Summit adopted the Concept of Cooperation on the Development of Interconnectedness and the creation of Efficient Transport Corridors, the Program of Infrastructure Development in the SCO space, as well as a Statement on ensuring reliable, Sustainable and Diversified Supply Chains. The implementation of these documents will contribute to building up more effective trade and economic cooperation between the SCO member states.

The COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic has come as an unexpected and serious shock to most of the world's countries. Even though initially this crisis was provoked by medical epidemiological problems, its development has an important economic aspect, since the measures introduced to combat the virus carry extremely high economic costs. Business, supply chain, manufacturing, and trade are affected all over the world. During this period, special attention should be paid to the state of the labor market.

As a result of the lockdown due to the COVID-19 pandemic, in 2020, the global unemployment rate increased by 33 million people to 220 million, while the unemployment rate increased by 1.1 percentage points to 6.5%. This growth is much higher than recorded during the global economic crisis of 2009 (0.6 percentage points). Unlike the global economic crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic crisis has affected labor markets around the world, leading to increased job losses and widespread unemployment — including in low- and middle-income countries that were not so badly affected during the global economic crisis. In countries with high income growth in unemployment in the period from 2019 to 2020 (2.0 percentage points) is very close to that observed in the period from 2008 to 2009 (2.1 percentage points).²⁹⁵

This is since due to the introduction of lockdown, employees of various enterprises and shops began to quit en masse, because of which there was a decrease in the efficiency of using labor potential. As a result, it can be said that the state was not ready for such a long period of the COVID-19 pandemic, it was not possible to function as before and stop the spread of infection, all this turned into a threat to political and economic security.

Thus, to eliminate all the consequences of the coronavirus pandemic, the following measures had to be taken:

1. The population of the country under quarantine has become heavily dependent on the media. The State needed to exercise control over the published information, as it had a strong

²⁹⁵ Вестник МОТ: COVID-19 и сфера труда. Седьмой выпуск. Обновленные оценки и анализ. 25 January, 2021 // URL: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---europe/---ro-geneva/---sro-moscow/documents/briefingnote/wcms_767671.pdf (accessed: 25.05.2022)

influence on the public. With the help of television and the Internet, it was possible to refute all people's fears about vaccination, thereby increasing the percentage of the vaccinated population.

2. It was necessary to develop a distance education and work format. This measure was necessary for the development of the country because it was an integral part of modern life. The development of this area allowed to receive education in a new format, and also led to the emergence of new professions.

3. Creation of a new structure, the main task of which would be to control the legality of the procedure for the introduction of vaccination against COVID-19. This measure made it possible to prevent the development of corruption in the health sector, thereby improving the level of economic security of the country.

4. Improving the economic security strategy. This was necessary to effectively respond to new threats.

The SCO's agenda now includes the issue of arranging Eurasia in such a way that international organizations and countries are more connected — transport corridors and economic chains are being built. All this makes the organization itself more relevant, increasing the interest of new players in it.

The SCO has a common vision of the problems that currently persist on the world stage. And there is a common desire to coordinate actions both at the UN and on the Eurasian continent with such structures as the Eurasian Economic Union, ASEAN, and the BRICS countries. As for the creation of a common currency of the SCO countries, the participating countries have made it clear that such an initiative is being discussed, but so far there is a prevailing mood among the participating countries in favor of wider use of national currencies. In addition, the ministers reached an agreement on the activation of the SCO–Afghanistan contact group. The situation in this country, according to the Minister, requires rather urgent measures. Moreover, the United States is once again trying to interfere in its affairs and does not give up trying to reintroduce its military infrastructure in the region around Afghanistan, in Central Asia.

In 2023, the summit of the leaders of the member countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was held, which was chaired by India for the first time. The meeting, which took place in the format of a videoconference, was attended by all SCO member states, as well as Iran, which joined the organization as a full member. Belarus and Mongolia were present as observers, as well as heads of international and regional structures, including the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and the

Eurasian Economic Union. Following the summit, the New Delhi Declaration was adopted, which sets out the main approaches of the parties to key issues of the SCO's activities and global problems. The baton of the chairmanship of the organization for 2023-2024 has passed to Kazakhstan.

In the new geopolitical conditions, *the SCO is becoming the most priority and viable international organization for Kazakhstan in the entire Eurasian space*. The key factor here is the simultaneous membership of two leading world powers - China and Russia. This creates the necessary balance within this multilateral format. However, the most important thing is that the SCO should not turn into a military bloc and become a link in the confrontation with the West.

Kazakhstan's participation in the SCO is fully consistent with the national concept of a multi-vector policy and is purely pragmatic in nature, related to strengthening security and developing economic cooperation.

The SCO's activities have convincingly demonstrated the relevance of the fundamental principles formulated in its charter documents: the fight against the "three evils" - extremism, terrorism, separatism, as well as the protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states and non-interference in internal affairs.

Strengthening regional security remains the SCO's top priority. According to the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, K.J. Tokayev, strengthening cooperation between the SCO and the Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Center could play an important role here. Of relevance are the issues of combating cybercrime to create an infrastructure to protect the information space of the Organization.

Kazakhstan is one of the founding members of the SCO. It is important for Kazakhstan to develop an organization and multilateral cooperation covering almost all spheres of life in the region. For Kazakhstan, cooperation within the SCO is of practical interest in terms of stimulating regional integration processes, countering traditional and new threats, and challenges, implementing economic policy, ensuring energy security, and resolving the situation around Afghanistan. Further intensification of activities within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization will contribute to the implementation of the foreign policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan. The SCO Summit in New Delhi in June 2023 marked the transfer of the SCO presidency to the Republic of Kazakhstan, which will last until July 2024 and will end with the summit in Astana. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, the heads of the SCO member states will adopt a package of documents that will be developed during expert and ministerial meetings in the country during the year.

Kazakhstan's chairmanship will cover issues of security, economy and trade, energy and health, ecology, and education. A step-by-step process of improving the organization itself will begin. Almaty will become the tourism and cultural capital of the SCO, where a lot of public events are planned.

Finally, I would like to note that to achieve the goals and implement the main tasks of the SCO aimed at the development at the present stage, it is necessary:

- Further consolidation of the member states on the principles enshrined in the Charter and other fundamental documents of the SCO,
- Giving a qualitatively new dynamic to joint efforts to maintain peace, security, and sustainable development in the SCO space,
- Combating terrorism, smuggling, drug trafficking and other types of cross-border crime,
- Promoting the socio-economic development of the SCO member states and promoting humanitarian cooperation between them,
- Strengthening the SCO's international authority and influence as an innovative interstate structure, an important element of the emerging multipolar world order.

Analyzing the cooperation of the SCO member states as an effective tool for regional economic integration and the basis for ensuring the collective security of its member states allows us to determine the further directions of the SCO development and these include:

- Development as a regional security organization dealing with issues of maintaining peace and confidence-building in the region, as well as combating smuggling, drug trafficking, cross-border organized crime, threats to information security,
- Development as an economic cooperation organization that promotes the creation of favorable conditions for mutual trade and investment,
- Development as a regional arbitrator or forum for discussing emerging multilateral problems (integration, economic, financial, military, environmental, information, etc.),
- Development as a universal organization that would not focus its activities on solving only one task, but would solve a wide range of problems,
- Updating information technologies considering cyber threats.

Summing up, it should be noted that, undoubtedly, much remains to be done to ensure border security, combat terrorism in the region, strengthen economic cooperation and stability, as well as to develop the energy sector not only between the countries of Central Asia, but also in the format of Greater Eurasia. It is also worth emphasizing the peaceful nature of the organization,

which seeks to ensure the security regime by non-military means, through diplomatic negotiations, and is achieving certain successes.

8.1. FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION OF THE SCO MEMBER STATES

Thus, the action plan provides for co-ordination of steps to further deepen co-operation in the fields of politics and security, trade and economy, culture, and humanitarian ties. In addition, the leaders adopted a declaration and about 20 other statements and decisions. They relate to climate issues, ensuring global food security and sustainable supply chains, as well as ensuring international energy security.

The SCO is neither a pure security nor a military regional organization. Throughout its 20 years of existence, the organization has been guided by the "Shanghai spirit". What is the "Shanghai spirit"? I want to refer to Xi Jinping's words as he understands the "Shanghai spirit". *It is mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, mutual consultation.* It is respecting the diversity of cultures and striving for common development, making unremitting efforts for world peace and development and human progress. The SCO has established a new model of partnership and dialogue development without block thinking and confrontation. Therefore, the acceptance of Iran indicates that the SCO will give it full support. Importance is attached to the fight against drug trafficking, against cross-border organized crime. And I would like to stress that the SCO is an organization that unites such, one could say, different states as the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Republic of India, and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, which are in a complex border confrontation. The Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan are fighting over water sources, over glaciers that are in the region of the states of Jammu and Kashmir. Whoever controls these glaciers will ensure the flow of water. And that is why the next phase of aggravation of relations is now precisely because of water.

And if we look from the other side at Iran's acceptance means that the SCO will provide it with full support. Great importance is attached to the fight against drug trafficking and cross-border organized crime. Iran's admission to the SCO has allowed the organization to pursue a more consistent policy towards the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

In a short historical period, the SCO has taken its rightful place among authoritative and influential international and regional organizations and has become an effective factor in ensuring security, stability, and sustainable development.

After the collapse of the USSR, the Republic of Kazakhstan, like all the independent states of the former Soviet Union, found itself alone with the People's Republic of China. The issue of borders became acute. During the Soviet period, relations with China were not the best,

as evidenced by the conflicts on Damansky Island and on the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan in Lake Jalanashkol, after which large military units appeared here. Therefore, the issue of settling the state border of the Republic of Kazakhstan with the People's Republic of China was of paramount importance. And the second issue was the withdrawal of military units. And these two tasks were successfully resolved within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

Now the situation in the world has changed, and for China the vector of military tension has shifted to the Asia-Pacific region. Therefore, the People's Republic of China needs a reliable rear guard in the Central Asian region. That is why such a mutually beneficial process took place here. The SCO is an example of resolving border disputes. It is not by chance that the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Republic of India, and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, which have problems on the border, have joined it.

The experience of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in resolving complex border issues is now recognized worldwide, and the accession of these states is another indisputable proof of the success of the Shanghai Organization. The question now is whether the SCO should evolve from a security organization into another dimension - that of international economic cooperation.

The Republic of Kazakhstan is one of the founders of the SCO. It is important for the Republic of Kazakhstan to develop the organization and multilateral cooperation covering virtually all spheres of life in the region. For the Republic of Kazakhstan, cooperation within the SCO is of practical interest - from the point of view of stimulating regional integration processes, countering traditional and new threats, risks, and challenges, implementing economic policy, ensuring energy security, and resolving the situation around the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Further intensification of activities within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization will contribute to the implementation of the foreign policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

The SCO's activities have convincingly demonstrated the relevance of the fundamental principles formulated in its charter documents: combating the "three forces of evil" - extremism, terrorism, separatism, as well as protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states and non-interference in internal affairs.

Strengthening regional security remains the SCO's top priority. In the opinion of the Kazakh President, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, strengthening SCO cooperation with the Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre could play an important role here. The

issues of combating cybercrime are of relevance in creating an infrastructure to protect the information space of the Organization.

Under the new geopolitical conditions, *the SCO is becoming for the Republic of Kazakhstan the most priority and viable international organization in the entire Eurasian space*. The key factor here is the simultaneous membership of the two leading world powers – the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation. This creates the necessary balance within this multilateral format. However, the most important thing is that the SCO should not turn into a military bloc and become a link in the confrontation with the West.

At the same time, despite the dynamism of its development and the scale of its activities, the SCO remains a young organization with great potential. In this regard, several internal contradictions and external challenges in the Organization will have to be overcome. The most common challenges are:

- The problem of the organization’s international status and its future role in resolving key contradictions in the SCO space.
- The large scope of the SCO's areas of activity and the duplication of many areas by other international organizations (The wide range of problems the SCO seeks to cover leads to the fact that its area of responsibility largely overlaps functionally and geographically with other structures in the region. Duplication of functions leads to negative results in the form of inefficiency and creation of conflict potential in relations between organizations).
- The problem of SCO expansion. Asymmetry of the SCO member states in terms of their political and economic potential. It can be stated that the existence of some disadvantage of the Central Asian states has not yet entered an active phase. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the SCO has been formed mainly at the highest level of cooperation, at which it is customary to skillfully conceal or circumvent existing differences, but in case of further expansion and deepening of cooperation, the sectoral levels will be activated, at which the difference in the potential of the states will become problematic.
- Divergence in the prioritization of SCO activities.

The main external challenge at present and soon is the American factor against the backdrop of growing global imbalance and sanctions actions against individual full members of the organization.

The SCO Secretary-General drew attention to the fact that the socio-economic crisis caused by the Pandemic is a major external challenge at present and in the near future.

To sum up, it should be noted that there is certainly still much to be done to ensure border security, in the field of combating terrorism in the region, to strengthen economic co-operation and stability, and to develop the energy sector not only among the Central Asian countries but also worldwide. The peace-loving nature of the organization, which seeks to ensure the security regime by non-military means, through diplomatic negotiations, should also be stressed and is achieving some success.

8.2. SCIENTIFIC RESULTS

On the basis of this thesis four main results are identified as the scientific ones which are consistent with the hypothesis given at the beginning of the thesis.

1. I have proved that the organization today consistently implements the principle of openness enshrined in the Charter. The admission of new powerful and internationally respected states – India, Pakistan and Iran - has significantly strengthened the SCO and expanded its potential and capabilities. The SCO has become one of the most powerful trans-regional organization, which need a further major reconfiguration and adaptation of internal operations.
2. The experience of developing the Belt and Road Initiative programs in the region, and fighting the Coronavirus pandemic has helped strengthen economic security cooperation between the countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Examining the economic indicators of various SCO member countries, the SCO has proved to be a powerful economic organization in terms of adapting a number of economic measures and incentives in support their economics.
3. I have found that the SCO has created a strong policy and effective system to countering of terrorism, separatism and extremism in all manifestations, and fighting uncompromisingly against illegal drug and arms trafficking, other types of transnational criminal activity and illegal migration. It is justified that this is a key area of the SCO's work, co-operation among its member States in ensuring regional security and stability providing a stable environment for further development of the Organization.
4. I found that Kazakhstan has established a strong SCO policy and contributing system to counter terrorism, separatism and extremism in all its manifestations, as well as uncompromisingly combats drug and arms trafficking, other types of transnational criminal activity and illegal migration. It is proved that Kazakhstan has played an important role in the

key areas of the SCO's work, cooperation between its member states in ensuring regional security and stability, providing stable conditions for the further development of the Organization.

8.3. RECOMMENDATIONS

These studies in the field of security cooperation within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) with a special focus on Kazakhstan can be used in various fields:

1. The results of the study may be useful to present to the SCO Central Office in Beijing and the governmental authorities of Kazakhstan to assess the current state of security cooperation within the SCO, determine strategic priorities for future development, and improve policies in the Organization's activities.
2. The scientific results of the thesis can be used to develop and adjust the national security policy of Kazakhstan and Central Asian countries, including measures to combat terrorism, separatism, and extremism.
3. The results of the dissertation can be presented to the Budapest Representation Office of Organization of Turkish States for the exchange of experience and transfer of knowledge about the practice of security cooperation within the SCO, particularly the experience of Kazakhstan.
4. The research can be used to develop educational programs and courses on security with an emphasis on cooperation within the SCO to train future specialists and students in higher education institutions. It is suggested to include the SCO issues into the Master Courses about International Studies and the security research area of the Doctorate School
5. The research results can be used to provide expert advice and recommendations to various stakeholders, including governmental and non-governmental organizations, the academic community, and the business sector.
6. It is suggested to continue researching the SCO in two dimensions: its role and possibilities to represent the Eurasian interest in the major power competition and forming the new world order, and at national levels, to research the relations of Member States and the Organization independently and build data base between the countries and the Central HQs.

I do believe that my research will help in various area improve the understanding and effectiveness of security cooperation within the SCO, considering the interests and needs of my country, Kazakhstan.

9. LIST OF TABLES AND MAPS

Table 1. Strong and weak (problematic) sides to the activities of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

Table 2. The budget of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)

Table 3. The SCO members

Table 4. The full list of SCO countries for 2023

Table 5. The list of dialogue and observer states.

Table 6. Number of populations, GDP, and land area in the world.

Table 7. The principal structure of the SCO

Table 8. The structure of the SCO Secretariat

Table 9. Contributions of the SCO member states to the Organization's budget

Table 10: List of Council of Heads of States and Council of Heads of Government

Table 11: List of the SCO summits

Table 12. List of summits of government

Table 13. The member countries of the organization

Table 14. GDP ranked by Country (2023)

Table 15. Macroeconomic indicators of the SCO countries (2023)

Table 16. Coronavirus cases

Table 17. Number of cases in the SCO states

Table 18. List of exercises

Table 19. Logistics Performance Index (LPI)-Global Index 2023

Map 1: SCO members, observers, and dialogue partners

Map 2: BRI routes

Map 3. Economic corridors of BRI

Map 4. East Turkistan

Map 5. The Caspian Sea

Map 6. New silk road

Map 7. The map of the BRI member-countries 2023

10. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AIIB - Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

APR - Annual percentage rate

APEC - Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

ASEAN - Association of Southeast Asian Nations

AUKUS - Australia, United Kingdom, United States

BRI – Belt and Road Initiative

BRICS - acronym for Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa

CFM - Council of Foreign Ministers

CICA - Confidence-Building Measures in Asia

CIS - Commonwealth of Independent States

CSTO - Collective Security Treaty Organization

DSCI - Data Security Council of India

DPPA - Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs

EAC - Equivalent annual cost

EAEU or EEU - Eurasian Economic Union

EDB - Execute Disable Bit

EEC - European Economic Community

ESCAP - United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific

EU – European Union

FSP – Financial Sector Policy

G8 – Group of eight: eight of the world's biggest industrial countries: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the UK, and the US.

G20 - Group of twenty is an intergovernmental forum comprising 19 sovereign countries, the European Union (EU), and the African Union (AU)

GDP - Gross domestic product

GTI - Global Terrorism Index

ICT - Information communications technology

IOM - International Organization for Migration

IMU - Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

IRPT - Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan

LPI - Logistics Performance Index

MERCOSUR – or the Southern Common Market, is an economic and political bloc originally comprising Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay

NAFTA - North American Free Trade Agreement

NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NSC - National Security Council NSC

NED - National Endowment for Democracy

NSR - Northern Sea Route

OSCE - Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

OAU - Organization of African Unity

PPP - Purchasing power parity.

PRC - People's Republic of China

RATS - Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure

SRB - Silk Road Economic Belt

TRACECA - Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia

UAE - United Arab Emirates

UN – United Nations

UNDP - United Nations Development Programme

UNGA – United Nations General Assembly

UNRCCA - United Nations Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia

UNWTO - World Tourism Organization

USA - United States of America

USSR - Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WTO - World Trade Organization

XUAR - Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region

11. BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

1. Agnew J.: *Geopolitics: Re-Visioning World Politics*. Abingdon, UK: *Routledge*. 2003. 572.
2. Allison, Roy. *Regionalism Regional Structures and Security Management in Central Asia // International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs)*. 2004. No 80. pp. 463–483.
3. Alimov R. K.: *Шанхайская организация сотрудничества: Глобальный профиль в международных отношениях [Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Global profile in international relations]*. Moscow, *Ves mir*. 2018. 400 p.
4. Asankanov A. *Уйгуры Кыргызстана. Двадцатилетию Ассамблеи народа Кыргызстана и Двадцатилетию общества уйгуров “Иттипак” [Uighurs of Kyrgyzstan. Dedicated to the twentieth anniversary of the Assembly of the People of Kyrgyzstan and twenty-fifth anniversary of “Ittipak” Uighurs Association]*. Bishkek - 2014 URL: <https://elkitab.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/ئۇيغۇرلارنى-قىرغىزىستان.pdf> (accessed: 09.08.2023)
5. Vokeria S.A., Sidorov D.A.: *Эволюция подходов стран БРИКС к "ответственности по защите". Политическая наука [The evolution of the BRICS countries' approaches to the "responsibility to protect". Political science]*. 2020. No. 3. pp. 32-41.
6. Bakhlova O. V.: *Теория и практика региональной интеграции: Политико-правовые аспекты; Средне-Волжский (Саранский) фил. Российская правовая академия. Министерство юстиции Российской Федерации. Saransk: Издательство Мордовского университета [Theory and practice of regional integration: Political and legal aspects; Middle Volga (Saransk) phil. The Russian Law Academy. The Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation. Saransk: Mordovian University Press]*. 2006. 206.
7. Bogaturov A.D.: *Международные отношения в Центральной Азии. События и документы. [International relations in Central Asia. Events and documents]* Moscow. *Aspect-Press*, 2011. pp. 450-453.
8. Volgova I.V., Nikitina Yu.A.: *Евразийский экономический союз между интеграцией и суверенитетом. Современная Европа [The Eurasian Economic Union between integration and sovereignty. Modern Europe]*. 2019. No5 (91). pp. 13-23.

9. Borisov D. A.: Эволюция политики безопасности Шанхайской организации сотрудничества: (1996 - 2010) [The evolution of the security policy of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: (1996 - 2010)]. Tomsk, 2011. 210 p.;
10. Chernyavsky S.I.: Содружество Независимых Государств как организация региональной безопасности. *Проблемы постсоветского пространства*. [The Commonwealth of Independent States as a regional security organization. Problems of the post-Soviet space]. 2020. Vol. 7. No. 2. pp. 142-153.
11. Chernyavsky S.I.: Нагорно-карабахский конфликт в контексте изменения региональной геополитики. *Проблемы постсоветского пространства* [The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the context of changing regional geopolitics. Problems of the post-Soviet space]. 2021. Vol. 8. No. 3. pp. 341-360.
12. Chernyavsky S.I.: Национальная безопасность России в формате СНГ. *Международное сотрудничество государств Евразии: политика, экономика, право* [Russia's national security in the CIS format. International cooperation of the Eurasian States: politics, economics, law]. 2020. No. 1. pp. 32-41.
13. Chufurin G.I.: Постсоветские государства Евразии в международных экономических отношениях. *Федерализм* [The post-Soviet states of Eurasia in international economic relations. Federalism]. 2021. Vol. 26. No. 4. pp. 89-110.
14. Dikarev A.D., Lukin A.V.: Подход Китая к территориальным спорам в Южно-Китайском море и внешняя политика России. *Мировая экономика и международные отношения* [China's approach to territorial disputes in the South China Sea and Russia's foreign policy. World economy and international relations]. 2021. Vol. 65. No. 2. pp. 5-15.
15. Dikarev A.D., Lukin A.V.: "Тайваньская нация": от мифа к реальности? *Сравнительная политика* ["The Taiwanese Nation": from myth to reality? Comparative politics]. 2021. Vol. 12. No. 1. pp. 43-59.
16. Derankian A.: ШОС и противодействие Западу присоединению Ирана, интервью. *Центр исследований Ирана и Евразии* [The SCO and the West's opposition to Iran's accession, an interview. Iran and Eurasia Research Center]. 2020. pp. 23-25.
17. Dubrovin Yu. I., Naumov A.V.: Региональная безопасность Центральной Азии: ШОС и ОДКБ как основные участники. *Сибирский международный* [Regional security in Central Asia: the SCO and the CSTO as the main participants. Siberian International]. 2015. No. 17. pp. 220-226.

18. Hillman J. J.: China's Belt and Road Initiative: Five Years Later. *China Economic and Security Review Commission*, 2018. p. 231
19. Hillman J.: China's Belt and Road Initiative: Five Years Later. *China Economic and Security Review Commission*, 2018. p. 10.
20. Jaspal Z.N.: Расширение ШОС для региональной стабильности: Пакистанская перспектива. Роль ШОС в региональной стабильности: перспективы ее расширения. *Исламабад: Исследовательский институт политики Исламабада* [SCO expansion for Regional Stability: A Pakistani Perspective. The SCO's role in regional stability: prospects for its expansion. Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute]. 2013. pp. 76-87.
21. Kamolov T.M.: Шанхайская организация сотрудничества (ШОС) как форма политико-правовой защиты суверенитета стран-участниц ШОС. *Вестник Таджикского национального университета. Серия социально-экономические и общественные науки*. [The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as a form of political and legal protection of the sovereignty of the SCO member states. Bulletin of the Tajik National University. Socio-economic and Social Sciences Series] 2016. No. 2/4 (204). pp.194-197.
22. Khan A., Jamali B.: Шанхайская организация сотрудничества в продвижении регионального мира и стабильности: Анализ индо-пакского конфликта. *Обзор глобальных исследований в области стратегии и безопасности* [The Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Promoting Regional Peace and Stability: An Analysis of the Indo-Saka conflict. Overview of global research in the field of strategy and security]. 2021. Vol. VI(II). pp. 1-11.
23. Komarovskiy V.V.: Россия и СНГ: динамика миграционных потоков (2010-2019 гг.). *Россия и новые государства Евразии* [Russia and the CIS: the dynamics of migration flows (2010-2019). Russia and the new States of Eurasia]. 2020. Vol. 2. No. XLVII. pp. 151-162; V.V. Komarovskiy V.V.: Роль и место внешней трудовой миграции в структуре иностранной рабочей сил. *Социально-трудовые исследования* [The role and place of external labor migration in the structure of the foreign labor force. Social and labor research]. 2021. No. 2 (43). pp. 19-32.
24. Klimenko A.F.: Проблема региональной безопасности и некоторые пути ее решения при реализации стратегии развития ШОС до 2025 года. *Проблемы обеспечения безопасности на пространстве ШОС* [The problem of regional

- security and some ways to solve it in the implementation of the SCO development strategy until 2025. Problems of ensuring security in the SCO space] 2017. pp. 27-44.
25. Lаренко М.В., Курьев К.: Новая модель сотрудничества в Евразии - Евразийский экономический союз и Шанхайская организация сотрудничества: рамки "Большого евразийского партнерства". *В региональной интеграции и будущих инициативах сотрудничества в Евразийском экономическом союзе* [A new model of cooperation in Eurasia - the Eurasian Economic Union and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: the framework of the "Greater Eurasian Partnership". In regional integration and future cooperation initiatives in the Eurasian Economic Union], 2020. pp. 209-234.
26. Lаренко М.В.: Новая модель сотрудничества в Евразии: EASE и СО в рамках Партнерства "Большая Евразия". *Вестник Евразийского национального университета им. Л.Н. Гумилева. Серия: Политические науки. Региональные исследования. Востоковедение* [A new model of cooperation in Eurasia: EASE and СО within the framework of the Greater Eurasia Partnership. Bulletin of the L.N. Gumilev Eurasian National University. Series: Political Sciences. Regional studies. Oriental studies]. 2021. No. 2. pp. 95-106; М.В.
27. Lаренко, М.В. Onuchko: От контакта к барьеру: российско-казахстанская граница и приграничное сотрудничество в контексте пандемии КОВИД-19. *Постсоветские исследования* [From contact to barrier: the Russian-Kazakh border and cross-border cooperation in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. Post-Soviet studies]. 2021. Vol.4. No. 7. pp. 604-614.
28. Luzyanin S. G.: Проблемы обеспечения безопасности на пространстве ШОС [Problems of ensuring security in the SCO space]. *Moscow*, 2017. p.168.
29. Lukin A.V.: Россия и Китай в Большой Евразии. *Польша: Журнал политических исследований* [Russia and China in Greater Eurasia. Polsk: Journal of Political Studies]. 2020. No. 5. pp. 24-51.
30. Lukashuk I.I.: International law. Special part: studies. for law students. fac. and universities; Russian Academy of Sciences, Institute of State and Law, Academy of Sciences. Legal Un-T. - Ed. 3rd, reprint. and additional - M.: Walters Kluwer, 2015. - 544.
31. Luzyanin S.G.: Проблемы обеспечения безопасности на пространстве ШОС [Problems of ensuring security in the SCO space]. 2017. 168 p.;

32. Mammadov H. M.: *Security Problems: the SCO and Iran. Shanghai cooperation organization: towards new frontiers of development*; Collection of materials of the "round table", April 2007. - M.: Publishing house of The Institute of the Far East of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2008. pp. 329-350.
33. McKibbin W. J., Fernando R. (2020). The global macroeconomic impacts of COVID-19: Seven scenarios. // CAMA working paper. No. 19/2020. <https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3547729> (accessed: 07.01.2023).
34. Muratshina K.G., Khamzin I.R.: Сотрудничество Российской Федерации и Республики Таджикистан в области туризма: состояние, проблемы, перспектив. *Вестник Московского государственного областного университета* [Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tajikistan in the field of tourism: status, problems, prospects. Bulletin of the Moscow State Regional University]. 2020. No. 1. pp. 88-97.
35. Muratshina K.G.: Россия и страны Центральной Азии: механизмы сотрудничества в области туризма в рамках ШН. *Вестник Национальной академии туризма* [Russia and the countries of Central Asia: mechanisms of cooperation in the field of tourism within the framework of the ШН. Bulletin of the National Academy of Tourism]. 2021. No. 2. pp. 32-34.
36. Muratshina K.G., Bakhtin E.L.: Россия и страны Центральной Азии в молодежных обменах в рамках ШО. *Каспийский регион: политика, экономика, культура* [Russia and Central Asian countries in youth exchanges within the framework of the SCO. The Caspian region: politics, economy, culture]. 2021. No. 1 (66). pp. 115-121.
37. Nazarbayev N. A. Эра Независимости ["The Age of Independence"] 2017, pp. 24-34 // URL: <https://nazarbayev.kz/sites/default/files/pagefiles/2019-06/423d7253d66cad2c6f68758bc33782.pdf>
38. Nikitina Yu. A.: ОДКБ и ШОС в системе региональной безопасности на постсоветском пространстве. *Международная безопасность: Глобальные и региональные акторы* [The CSTO and the SCO in the system of regional security in the post-Soviet space. International security: Global and regional actors]. *Moscow: Аспект Пресс*. 2020. pp. 113-123.
39. Phan D. H. B., Narayan P. K. (2020). Country responses and the reaction of the stock market to COVID-19: A preliminary exposition. // *Emerging Markets Finance and Trade*, 56(10), 2138–2150. (accessed: 09.02.2023).

40. Rasmussen M. V.: A New Kind of War: Strategic Culture and the War on Terrorism, *IIS Working*. 2003. No 3.
41. Safronova E. Problems of Central Asian integration in the context of the SCO E. Safronova, O. Tikhonov // China in world and regional politics: History and modernity: Collection of articles. - M., 2003. - pp.69-96. (in Russian)
42. Salisu A. A. Revisiting oil-stock nexus during COVID-19 pandemic: Some preliminary results. // *International Review of Economics & Finance*, 69, 280–294. (accessed: 09.01.2023).
43. Sidorova N.P., Sidorov D.A.: "Дипломатия второго трека" в рамках Шанхайской организации сотрудничества (на примере Форума ШОС). *Современные вызовы и угрозы в условиях трансформации международных отношений* ["Diplomacy of the second track" within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (using the example of the SCO Forum). Modern challenges and threats in the context of the transformation of international relations]. 2018. pp. 6-11.
44. Sitenko V.N.: ШОС и проблемы безопасности в Центральной Азии: значение для Казахстана [SCO and security problems in Central Asia: significance for Kazakhstan]. URL: <http://kisi.kz/ru/categories/geopolitika-i-mezhdunarodnye-otnosheniya/posts/shosi-problemy-bezopasnost-v-centralnoy-azii-znachen>. (accessed: 09/23/2020).
45. Stolpovsky O., Paramonov V. "Проблема уйгурского сепаратизма" в китайско-центральноазиатских отношениях: или о необходимости постановки новых задач для ШОС ["The problem of Uighur separatism" in Sino-Central Asian relations: or about the need to set new tasks for the SCO] URL: https://uighur.narod.ru/articles/shos_uyghur_problems3.html?ysclid=ll5rd2rzmq835684292 (accessed: 09.06.2023)
46. Streltsov D. V.: Территориальный вопрос в афро-азиатском мире. [The territorial issue in the Afro-Asian world] *Moscow. Aspect press*. 2013. pp.104-105.
47. Syroezhkin K.L.: Проблемы современных казахстанско-китайских отношений. *Россия и новые государства Евразии* [Problems of modern Kazakh-Chinese relations. Russia and the new Eurasian States]. 2019. No. 1. pp. 21-36.
48. Syroezhkin K.L.: Китай после XIX съезда КПК: новый баланс сил. *Алматы: Научно-исследовательский институт международного и регионального сотрудничества Казахско-Германского университета* [China after the 19th CPC

- Congress: a new balance of power. Almaty: Scientific Research Institute of International and Regional Cooperation of the Kazakh-German University], 2018. 284.
49. Syroezhkin K.L.: Проблемы сопряжения ЭПШП и "Нурлы жол". *Постсоветское пространство: роль внешнего фактора* [Problems of coupling of the Economic Belt on the Silk Road and Nurly Zhol. The post-Soviet space: the role of the external factor]. 2018. pp. 206-210.
50. Szabó Márk: A Sanghaji Együttműködési Szervezet. In: In: Szálkai Kinga, Baranyi Tamás Péter, Szarka E. Luca (Szerk): *Biztonságpolitikai Corvinák*, Budapest: Antal József Tudásközpont, 2019. pp. 133-142.F
51. Szálkai Kinga: Generációváltás Közép- Ázsiában: biztonság és stabilitás Mirzijojev and Tokajev hatalomra kerülése után. *Nemzet és biztonság. Biztonságpolitikai Szemle*, 2022. 4. szám. pp. 59-90.[Generációváltás Közép-Ázsiában megtekintése \(ludovika.hu\)](https://www.ludovika.hu/generaciovaltasi-kozep-azsiban-megtekintese)
52. Szálkai Kinga: Közép- Ázsia. In: Szálkai Kinga, Baranyi Tamás Péter, Szarka E. Luca (Szerk): *Biztonságpolitikai Corvinák*, Budapest: Antal József Tudásközpont, 2019. pp. 373-398.
53. Szenes, Zoltán: Military Security Today. New Treats, New Wars, New Theories. In: Finszter, Géza, Sabjanics, István (Eds): *Security Challenges in the 21st Century*. Budapest: Dialóg Campus Kiadó, 2018. p. 71.
54. Swaine M. D.: Chinese Views and Commentary on the "One Belt, One Road" Initiative, *China Leadership Monitor*, 2015. No. 47. P.1-24.
55. Titarenko M.L., Petrovsky V. E., Russia, China, and the New World Order: theory and practice. *Moscow*, 2016. pp.188, 190, 208.
56. Torkanovsky E. P. The global environmental agenda, the COVID-19 pandemic and the new normal. *Economic relations*. - 2020. - Volume 10. - No. 3. - pp. 663-682. - doi: 10.18334/eo.10.3.110600
57. Уянаев S.V.: Индийско-китайский пограничный спор: возможен ли свет в конце тоннеля? Китай в мировой и региональной политике. История и современность [India-China border dispute: Is light possible at the end of the tunnel? China in world and regional politics. History and modernity]. 2021. Vol. 26. No. 26. pp. 63-78.
58. Уянаев S.V.: Развитие формата "Россия-Индия-Китай" в контексте диалога "Нью-Дели-Вашингтон" // Китай в мировой и региональной политике. История и современность [The development of the Russia-India-China format in the context of the New Delhi-Washington Dialogue // China in World and Regional Politics. History and modernity]. 2020. No. 4. pp. 24-41.

59. Vasilenko V.I., Vasilenko V.V., Poteenko A.G.: Шанхайская организация сотрудничества в системе региональной безопасности (политико-правовой аспект) [Shanghai Cooperation Organization in the Regional Security System (political and legal aspect)]. *Moscow: Prospect*, 2014. 192.
60. Vorobyov V. Ya. Where will the Shanghai Cooperation Organization move? Problems of the Far East, 2016, No. 5, pp. 4-10.
61. Wallace T. China and the Regional Counter-Terrorism Structure: An Organizational Analysis // *Asian Security*. 2014 V.10(3).pp 627-645.
62. Xue Y., Makengo B. Twenty Years of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Achievements, Challenges and Prospects. *Open Journal of Social Sciences*, 2021. 9. pp. 184-200.
63. Yun S. M.: The policy of the European Union in Central Asia: from the "opening" of the region to the "strategy of a new partnership" (1992-2008). Tomsk, 2009.
64. Zhao L. To a Mutual Understanding. *China*, 2017, no. 5, pp. 24-25

Journals, monographs

1. Alimov R. K. Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Greater Eurasia. *Bulletin of International Organizations*, 2018, vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 33.
2. Borisov D. A.: Эволюция политики безопасности ШОС [Evolution of the SCO security policy]. Tomsk, 2011. 361 p.
3. Вуков А. И.: Экономическое сотрудничество в рамках ШОС: основные направления и перспективы развития [Economic cooperation within the framework of the SCO: main directions and prospects for development]. Moscow, *Nauka*, 2011. 227 p.
4. Belt and Road Initiative: Status and Prospects. - Almaty: Research Institute of International and Regional Cooperation at the Kazakh-German University, 2018. - С. 183-191.
5. Веккауров Н. В. Сотрудничество в области обеспечения безопасности и борьбы с терроризмом в рамках Шанхайской организации // Молодой ученый. — 2018. — No14. — С. 213-215. — URL <https://moluch.ru/archive/200/49184/> (дата обращения: 10.12.2019). [Cooperation in the field of security and counter - terrorism within the framework of the Shanghai organization // Young scientist. - 2018. - No. 14. Pp. 213-215.) (accessed 10.12.2019)

6. Carroll R., William E.: China in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Hegemony, Multi-Polar Balance or Cooperation in Central Asia. *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science*. 2011. Vol. 1. pp 1–8.
7. Cheang Chris, Russo-Kazakh Relations: The China Factor- Analysis, *Eurasian Review*, Nov 20. 2019. <https://www.eurasiareview.com/20112019-rus-so-kazakh-relations-the-china-factor-analysis/> (accessed: 28.01.2023)
8. China has suspended debt collection from developing countries. *Katehon*. URL: <https://katehon.com/news/china-has-suspended-debt-collection-developing-countries> (accessed: 05.12.2022)
9. Chufirin G.I.: Зарождение, становление и перспективы развития евразийской интеграции. *Федерализм* [The origin, formation and prospects for the development of Eurasian integration. Federalism]. 2021. No. 2. pp. 115-148.
10. Dunay, Pál: China's Influence in Central Asia. Implications for the Euro-Atlantic world. per *Concordian*. 2020. 10. [pC_V10N3_en-6_Dunay.pdf \(marshallcenter.org\)](https://www.marshallcenter.org/Portals/0/Concordian/2020/10/pC_V10N3_en-6_Dunay.pdf)
11. Dadabayeva Z.A.: Таджикистан // Россия и постсоветские страны: вопросы экономических отношений [Tadjikistan // Russia and post-Soviet countries: issues of economic relations], 2021. 232 p.;
12. Dadabaeva Z.A.: Расширение ШОС: новые возможности и новые риски // Мир перемен [SCO expansion: new opportunities and new risks // A world of change]. 2017. No. 3 pp. 159-173.
13. Degang Sun, Hend Elmahly. NATO vs. SCO: A Comparative Study of Outside Powers' Military Presence in Central Asia and the Gulf. *Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies*. 2018. Vol. 12. No 4. pp. 438-456 // URL: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25765949.2018.1562594> (Accessed: 30 March 2024.)
14. Dosova B.A. Kazakhstan and China: Milestones of Bilateral Relations. URL: https://rep.ksu.kz/bitstream/handle/data/7457/Dosova_Kazakhstan_2019.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (accessed: 22.03.2023)
15. Gushchin A. N., Khanova I. E.: Евразийский экономический союз - образ и гуманитарное измерение. *Современная история и геополитика в Центральной Азии. Астана* [The Eurasian Economic Union is an image and a humanitarian dimension. Modern history and geopolitics in Central Asia. Astana], 2017. pp. 150-158.
16. Gushchin A. N., Levchenkov A. S., Pivovarov E. I., Khanova I. E.: Роль Казахстана в процессах евразийской интеграции на рубеже XX - XXI вв. *Электронный*

- научно-образовательный журнал "История" [The role of Kazakhstan in the processes of Eurasian integration at the turn of the XX - XXI centuries. Electronic scientific and educational magazine "History"]. 2019. T. 10. Issue 1 (75). pp. 452-473.
17. Hillman J.: China's Belt and Road Initiative: Five Years Later, *China Economic and Security Review Commission*, 2018. 12 p.
 18. Huasheng Zh. SCO: Review and Outlook, *Moscow*, 2012, 279 p.
 19. Igibayeva M. The twenty-year-old Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Security, Economic and Cultural Cooperation. *A Haza szolgálatában*. 2021. pp. 111-112.
 20. Igibayeva M. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization 20th anniversary summit meeting - Challenges and Prospects. *A Haza szolgálatában*. 2021. pp. 78-79
 21. Igibayeva M. Economic Mobilization Measures for the COVID-19 Pandemic in the SCO member states. *A hadtudomány és a 21. század* 2021. p. 227.
 22. Igibayeva M. Implementing the Belt and Road Initiative in Kazakhstan. *A haza szolgálatában*. 2019. p 287.
 23. József Kaló and Lóránd Ujházi (2018) "Budapest report on Christian Persecution" URL: http://www.dialogcampus.hu/users/default/dialogcampus/ebooks/978-615-5945-48-9/pdf/web_pdf_budapest_report_on_christian_persecution_kicsi.pdf (Accessed: 14.02.2020)
 24. Joint Interview of Journalists from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Member States on President Hu Jintao. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China May 30th, 2006*. URL: <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/zyjh/t256398.htm> (accessed: 06.12.2022).
 25. Karneev A.: Научная конференция "ШОС: Проблемы и перспективы межгосударственных отношений в Евро-Азиатском регионе" [Scientific conference "SCO: Problems and prospects of interstate relations in the Euro-Asian region"]. *Problems of the Far East*. - 2004. - No5
 26. Khalatyan A. Central Asia: the prolongation of dynastic regimes brings the "Arab spring" closer. *Colossal*. 2016, May 30 / URL: <https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2016/05/30/centralnaya-aziya-prolongaciya-dinasticheskikh-rezhimov-priblizhayet-arabskuyu-vesnu> (Accessed: 07.02.2020)
 27. Kamalov A.K., Yusupov R.K. Устная история миграции из Китая в Казахстан в период «культурной революции» (1966-1976). [Oral history of migration from China to Kazakhstan during the "Cultural Revolution"] 2022, Bulletin of Karaganda University. The series "History. Philosophy". No. 3. pp. 91-99 URL:

- https://www.academia.edu/100262528/Устная_история_миграции_из_Китая_в_Казахстан_в_период_культурной_революции_1966_1976_гг_ (accessed: 31.05.2023)
28. Kaukenov A.S. Казахстанско-китайские отношения в условиях геополитического разлома. 30 лет дипломатическим отношениям Республики Казахстан и Китайской Народной Республики: от становления до стратегического партнерства. [Kazakh-Chinese relations in the context of a geopolitical rift. Collection of materials of the scientific conference] Almaty, December 23, 2021.
 29. Kulkova I. A. Adaptation of the behavior of entrepreneurs to the changes caused by the coronavirus pandemic. *Economics, Entrepreneurship and Law*. - 2020. - Volume 10. - No. 10. - pp. 2529-2540. – doi: 10.18334/epp.10.10.111051. (accessed: 18.01.2023).
 30. Kokoshina Z.A. The role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in countering terrorism and extremism in the post-Soviet space // *International relations and world politics*. 2017. No. 4 pp. 97-123
 31. Kurylev K., Malyshev, D.V. A. Khotivrishvili, V. Shablovsky: ШОС и ЕАЭС в контексте евразийской интеграции, *МЭиМО* [The SCO and the EAEU in the context of Eurasian integration, *MEiMO*]. 2021. No. 2. pp. 81-88.
 32. Kurylev K.P., Smolik, N.G. Khimich G.A.: Проблемы и перспективы продвижения русского языка в государствах Центральной Азии в контексте развития культурно-гуманитарного сотрудничества России со странами региона, *Альманах "Козаки"* [Problems and prospects of promoting the Russian language in the Central Asian States in the context of the development of cultural and humanitarian cooperation between Russia and the countries of the region, *The Cossacks Almanac*]. 2020. No. 47. pp. 44-52.;
 33. Lavrov V. S. Динамика развития ШОС. *Московский журнал международного права* (The dynamics of the SCO development. *Moscow Journal of International Law*) 2008. No. 1. pp.204-221.
 34. Lavrov V. S.: Право ШОС и безопасность XXI века. *Международная жизнь* [SCO law and security of the XXI century. *International life*] 2008. No1. pp. 172-184.
 35. Luzyanin S.G.: Россия-Монголия-Китай: исторические и современные трансформации // *Восток. Афро-азиатские общества: История и современность* [Russia-Mongolia-China: Historical and modern transformations // *Vostok. Afro-Asian societies: History and modernity*]. 2021. No. 5. pp. 141-152.
 36. Luzyanin S.G.: Китайско-американские отношения после Д. Трампа: оценки, подходы, перспективы // *США и Канада: экономика, политика, культура* [Sino-

- American relations after D. Trump: assessments, approaches, prospects // USA and Canada: economics, politics, culture]. 2021. Vol. 51. No. 8. pp. 75-80.
37. Malyshev D.V.: Шанхайская организация сотрудничества и ее роль в системе современных международных отношений (к 20-летию создания ШОС), *Вестник Московского университета*. Series 25: Международные отношения и мировая политика [The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and its role in the system of modern international relations (on the 20th anniversary of the creation of the SCO), *Bulletin of the Moscow University*. Series 25: International Relations and World Politics]. 2021. Vol. 13. No. 4. pp. 81-104.
38. Malyshev D.V.: Миротворчество в СНГ и мировой опыт [Peacekeeping in the CIS and world experience], *Svobodnaya mysl*. 2021. No. 5. pp. 105-118.
39. Malyshev D.V.: Радикализация ислама в Центральной Азии и на Западе, *Актуальные проблемы Европы* [Radicalization of Islam in Central Asia and the West, *Current problems in Europe*]. 2016. No. 3. pp. 186-205.
40. Malyshev D.V.: Центральная Азия: угроза радикального исламизма. Ситуация в Таджикистан, *Свободная мысль* [Central Asia: the threat of radical Islamism. The situation in Tajikistan, *Free thought*]. 2016. Vol. 1658. No. 4. pp. 181-192.
41. Morozov Yu.V.: Перспективы развития ШОС с точки зрения национальных интересов России, *Институт Дальнего Востока РАН, Москва* [Prospects for the development of the SCO from the point of view of Russia's national interests, *Institute of the Far East of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow*], 2016. 303 p.
42. Mikheev V. V.: Проблемы и перспективы взаимодействия ШОС и ЕврАзЭС в Центральной Азии. [Problems and prospects of cooperation between the SCO and EurAsEC in Central Asia] *Collection of materials of the International Scientific and Practical Conference "Problems of economic and financial cooperation within the SCO"*, May 31, 2006 Almaty: CIS under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2006.
43. Malyshev D.V.: Шанхайская организация сотрудничества и ее роль в системе современных международных отношений (к 20-летию образования ШОС). *Moscow University Bulletin of World Politics*. 2021. No. 4. P. 81–104. URL: <https://www.imemo.ru/files/File/ru/articles/2021/MoscowUniversityBulletin-042021-Malyshev.pdf> (accessed:20.08.2022).

44. Marcus Cloud. The conflict at lake Zhalanashkol: how the Soviet guards fought with the Chinese. URL:<https://www.ilawjournals.com/the-conflict-at-lake-zhalanashkol-how-the-soviet-guards-fought-with-the-chinese/> (accessed: 25.05.2023)
45. Maximizing the Positive Impacts and Minimizing the Risks of the BRI in the Central Asia and South Caucasus Region: A Policy Paper. *The Emerging Markets Forum* (2019) September. <https://www.emergingmarketsforum.org/policy-paper-maximizing-the-positive-impacts-and-minimizing-the-risks-of-the-bri/> (accessed: 15.01.2023).
46. Myrzakhmetova A.M. Transit potential of Kazakhstan within the EAEU // *Almaty: Bulletin of KazNU*. - 2015. No1. pp. 43-46.
47. Nicola M. The socio-economic implications of the coronavirus and COVID-19 pandemic: A review. *International Journal of Surgery* 2020, 78, 185–193
48. Nigmatullin R. V. Деятельность международных организации по совершенствованию нормативной базы борьбы с терроризмом: история и тенденция развития // *Правовое государство: теория и практика*. 2014. 4 (38). С. 166 [Activity of the international organizations on improvement of normative base of fight against terrorism: history and a tendency of development // *the Legal state: theory and practice*. 2014. 4 (38). pp. 166]
49. Nikitina Yu. A.: Эволюция механизмов и международно-политических стратегий ОДКБ и ШОС. [The evolution of the mechanisms and international political strategies of the CSTO and the SCO]. *Moscow*, 2008. 211.
50. P. Szabó, Sándor, Horváthné Varga Polyák, Csilla: A koronajárvány hatása a kínai export alakulására. *Eurázsiai Szemle*, II. évf. 2022. 1. szám. pp. 30.-55. [A-koronavirus-jarvany-hatas-a-kinai-export-alakulasara.pdf \(eurasiacenter.hu\)](https://www.eurasiacenter.hu/jarvany-hatas-a-kinai-export-alakulasara.pdf)
51. People’s Republic of China: At least 1000 people executed in “strike hard” campaign against crime. URL: <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa17/072/1996/en/> (accessed: 29.01.2023)
52. Pivovarov E.I.: Евразийский интеграционный проект: предпосылки, становление, развитие. Глобальные процессы на постсоветском пространстве: Предпосылки, становление, развитие. *Санкт-Петербург* [The Eurasian integration project: prerequisites, formation, development. Global processes in the post-Soviet space: Background, formation, development. Saint-Petersburg], 2019. 904.
53. Pivovarov E.I.: Экономический совет Содружества Независимых Государств: предпосылки, создание, основные направления интеграционной деятельности. *Вестник Российского государственного университета* [The Economic Council of

- the Commonwealth of Independent States: prerequisites, creation, main directions of integration activities. Bulletin of the Russian State University]. 2020. No2. pp. 10-44.
54. Pivovarov E.I.: Содружество Независимых Государств. К тридцатилетию со дня образования. *Исторические записки* [The Commonwealth of Independent States. On the thirtieth anniversary of its formation. Historical notes]. 2021. Vol. 20. No 128. P. 274-321.
55. Pivovarov E.I.: "Деловой центр экономического развития Содружества Независимых Государств". Основные вехи международного интеграционного сотрудничества. *Вестник Российского государственного университета* ["Business Center for Economic Development of the Commonwealth of Independent States". The main milestones of international integration cooperation. Bulletin of the Russian State University]. 2021. No.1. pp. 23-59.
56. Pochekaev R.Y. Российские и британские путешественники об административных и правовых преобразованиях Якуб бека в Восточном Туркестане (1860-1870s). [Russian and British travelers about the administrative and legal transformations of Yakub-bek in East Turkestan]. URL: <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/rossiyskie-i-britanskie-puteshestvenniki-ob-administrativnyh-i-pravovyh-preobrazovaniyah-yakub-beka-v-vostochnom-turkestane-1860-1870-e/viewer> (accessed: 31.05.2023)
57. Public International Law: Textbook / Edited by D. K. Bekyashev. M., 2019. 553 p.
58. Rakhimov K. Kh., Kurylev K.P., Khimich G.A: Взаимодействие Шанхайской организации сотрудничества с международными и региональными организациями по поддержанию международного мира и коллективной безопасности, *Вопросы национальных и федеративных отношений* [Interaction of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization with international and regional organizations for the maintenance of international peace and collective security, Issues of national and federal relations]. 2020. Vol. 10. No. 9. pp. 2322- 2338.;
59. Rakhimov K. Kh., Kurylev K.P.: Роль ШОС в обеспечении безопасности Центральной Азии. *Екатеринбург* [The SCO's role in ensuring the security of Central Asia. Ekaterinburg], 2018. 202 p.
60. Rusmussen M. V.: Новый вид войны: стратегическая культура и война с терроризмом [A new kind of war: Strategic culture and the war on terrorism] *IIS Working*. 2003. No 3.

61. Rakhimov R. Своеобразие ислама в Центральной Азии // Россия и мусульманский мир (ИНИОН, ИВ РАН), 2011 [Peculiarity of Islam in Central Asia // Russia and the Muslim world (INION, IV RAS), 2011].
62. S. Horn, C.M. Reinhart, C. Trebesch. How Much Money Does the World Owe China? *Harvard Business Review*. URL: [https:// https://hbr.org/2020/02/how-much-money-does-the-world-owe-china](https://hbr.org/2020/02/how-much-money-does-the-world-owe-china) (accessed: 15.01.2023).
63. Nuryshev Sh. Kazakhstan and China: strategic partnership and good neighbourliness // *Diplomatiya jarshysy*. - 2018. - No3. pp 107-108.
64. Shi Ze. 'A Study on Xinjiang Development Strategy', *Asian Development Bank Press*.
65. Shokhin A.N. Multilateral cooperation is the only effective way to overcome systemic crises. URL: <https://ru.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/mnogostoronnee-sotrudnichestvo-effekt/> (accessed: 03.03.2021)
66. Sebastien Peyrouse. In the face of separatism, the European Union, Central Asia and the Uighur question. EU-Central Asia monitoring (EUCAM). URL: <https://eucentralasia.eu/facing-the-challenges-of-separatism-the-eu-central-asia-and-the-uyghur-issue-ru/> (accessed: 11.04.2023)
67. Solovyov., Chufirin G.I., Политические процессы на постсоветском пространстве: новые тенденции и старые проблемы [Political processes in the post-Soviet space: new trends and old problems]. *Moscow: ИМЭМО РАН*. 2020. 276.
68. Sudhi Ranjan Sen. Iran Joins SCO, the China-Founded Regional Security Grouping // URL: <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-07-04/iran-joins-sco-the-china-founded-regional-security-grouping#xj4y7vzkg> (accessed: 08.08.2022)
69. The Uighur problem within the SCO. URL: https://web.archive.org/web/20071217021251/http://www.analitika.org/?topic=cis_uygurs (accessed: 29.04.2023)
70. The Silk Road Economic Corridor and Kazakhstan: Status and Prospects. - Almaty: Research Institute of International and Regional Cooperation at the Kazakh-German University, 2015. pp 89-92.
71. The Eurasian Economic Union. St. Petersburg, EDB Integration Research Center, 2017, pp. 296
72. The Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan "On the State Border of the Republic of Kazakhstan" No. 70-V dated January 16, 2013.// *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda*.2013.– 22.01.– No 22–23. pp. 27296–27297.

73. Trade set to plunge as COVID-19 pandemic upends global economy / Trade forecast press conference: Remarks by DG Azevêdo. *World Customs Organization*. URL: https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres20_e/pr855_e.htm (accessed: 15.01.2023).
74. Trilling D. (2015) Remittances to Central Asia Fall Sharply, as Expected /Inside the Cocoon (blog). / EurasiaNet. 2015, April 21 / URL: <https://eurasianet.org/remittances-to-central-asia-fall-sharply-as-expected>: (Accessed: 01.01.2020)
75. Yurtaev V.I., Rogov A.S.: ШОС и БРИКС: особенности участия в процессе евразийской интеграции. *Вестник Российского университета дружбы народов. Серия: Международные отношения*. [SCO and BRICS: features of participation in the Eurasian integration process. Bulletin of the Peoples' Friendship University of Russia. Series: International Relations] 2017. Vol. 17. No 3. pp. 469-482.
76. Zhang D. Financial markets under the global pandemic of COVID-19. *Finance Research Letters*. 36, 101528 // URL: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/340714575_Financial_markets_under_the_global_pandemic_of_COVID-19 (accessed: 09.02.2023).
77. Уйгурский вопрос – разменная карта Казахстана – Китайских отношений. [The Uighur issue is a bargaining chip of Kazakh - Chinese relations] Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Kazakhstan Kazakh National Pedagogical University. *Kazakh-Chinese relations*. Almaty 2006. URL: <https://neweurasia.info/archive/book/AIBOL3.htm> (accessed: 28.05.2023)
78. 上合组织"和平使命"军演之综合分析 [A Comprehensive Analysis of the SCO's "Peace Mission" Military Exercises] *Eurasian Studies Quarterly* No.6 // URL: https://gioip.nchu.edu.tw/File/Userfiles/0000000001/files/劉承宗_上合組織歷次和平使命_軍演之綜合解析.pdf (accessed: 03.05.2021)
79. 上海合作组织(2001-2018):回眸与前瞻 [Shanghai Cooperation Organization (2001-2018): looking back and looking into the future]. The National Research Center of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization of China: World Knowledge Press].2020. 274 p.

Documents

1. Agreement between the member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on Cooperation in Combating Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances and Their Precursors. Tashkent, June 17, 2004. URL: http://www.kremlin.ru/interdocs/2004/06/17/0000_type72066_75285.shtml?type=72066.html (December 2005)
2. Agreement on the procedure for the formation of the budget execution of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (Sochi, December 1, 2017). This Agreement was approved by the Decree of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan dated March 28 2018. No. PP-3627 "On approval of an international treaty"
3. Agreement between the member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on a Regional Anti-terrorist structure. 2008. URL: <http://www.kremlin.ru/supplement/3864> (accessed: 27.12.2022).
4. Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan, and the People's Republic of China on confidence-building in the military field in the border area. 1996. URL: http://base.spinform.ru/show_doc.fwx?rgn=3879 (accessed: 12/30/2020); Agreement between the Russian Federation, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, and the People's Republic of China on the Mutual Reduction of Armed Forces in the Border Area. 1999. Text. URL: <http://docs.cntd.ru/document/901779315> (accessed: 28.12.2022).
5. Agreement between the member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on cooperation in Combating Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances and Their Precursors. 2008. Official text. URL: <http://docs.cntd.ru/document/902111650> (accessed: 28.12.2022).
6. Agreement between the member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on a Regional Anti-terrorist structure. URL: [https:// docs.cntd.ru/document/901858897](https://docs.cntd.ru/document/901858897) (accessed: 12.12.2022).
7. Agreement between the Russian Federation, the Republic of Kazakhstan, The Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, and the People's Republic of China on the mutual reduction of armed forces in the border area. URL: <https://docs.cntd.ru/document/901779315> (accessed: 19.08.2022).
8. Agreement between Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and China on Confidence Building in the Military Field in the Border Area // URL:

- <https://peacemaker.un.org/regional-confidencebuildingborders96> (accessed: 22.10.2021)
9. Agreement between the SCO member States on a Regional Anti-terrorist Structure, 23.02.2006//http://www.ecrats.com/content_rus/docs/23.02.06.html (June 20, 2006)
 10. Astana Declaration of the Heads of the member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: official text. 2017 // URL: <http://infoshos.ru/ru/?id=137> (accessed: 01.12.2022); Declaration of the 10th Anniversary of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: the official text. 2011 // URL: <http://www.sectsco.org/EN123/show.asp?id=294> . (accessed: 06.02.2022).
 11. Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. *Website of the Chairmanship The Russian Federation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2019-2020*. URL: <https://scorussia2020.ru/images/17/25/172532.pdf> (accessed:20.08.2022).
 12. Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. *CIS Legislation*. June 7, 2002. URL: <https://cis-legislation.com/document.fwx?rgn=3851> (accessed: 12.04.2023).
 13. Charter of the SCO. URL: https://www.google.com/url?sa=i&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=0CDcQw7AJahcKEwiY7PPmn4mBAxUAAAAAHQAAAAAQAw&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.sectsco.org%2Fload%2F203013%2F&psig=AOvVaw1P_pPqVh_m52Z53nFfsNfN&ust=1693652080639382&opi=89978449 (accessed: 22.10.2021)
 14. Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (adopted in St. Petersburg on June 7, 2002)
 15. Charter of the SCO // URL: https://www.google.com/url?sa=i&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=0CDcQw7AJahcKEwiY7PPmn4mBAxUAAAAAHQAAAAAQAw&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.sectsco.org%2Fload%2F203013%2F&psig=AOvVaw1P_pPqVh_m52Z53nFfsNfN&ust=1693652080639382&opi=89978449 (accessed: 22.10.2021)
 16. Charter of the SCO // URL: https://www.google.com/url?sa=i&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=0CDcQw7AJahcKEwiY7PPmn4mBAxUAAAAAHQAAAAAQAw&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.sectsco.org%2Fload%2F203013%2F&psig=AOvVaw1P_pPqVh_m52Z53nFfsNfN&ust=1693652080639382&opi=89978449 (access: 22.10.2021)
 17. Concept of Cooperation Between SCO Member States in Combating Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism, art. 3, June 5, 2005 // URL:

<http://hrichina.org/sites/default/files/PDFs/Reports/SCO/2011-Whitepaper-AppendixASCO-Docs.pdf> (accessed: 29.12.2022). HRIC-SCO-

18. Declaration on the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. *Official website of the President of Russia*. URL: <http://www.kremlin.ru/supplement/3406> (accessed: 19.08.2022).
19. Dushanbe Declaration of the twentieth anniversary of the SCO. 20.09.2021. URL: <https://www.ritm Eurasia.org/news--2021-09-20--dushanbinskaja-deklaracia-dvadcatiletia-shos-56519> (accessed: 30.07.2022)
20. "Dushanbe Declaration for the 20th Anniversary of the SCO", September 17, 2021, <http://eng.sectSCO.org/news/20210917/782639.html> (accessed: 12.12.2021)
21. European Commission. A maturing partnership - shared interests and challenges in EU - China relations. COM (2003). 533 finals. Brussels, 2003. P. 11
22. "Full text of the Joint Communiqué of the 2006 SCO Summit", June 15, 2006, <http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/meeting/171590.htm> (accessed: 12.02.2021)
23. Joint statement of the Heads of State of the Republic of Kazakhstan, China People's Republic, Kyrgyz Republic, Russian Federation, Republic Tajikistan, Republic of Uzbekistan. January 15, 2001. *Secretariat of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization*. URL: <http://www.sectSCO.org/RU/show.asp?id=84> (accessed: 19.08.2022).
24. Joint Declaration on Cooperation in the field of information exchange: official Text. 2010 // URL: <http://rus.sectSCO.org/cooperation/> (accessed: 28.02.2022); Qingdao Declaration of the Council of Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: official Text. 2018 // URL: <http://infoshos.ru/ru/?id=150> (accessed: 08/19/2022); Bishkek Declaration of the Council of Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: official text. 2019 // URL: https://www.akorda.kz/ru/events/international_community/foreign_other_events/bishkekskaya-deklaraciya-soveta-glav-gosudarstv-chlenov-shanhaiskoi-organizacii-sotrudnichestva (accessed: 30.07.2022)
25. Memorandum of Obligations of the Islamic Republic of Iran to obtain the status of a member State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Samarkand, September 16, 2022 (Effective from July 2, 2023)
26. Nazarbayev N.A. Programme "Strategy Kazakhstan 2050" // Akorda. - 2015. - 16 January. - 8 c.
27. On the ratification of the Agreement between the member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure: Federal Law of the

- Russian Federation of March 5, 2004. No. 7-FZ. URL: [http://www.aNews.ru/archive / 738827.htm](http://www.aNews.ru/archive/738827.htm) (February 2006)
28. Qingdao Declaration of the Council of Heads of Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization / Website of the President of the Russian Federation. June 10, 2018 // URL: <http://www.kremlin.ru/supplement/5315> (accessed: 08.01.2023).
 29. Regulations on the status of the SCO Dialogue Partner. *SCO Website*. 29.08.2008 // URL: <http://rus.sectSCO.org/load/45451/> (accessed: 27.12.2022).
 30. Report on Human Development in Central Asia/ into the future without barriers: Regional cooperation in the field of human development and human security. *UNDP Regional Office for Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States*, 2005
 31. Regulations on the Council of Heads of Government (Prime Ministers) of the member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. URL: <https://docs.cntd.ru/document/901880663> (accessed: 22.10.2021)
 32. Regulations on the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization member States. URL: <https://docs.cntd.ru/document/901880662> (accessed: 22.10.2021)
 33. Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of Shanghai Cooperation Organization official page. URL: https://ecrats.org/ru/documents/regulatory_legal_acts/ (accessed: 29.04.2023)
 34. Shanghai Convention on combating terrorism, separatism, and extremism 2011. pp. 166-175.
 35. Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism. *The official website of the President of Russia*. URL: <http://kremlin.ru/supplement/3405> (accessed: 19.08.2022).
 36. Special Report on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social, Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, 49, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/11/5 (Feb. 3, 2009); Special
 37. The action program for implementing the provisions of the Joint Appeal of the Heads of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to Youth, Approved by the Decision of the Council of the Heads of States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: the official text // URL: <http://eng.sectSCO.org/news/20181012/471136.html> (accessed: 18.12.2022); Action Plan of the member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on the Problems of combating terrorism, drug trafficking and

- Organized Crime: official Text // URL: <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/rus/wjdt/wshd/t554807.htm> (accessed: 08.12.2022).
38. The Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism. Shanghai, June 15, 2001. *Moscow Journal of International Law*. - 2001, - No4. - pp. 3-10.
39. The Agreement between the SCO member States on the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure, 23.02.2006//http://www.ecrats.com/content_rus/docs/23.02.06.html (June 20, 2006)
40. The RATS made every effort to fulfill the tasks of combating terrorism and extremism. URL: <http://berlek-nkp.com/analitics/11418-rats-shos-za-god-predotvratila-41-terakt-v-stranah-organizacii.html?ysclid=lmrmqe9j684870545> (access: 05.09.2023)
41. Transport Corridors of the Republic of Kazakhstan. // Ministry of Transport and Communications of the Republic of Kazakhstan and Trade Representation of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the Russian Federation. - 2013.
42. The Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan // URL: https://www.akorda.kz/en/official_documents/constitution (accessed: 05.04.2023)
43. The 2017 Convention of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on Countering Extremism // URL: <http://docs.cntd.ru/document/436739639> (accessed: 31.05.2022)
44. UNGA Resolution "Cooperation between the United Nations and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization" A/Res/73/344 / UNGA. August 30, 2019 // URL: <https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=ru/A/RES/73/334> (accessed: 21.11.2022); resolution 2250. Adopted by the Security Council at its 7573rd meeting on 9 December 2015: official text // URL: <https://undocs.org/S/RES/2250> (2015) (accessed: 21.11.2022).
45. Декларация о создании Шанхайской организации сотрудничества [Declaration on the Establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization]. *Website of the President of the Russian Federation*. June 14, 2001 // URL: <http://www.kremlin.ru/supplement/3406> (accessed: 27.12.2022).
46. План сотрудничества по сопряжению Новой экономической политики "Нұрлы Жол" и строительства "Экономического пояса Шелкового пути" между Правительством Республики Казахстан и Правительством Китайской Народной Республики [The plan of cooperation on the integration of the New Economic Policy "Nurly Zhol" and the construction of the "Silk Road Economic Belt" between the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Government of the People's

- Republic of China] // URL: <http://www.adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/P1600000518> (accessed: 05.10.2023)
47. Распоряжение правительства Российской Федерации от 24 ноября 2017 г. № 2612-р Москва. О подписании Соглашения о порядке формирования и исполнения бюджета Шанхайской организации сотрудничества [Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 2612-r dated November 24, 2017 Moscow. On signing an Agreement on the procedure for the formation and execution of the budget of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization] URL: <https://docs.yandex.ru/docs/view> (access: 01.01.2024)
48. Стратегия развития Шанхайской Организации Сотрудничества до 2025 года [Development Strategy of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization until 2025 (Ufa, July 10, 2015)]. URL: https://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=33755348 (accessed:25.05.2021)
49. Шанхайская конвенция о борьбе с терроризмом, сепаратизмом и экстремизмом [Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism]. *Website of the President of the Russian Federation*. June 14, 2001 // URL: <http://www.kremlin.ru/supplement/3405> (accessed: 27.12.2022).
50. Хартия Шанхайской организации сотрудничества [Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization]. *Website of the President of the Russian Federation*. June 6, 2002 // URL: <http://www.kremlin.ru/supplement/3450> (accessed: 27.12.2022).
51. 上海合作组织成员国元首理事会撒马尔罕宣言 [Samarkand Declaration of the Council of Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Member States] // URL: http://ru.china-embassy.gov.cn/zgxw/202209/t20220917_10767328.htm?ysclid=llv7o8h9ig310357685 (accessed: 08.08.2023)
52. 中华人民共和国反恐怖主义法 (2015 年 12 月 27 日第十二届全国人民代表大会常务委 员会第十八次 会议日中华人民共和国主席令第 36 号公布通过, 自 2016 年 1 月 1 日起施行) [On the fight against terrorism: the Law of China (adopted at the 18th session of the standing Committee of NPC of the PRC's twelfth convocation 27.12.2015, promulgated by decree of the President of China from December 27, 2015 No. 36; effective from 1 January 2016) / translated by Manzurova A. Y.] // URL: <http://www.mps.gov.cn> (accessed: 29.12.2020); the Strategy for countering extremism in the Russian Federation until 2025 (approved. Russian President 28.11.2014 N PR-

2753): the official. Text // URL:
http://www.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc&base=LAW&n=194160&fld=134&dst=100#0249_40063377856303 (accessed: 08.11.2022).

Other sources

1. Address by SCO Secretary-General Zhang Ming at a meeting of the SCO Heads of State Council, 4 July 2023, via videoconference. *SCO official website*. URL: <http://eng.sectsco.org/archives/20230704/948756/-Address-by-SCO-Secretary-General-Zhang-Ming-at-a-meeting-of-the-SCO-Heads-of-State-Council-4-July.html> (accessed: 14.07.2023)
2. Alimov R. SCO facing a new challenge. *Valdai Discussion club*. URL: <https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/sco-facing-a-new-challenge/?ysclid=lm3msshida674997593> (accessed: 01.01.2023)
3. Alimov R. ШОС на саммите в Душанбе приняла решения в пользу расширения. [The SCO made decisions in favor of expansion at the Dushanbe summit] *Renmin Zhibao* URL: <http://russian.people.com.cn/n3/2021/0917/c95181-9898035.html> (accessed: 08.08.2022)
4. Alimov R. Генеральный секретарь ШОС: «Угроза экстремизма требует безотлагательного решения»б 2017. [SCO Secretary General: "The threat of extremism requires an urgent solution", 2017]
5. Ajit Singh. Inside the US-Backed World Uyghur Congress. URL: <https://consortiumnews.com/2020/03/09/inside-the-us-backed-world-uyghur-congress/> (accessed: 29.04.2023)
6. Aris S.: Российско-китайские отношения через призму ШОС [Russian-Chinese relations through the prism of the SCO] // URL: http://www.ifri.org/files/Russie/Ifri_RNV_Aris_CHOS_RUS.pdf (accessed: 10.10.2022)
7. Armed Conflict Location and Event Data. URL: <https://www.acleddata.com/dashboard/> (accessed: 24.11.2021);
8. BCG Redrawing the Map of Global Trade. URL: <https://www.bcg.com/publications/2020/redrawing-the-map-of-global-trade?> (accessed: 15.01.2022).
9. Brief history of the Uyghurs. URL: <https://www.oocities.org/idonkari/Brief%20History%20of%20the%20Uyghers.htm> (accessed: 05.05.2023)

10. Bernstein D. Беларусь вступает в ШОС. Как Китай может помочь Лукашенко? [Belarus is joining the SCO. How can China help Lukashenko?] *Deutsche Welle*. URL: <https://www.dw.com/ru/belarus-vstupayet-v-sos-cem-kitaj-mozet-pomoc-lukasenko/a-66222228> (accessed: 08.08.2022)
11. BP Energy outlook 2020. 14 September 2020. URL: <https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/news-and-insights/press-releases/bp-energy-outlook-2020.html> (accessed: 01.09.2021);
12. BRI: clarifying the path and expanding the belt. [Electronic resource] // URL: <https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2019/05/03/odin-poyas-odin-put-utochnenie-puti-i-rasshirenie-poyasa> (accessed: 03.05.2023)
13. Chinese Internet Information Center. URL: <http://www.china.com.cn/index.shtml>. (accessed: 19.04.2023)
14. Central Asia Military Exercises Database // URL: <https://oxussociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Central-Asia-Military-Exercises-Database.xlsx> (accessed: 02.03.2023)
15. Council of Heads of SCO States. *Secretariat of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization*. URL: http://rus.sectsco.org/about_sco/20190715/564695.html (accessed: 22.10.2021)
16. China Daily Global. Bilateral relations between China, Kazakhstan get new push // URL: <http://epaper.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202309/15/WS65039388a31020d7c67bca45.html#:~:text=In%202022%2C%20the%20volume%20of,Asian%20country%20a%20transit%20hub.> (accessed: 19.10.2023)
17. “China's neighbourhood policy”. *European Council on Foreign Relations. Asia Centre*. URL: http://www.ecfr.eu/page//China_Analysis_China_s_Neighbourhood_Policy_February_2014.pdf (accessed: 25.03.2022)
18. China pays great attention to relations with Kazakhstan- Xi Jinping. URL: <https://sputnik.kz/20220914/qytay-qazaqstanmen-qarym-qatynas-27584787.html> (accessed: 05.11.2022)
19. CIS Internet Portal. *Integration Space: Official website*. 2022. URL: <https://e-cis.info> (accessed: 30.01.2023)
20. Communique of the XIII session of the SCO Forum. URL: <https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=http://en.sco->

- russia.ru/load/1013273717&ved=2ahUKEwiLutzMuKqFAxU_hv0HHVJuDccQFnoE
CB8QAQ&usg=AOvVaw0KjZ75ZxzpQSa1_nTOQDL9 (accessed: 04.11.2022).
21. CSTO- official web page. URL: <https://en.odkb-csto.org/25years/?ysclid=lm2asecnls315339619> (accessed: 02.02.2022)
 22. Council of Heads of Government. URL: http://rus.sectsco.org/about_sco/20190715/564700.html (accessed: 29.03.2023)
 23. Deng Hao. 20 years of the SCO: Development, Experience and Future Direction. *China Insitute of International Studies*. 2021. URL: https://www.ciis.org.cn/english/ESEARCHPROJECTS/Articles/202112/t20211203_8276.html (accessed: 08.08.2022)
 24. Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Republic of Kazakhstan. URL: <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/rus/wjdt/> (accessed: 29.04.2023)
 25. Expert: "One Belt, One Road" has become a breakthrough project for Kazakhstan URL: <https://informburo.kz/stati/ekspert-odin-poyas-odin-put-stal-dlya-kazaxstana-proryvny-m-proektom?ysclid=lo941jrv4j611610384>
 26. Foreign Trade CIS. Functions of the Division. *Government of India. Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Department of Commerce*. The data of the Indian Commerce and Industry Ministry // URL: <https://commerce.gov.in/about-us/divisions/foreign-trade-territorial-division/foreign-trade-cis/?hilite=%27kazakhstan%27> (accessed: 01.08.2023)
 27. Free Trade Zone with China Is Disastrous for Russia (In Russ.) // URL: <https://riafan.ru/489921-grigorev-kitai-hochet-sdelat-iz-rossii-fabrichnyi-pridatok> (accessed: 05.06.2023).
 28. Global Terrorism Database. URL: <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/> (accessed: 24.01.2021);
 29. India-Russia-China Explore Alternative to SWIFT Payment Mechanism. *The Economic Times*. November 14, 2019. URL: <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/india-russia-china-explore-alternative-to-swift-payment-mechanism/articleshow/72048472.cms> (accessed: 29.09.2021]
 30. International Monetary Fund: official website. — URL: <https://www.imf.org/> (accessed: 31.01.2023)

31. Iran and Saudi Arabia agree to restore ties after China-brokered talks. URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/10/iran-saudi-arabia-agree-restore-ties-china-talks> (accessed: 31.01.2024)
32. Information message on the results of the meeting of the Council of Heads of Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Astana, June 8-9, 2017. URL: <http://rus.sectesco.org/news/20170609/289250> (accessed: 05.06.2023).
33. Кныазев А.А.: Хорошо забытые трансафганские проекты. *ИА-Центр* [Well-forgotten trans-Afghan projects. IA Center]. 11.08.2023. URL: <https://ia-centr.ru/experts/aleksandr-knyazev/khorosho-zabytye-transafganskije-proekty-aleksandr-knyazev/> (date of request: 12.12.2023);
34. Кныазев А.А.: Откуда исходят угрозы безопасности Центральной Азии. *ИА-Центр* [Where do the threats to the security of Central Asia come from? IA Center]. 27.05.2023. URL: <https://ia-centr.ru/experts/aleksandr-knyazev/knyazev-otkuda-iskhodyat-ugrozy-bezopasnost-dlya-tsentralnoy-azii/> (accessed: 12.12.2023).
35. Kucera J. (2015) State Department Downplays ISIS Threat in Central Asia / Bug Pit (blog) / EurasiaNet. 2015, June 12 / URL: <http://www.eurasianet.org/node/73836>
36. Koenkozov S. Центральная Азия: Раздолье для демократических фантазий [Central Asia: Expanse for democratic fantasies.]. Snob.kg. 2016, 8 дек. / URL: <http://snob.kg/labirint/pro-svobodu/item/306-tsa-razdole-dlya-demokraticeskikh-fantazij> (Accessed: 01.01.2020) (Koenkozov, S. Central Asia: Expanse for democratic fantasies. Snob.kg. 2016, 8 Dec.)
37. 55 Kazakh - Chinese projects worth \$27 billion will be implemented. [Electronic resource]. - URL: <https://www.zakon.kz/4969716-budut-realizovany-55-kazahstansko.html> (accessed: 14.05.2023)
38. Legal dictionary. 2000 // URL: <http://dic.academic.ru/dic.nsf/lower/15381> (access: 01.04.2023)
39. Litovkin V. 'CSTO and SCO - in harness'. *RIA Novosti*. 2006, URL: <http://www.rian.ru/analyt-ics/20060619/49717716.html> (access 19.03.2021)
40. McIntosh N. Lavrov: Moscow is Open to Dialogue with the West, Not a Threat // URL: https://www.newsdelivers.com/2023/08/25/lavrov-moscow-is-open-to-dialogue-with-the-west-not-a-threat/#google_vignette (accessed: 23.01.2024)
41. Meeting of the SCO SNC chaired by Tajikistan. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan*. URL: <https://mfa.tj/ru/main/view/8074/zasedanie-snc-shop-pod-predsedatelstvom-tadzhikistana> (accessed: 08.10.2022).

42. Ministry Of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit. URL: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gjhdqzz_681964/lhg_683094/jbqk_683096/201404/t20140430_9388210.shtml (accessed: 29.10.2023)
43. Min Zh. Генсек ШОС: цели и принципы нашей организации получили широкое признание [SCO Secretary General: the goals and principles of our organization have been widely recognized]. *TASS News Agency*. URL: https://tass.ru/interviews/14158013?utm_source=yxnews&utm_medium=desktop&utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fyandex.ru%2Fnews%2Fsearch%3Ftext%3D (accessed: 12.09.2023)
44. Musharraf P.: Pakistan intends to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Interview cor. *RIA Novosti and ITAR-TAS*. URL: <http://www.lenta.ru/world/musharraf.htm> (access:02.02.2022).
45. National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook 2013, Population at Year-End By Region (2013) URL: <http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2013/html/Z0305E.xls>. (accessed: 01.09.2021).
46. Neutral Countries. 2024. URL: <https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/neutral-countries> (accessed: 23.01.2024)
47. National Material Capabilities (v5.0). The Correlates of War Project. URL: <http://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/national-material-capabilities> (accessed: 25.06.2022).
48. Pepe Escobar. The SCO summit of Asian power players delineated a “road map” for strengthening the multipolar world. *Geopolitika.ru*. URL: <https://www.geopolitika.ru/en/article/sco-summit-asian-power-players-delineated-road-map-strengthening-multipolar-world?ysclid=lm3oswqp5d520449825> (accessed: 23.09.2022)
49. "Practical Seminar of the SCO RATS on the topic "SECURING THE BORDERS OF CYBERSPACE", organized by the Secretariat of the National Security Council of India", December 15, 2022, <https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1883880> (accessed: 15.12.2021)
50. Promote the construction of a closer community of destiny of the SCO”, People's Daily Online, http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2022-09/13/nw.D110000renmrb_20220913_2-03.html (accessed: 06.12.2022). (in chinese)

51. Regulation on the Status of Observer to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization // URL: <https://www.google.com/url?sa=i&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=0CDkQw7AJahcKEwjQzZnnnICBAxUAAAAAHQAAAAAQAw&url=http%3A%2F%2Feng.sectsco.org%2Fload%2F197725%2F&psig=AOvVaw2w0yqUWK7c8ieZslUfGcNY&ust=1693342039149205&opi=89978449> (accessed: 08.08.2022)
52. Regional Anti-terrorist Structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. URL: <https://ecrats.org/ru/> (accessed: 12.12.2022).
53. RATS SCO URL: <https://ecrats.org/glavnaya-stranica/> (accessed: 06.09.2022).
54. SCO can contribute to solving current problems – president. URL: https://sputnik.kz/20220916/shyu-qazirgi_zamannyn-ozekti-maselelerin-sheshuge-ules-qosuga-tiis--prezident-27631960.html (accessed: 05.12.2022)
55. Socio-political website about the activities of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. URL: <http://infoshos.ru> (accessed: 10.08.2023)
56. SCO development banks will adopt a new strategy of interbank unification in the fall of 2021. TASS. URL: <https://tass.ru/ekonomika/11395189> (accessed: 12.12.2022).
57. SCO Business Council. URL: <https://bcsc.ru> (accessed: 02.09.2021).
58. Six Countries to Join SCO. *LENTA.RU Rambler&Co.* — 2022. — URL: <https://lenta.ru/news/2022/09/13/shos/> (accessed: 30.01.2023)
59. SCO countries have approved a "blacklist" of terrorist organizations, 04.04.2006//<http://www.pr.kg/n/detail.php?id=6708> (May 21, 2006)
60. Speech by Chinese President XI Jinping in the Council of people's representatives of Indonesia. URL: <https://rus.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/ydylzt.htm> (accessed: 21.12.2022)
61. Statement of the Council of Heads of Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on Ensuring International Energy Security // URL: <http://www.kremlin.ru/supplement/5845> (accessed: 29.03.2023)
62. The list of organizations recognized as terrorist and extremist in the Member States Collective Security Treaty Organization. [https:// antiterror.odkb-csto.org/terror_orgs/](https://antiterror.odkb-csto.org/terror_orgs/) (accessed: 22.01.2024)
63. The SCO member states agreed on the need to form a coordination structure to combat drug trafficking. URL: <http://www.scosummit.org/> (accessed: 21.05.2022)
64. The SCO has received applications from 16 countries to join the organization. URL: <https://ria.ru/20201109/shos-1583750577.html> (accessed: 09.11.2022]
65. The. SCO Interbank Consortium. URL: https://ru.qaz.wiki/wiki/SCO_Interbank_Consortium (accessed: 29.07.2023)

66. The Silk Road Fund official web page // URL: <http://www.silkroadfund.com.cn> (accessed: 12.05.2023)
67. The World Bank. Logistics Performance Index (LPI) // URL: <https://lpi.worldbank.org/international/global> (accessed: 19.10.2023)
68. Tokayev called on SCO to strengthen cooperation in military-political sphere. URL: <https://sputnik.kz/20220916/toqaev-shyu-da-askeri-sayasi-yntymaqtastyq-27636417.html> (accessed: 05.11.2022)
69. "The SCO Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure approves measures to counter threats emanating from terrorist groups operating from Afghanistan," ANI, October 14, 2022, <https://www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/scos-regional-anti-terrorism-structure-approves-measures-to-counter-threats-posed-by-terror-groups-operating-from-Afghanistan-20221014152014/> (accessed: 09.03.2023)
70. Uighurstan (East Turkestan). URL: <http://karty.narod.ru/maps/uygh/uygh.html> (accessed: 17.03.2023)
71. Urban Planning Society. Chinese companies are contributing to the energy transformation of Kazakhstan // URL: <https://en.planning.org.cn/belt/view?id=1062> (accessed: 08.09.2023)
72. UCDP Dataset Download Center // Uppsala Conflict Data Program. URL: <https://www.ucdp.uu.se/downloads/> (accessed: 25.06.2022);
73. Visit of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Mikhail Gorbachev to the People's Republic of China, May 15-18, 1989: documents and materials. *Moscow: Politizdat*, 1989. 61 p .; Speech at the SCO summit in an expanded format URL: <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/54739> (accessed: 29.09.2022);
74. Vorobyov V.: Развитие ШОС. *Interview cor. RIA Novosti*. URL: <http://www.dni.ru/news/russia/2004/10/13/22604.html> (access: 23.01.2023).
75. University of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. URL: <http://uni-sco.ru> (accessed: 05.09.2021).
76. Webster's Dictionary named the word of the Year https://news.rambler.ru/world/45337388/?utm_content=news_media&utm_medium=read_more&utm_source=copylink (accessed: 07.12.2022).
77. Weitzel R. ИГИЛ – не религиозная организация. Ислам в СНГ [ISIS is not a religious organization. Islam in the CIS.]. 2015, 26 янв. / URL:

- <http://www.islamsng.com/kgz/report/8608>.(Accessed: 01.01.2020) (Weitzel R. (2015) ISIS is not a religious organization. Islam in the CIS. 2015, 26 Jan.)
78. Wu Jiao, Li Xiaokun: Cooperation contracts worth \$2 billion will be signed within the framework of the SCO summit // <http://www.gazeta.kz/art.asp?aid=76824> (June 2016)]. In 2010, the SCO approved the procedure for admitting new members. (June 12, 2019). "The SCO agrees to the expansion." *China Daily*. Archived from the original on June 17, 2010.
79. World Economic Outlook database: April 2023 // URL: <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2023/April/download-entire-database> (accessed: 23.05.2023)
80. XI Jinping's speech at Nazarbayev University (full text). URL: <http://kz.chineseembassy.org/chn/zhgx/zxdt/t1074174.htm> (accessed: 20.10.2023)
81. Xinhua news: Overview: China and Kazakhstan join hands to build "Belt and Road" and bear fruit // URL: http://www.news.cn/world/2023-05/18/c_1129624141.htm (accessed: 08.06.2023)
82. Xinhua news // URL: <http://news.cn> (accessed: 15.12.2022).
83. Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. URL: https://www.wikiwand.com/ru/Синьцзян-Уйгурский_автономный_район (accessed: 10.08.2023)
84. Xuanzun L.: Chinese troops start joint anti-terrorism drill In Peace Mission, 'displays capability to safeguard regional peace'. *Global Times*. URL: <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202109/1234029.shtml> (accessed: 28.09.2021)
85. "30 years of Diplomatic Relations between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the People's Republic of China: from formation to strategic partnership") Collection of materials of the scientific conference, 23 december, 2021, pp. 91-95 // URL: <https://dku.kz/content/Сборник%20материалов%20науч.%20конф.%202023.12.2021.pdf> (accessed: 25.04.2023)
86. Вестник МОТ: COVID-19 и сфера труда. Седьмой выпуск. Обновленные оценки и анализ [Bulletin of the ILO: COVID-19 and the field of work. The seventh issue. Updated estimates and analysis] 25 January, 2021 // URL: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---europe/---ro-geneva/---sro-moscow/documents/briefingnote/wcms_767671.pdf (accessed: 25.05.2022)
87. Генсек ШОС: цели и принципы нашей организации получили широкое признание [SCO Secretary General: the goals and principles of our organization have been widely recognized] // URL:

- <https://tass.ru/interviews/14158013?ysclid=lta2f4hvru48749436> (accessed: 23.04.2023)
88. Дипломаты России и Китая рассказали об истории создания ШОС [Diplomats of Russia and China talked about the history of the creation of the SCO] // URL: <https://ria.ru/20170424/1492950144.html?ysclid=lj64jzaybn839397896> (accessed: 25.04.2023)
89. Ду Дэвэнь: Наши страны нацелены на расширение сотрудничества [Our countries are aimed at expanding cooperation]. URL: <https://agro.kg/ru/news/24907/?ysclid=ll6zv6kv86515028944> (accessed: 10.07.2023)
90. ЕАЭС и БРИКС проработают создание универсальной платежной системы и независимых международных институтов [The EAEU and BRICS will work on the creation of a universal payment system and independent international institutions]. *Eurasian Economic Integration*. URL: <https://eec.eaeunion.org/news/eaes-i-briks-prorobotayut-sozdanie-universalnoy-platezhnoy-sistemy-i-nezavisimyykh-mezhdunarodnykh-in/> (accessed: 31.01.2023)
91. Институты и механизмы партнерства цивилизаций и объединений на всем Евразийском пространстве [Institutions and mechanisms of partnership of civilizations and associations throughout the Eurasian space] // URL: https://eurasianeconomic.org/news_ecco/2017/12/22/document3184.phtml?ysclid=ltaed2dxih290052252 (accessed: 23.04.2023)
92. Казахстан готовится принять председательство в ШОС в этом году [Kazakhstan is preparing to assume the SCO presidency this year] // URL: https://bizmedia.kz/2023/02/21/_trashed-11/?ysclid=lj7mkn13rv486119221 (accessed: 05.03.2023)
93. Лавров назвал условие разрешения конфликта на Украине [Lavrov called the condition for resolving the conflict in Ukraine] // URL: <https://www.rbc.ru/politics/05/05/2023/6454b7ff9a79473f224af4a7?ysclid=lta1665m9z101262369&from=copy> (accessed: 23.01.2024)
94. Межгосударственное объединение БРИКС [The BRICS Interstate Association]. *Bank of Russia*. URL: <https://www.cbr.ru/today/ms/smo/brics/> (accessed: 30.01.2023)
95. Перспективы продвижения деловой повестки дня деятельности ШОС на новом этапе развития. (Prospects for advancing the SCO business agenda at a new stage of development) *St. Petersburg International Economic Forum*. URL:

- <https://forumspb.com/news/news/perspektivy-prodvizhenija-delovoj-povestki-dnja-dejatelnosti-shos-na-novom-etape-razvitiya/?lang=ru> (accessed: 29.03.2023)
96. Протокол о взаимопонимании между РАТС ШОС и ОДКБ подписан в Астане [The Protocol of Understanding between the SCO and CSTO RATS was signed in Astana.]. *RIA News*. 2011. URL: <http://ria.ru/politics/20110614/388199720.html> (accessed: 19.03.2021)
97. Произошел хлопок. Новые санкции США бьют по легкой промышленности Китая, но неизвестно, помогают ли уйгурам [There was a bang. New US sanctions are hitting China's light industry, but it is unknown whether the Uighurs are being helped] URL: <https://mediazona.ca/article/2022/07/20/ussanctions?ysclid=115r6zo86r710364708> (accessed: 09.06.2023)
98. Совецание по экономическим вопросам [Meeting on economic issues] *Russian Government*. URL: <http://government.ru/news/49940/> (accessed: 31.10.2023)
99. Товарооборот между Ираном и ШОС за 11 месяцев вырос более чем на 18%. [Trade turnover between Iran and the SCO has increased by more than 18 in 11 months%] *Russian News Agency*. URL: https://iran.ru/news/economics/122511/Tovarooborot_mezhdu_Iranom_i_ShOS_za_11_mesyacev_vyros_bolee_chem_na_18 (accessed: 01.08.2023)
100. Что это за организация ШОС и зачем Беларусь хочет стать ее членом. [What kind of SCO organization is this and why does Belarus want to become a member of it] *CIS Internet Portal. Integration Space*. URL: <https://e-cis.info/news/566/103312/?ysclid=lhao60njvu695017079> (accessed: 21.09.2022)
101. Чжан Мин: странам ШОС комфортно сосуществовать друг с другом. [The SCO countries are comfortable working with each other] *Russia Today*. — 2023. — URL: <https://ria.ru/20230105/shos-1843074885.html> (accessed: 29.01.2023)
102. ШОС через призму приоритетных перспектив председательства Казахстана [SCO through the prism of priority prospects of Kazakhstan's chairmanship] // URL: <https://articlekz.com/article/10165?ysclid=lj7n4di7d3517534891> (accessed: 05.03.2023)
103. 上海合作组织机构 [The structure of the SCO]. *SCO official website*. URL <http://chn.sectsco.org/structure/> (accessed: 28.02.2022)

104. 中哈（连云港）物流合作基地累计到发中欧班列 5000 列(The China-Kazakhstan (Lianyungang) Logistics Cooperation Base has delivered a total of 5,000 trains to China and Europe) Gu Hua, Zhu Xiaoying. China News Network // URL: <https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/p/310902.html> (accessed:01.04.2023)
105. 肩负和平使命 共护友谊之舟——写在“和平使命-2021”上合组织联合反恐军演落幕之际 [Shoulder the mission of peace and protect the boat of friendship together-written on the occasion of the "Mission of Peace-2021" SCO joint anti-terrorism military exercise] Mei Shixiong. Xinhua News Agency // URL: <http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/jsxd/ly/4895536.html> (accessed: 12.12.2021)
106. “和平使命-2018”：两大亮点值得关注 [“Peace Mission-2018”：Two highlights worth paying attention] China National Defense News // URL: http://m.xinhuanet.com/mil/2018-08/24/c_129939733.htm (accessed: 09.12.2019) (in Chinese)

LIST OF THE AUTHOR'S PUBLICATIONS

Book

The role of Kazakhstan in the SCO, Chişinău, Kisjenő, Moldova : Eliva Press (2023) , 52.p.

Articles

1. The problem of Uighur separatism in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization - NATIONAL SECURITY REVIEW: PERIODICAL OF THE MILITARY NATIONAL SECURITY SERVICE 2023: 2 pp. 33-54. Paper: 19, 20 p. (2023)
2. The Role of Kazakhstan in the SCO - In: Kiss, Rebeka (eds.) *Critical Rethinking of Public Administration 2023 – Book of Abstracts* Bp, Hungary : Association of Hungarian PHD and DLA Students (2023) 27 p. pp. 11-11. , 1 p.
3. Comparing the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Collective Security Treaty Organization - In: Szelei, Ildikó (eds.) A hadtudomány és a 21. század 2023 Bp, Hungary : Association of Hungarian PHD and DLA Students, Colorcom Media Kft. (2023) 215 p. pp. 143-153. Paper: 10, 11 p.
4. Riot or Regime-Change Attempt in Kazakhstan: Causes and Consequences - The Eurasia Series Regional Integration in Eurasia 2022 pp. 57-74., 18 p. (2022)
5. Economic Mobilization Measures for the COVID-19 Pandemic in the SCO member states - In: Szelei, Ildikó (eds.) A hadtudomány és a 21. század 2021 Bp, Hungary : Association of Hungarian PHD and DLA Students, Colorcom Media Kft. (2021) 276 p. pp. 210-235., 26 p.
6. Implementing the Belt and Road Initiative in Kazakhstan - In: Baráth, Noémi Emőke; Pató, Viktória Lilla (eds.) A haza szolgálatában: Konferenciakötet 2019 Bp, Hungary : Association of Hungarian PHD and DLA Students (2020) 322 p. pp. 286-295. , 10 p.
7. Extremism in the Central Asian Countries and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization - In: Kovács, Petra; Pollák, Orsolya Luca (eds.) A hadtudomány és a 21. század 2020 Bp, Hungary: DOSZ Hadtudományi Osztály (2020) pp. 175-191. , 16 p.
8. The twenty-year-old Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Security, Economic and Cultural Cooperation - In: Baráth, Noémi Emőke; Kovács, Petra; Novák-Varró, Virág; Urbanovics, Anna (eds.) A Haza szolgálatában Bp, Hungary: Association of Hungarian PHD and DLA Students (2021) 270 p. pp. 111-127., 17 p.

9. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization 20th anniversary summit meeting - Challenges and Prospects - In: Kiss, Rebeka; Urbanovics, Anna (eds.) A haza szolgálatában : Konferenciakötet 2021 Bp, Hungary : Association of Hungarian PHD and DLA Students (2022) 208 p. pp. 77-90. , 14 p.
10. China and Kazakhstan relationships at Shanghai Cooperation Organization – In: The Fourth Republic scientific – practical conference for young scholars “Young Scientists: Dialogue of the Science and the Education”. Almati, Алматы, Kazakhstan: Kazakh Abylai Khan University of International Relations and World Languages (2017) pp. 277-284., 7 p.
11. The Government of Kazakhstan & Its migration policy: to deal with the problem – Chinese scientific journal (in Chinese), pp. 31-35., 5 p. (2016) Volume 23, Country: China.